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WKU Honors Program

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Student Honors Research Bulletin 1992-1993



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Foreword

We present the 1992-1993 edition of *Student Honors Research Bulletin* with pride. Since we wanted the *Bulletin* to present the best examples of serious and sustained scholarship by Western students, the selected papers are typically longer and more thorough than in earlier years. Three senior Honors theses are included; all other papers were written for advanced courses. As in earlier years, the papers selected for publication represent student concerns across a very broad spectrum. Papers on veterinary research, psychological problems, Kentucky literature and history, American and European history, Japanese culture, and current social issues are all included. We hope that each reader will find these papers informative and interesting.

Walker Rutledge of the English faculty and I reviewed all papers submitted for the *Bulletin*. We have chosen those we believe display the best overall scholarship and writing. Unfortunately, other good student papers were received but could not be included.

We commend the authors of these papers for their dedication to excellent research and writing. We hope that the selection of their papers for the *Bulletin* will encourage them to continue to develop their research and writing skills and to write for other publication outlets as well.

Finally, we thank the Western faculty members who contributed their best student papers for consideration. We look forward to receiving many good papers for the 1993-1994 *Bulletin*.

Sam McFarland, Director
University Honors Program

Anglo-Italian Relations During the Unification of Italy, 1859-1860

R. Scott Anderson

The desire for freedom and the struggle for unification preoccupied the peoples of the Italian peninsula during the late nineteenth century. Through the leadership of a brilliant prime minister, the patriotism of a true Italian, and the fervor of the Italian people for a united nation, efforts to oust the Austrians and to create one unified state were successful. From the fall of the Roman Empire, the direction of political events in the Italian peninsula had essentially been controlled by the other powers of Europe, and this unfortunate fact was to play a major part in the Italian unification. The Italians, eager for friends to support their cause, found in Great Britain a willing though somewhat silent partner. While not the only major power involved in the development of the Italian state, Great Britain's tacit approval and her pro-Italian sympathies proved to be of great importance in the unification of Italy. This support, however unplanned and dictated by changing events, has been unfortunately overlooked by many scholars.

A veritable playground for the warring powers of Europe, the Italian peninsula offered a wide variety of desired assets. The northern provinces of the Po River valley, an area greatly coveted for its abundant manpower and significant economies, became the battleground for many French and Austrian armies struggling for control of these small kingdoms. In the south, the natural harbors at Naples, Taranto, and Palermo on the isle of Sicily were of vital importance, particularly to Spain, France, and England, each intent on control of the rich trade lanes of the Mediterranean Basin. Because of the great outside interest and Italy's own inability (and unwillingness) to consolidate, the peninsula suffered centuries of foreign domination.

After the fall of Emperor Napoleon of France in 1815, a very hopeful Italy sent her envoys to the Congress of Vienna. There the fate of these kingdoms would be determined, for with Napoleon expelled from the continent a significant power vacuum was created, and each state wished to carve its own independent niche in the new power structure. Some of the Italian leaders wanted considerable autonomy, and others, such as the Pope, wanted a return to their own form of "enlightened despotism." The Congress of Vienna, however, was to once again give an outside nation the dominant

stance over the Italian states. During the years of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the French had for the most part held the upper hand in the peninsula. Dividing the peninsula into eight parts, the Congress of Vienna gave the rich kingdoms of Lombardy and Venetia to the Hapsburgs of Austria. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, composed of Naples and Sicily, was restored to the Bourbons. Piedmont shared the north with the Austrian holdings (Venetia and Lombardy) and with the smaller states of Tuscany, the Papal magnate, Modena, Parma, and Lucca (King 13). Austrian princes ruled Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and King Ferdinand I of Naples signed a treaty of alliance with the Hapsburgs. Thus, from its position of strength, Austria would play a major role in the next half-century of Italian history.

Once back on their respective thrones, the semi-independent kingdoms set about undoing the social changes introduced by the French. Those conservative monarchies, intent on retaining their powers, felt the French had disrupted the hierarchy of Italian social order, and they quickly denounced liberal ideas.¹ A reinstatement of Catholic education stemmed their fears of revolution. In truth, these reforms, made with the intent of restoring monarchical and ducal power, were not all greeted adversely by the people, as these new monarchs were on the whole far from despotic or tyrannical (King 18).

The mark of Napoleon's impact upon Italy would not easily be forgotten, however, and the embodiment of liberalism and progressive change came to focus under Italian secret societies, perhaps the most important being the Carbonari. This secret organization, formed of middle class workers, intellectuals, and veterans of Napoleon's army, sought increased liberty, less powerful monarchies, and constitutions guaranteeing the rights of individuals. The Carbonari were particularly strong in Naples, where much of the army and many of the businesses had profited under Napoleon and his captain-king, Joachim Murat. Although these liberals did manage to force Ferdinand into issuing a constitution in 1820, the Carbonari truly had little support, and the constitution became an ideological point rather than a document of worth and substance (Mack-Smith *Italy* 37). The Carbonari, though perhaps the only link of continuing liberalism

between Napoleon's expulsion to the unification later that century, served rather as one example of the societal struggle which only made Italy more easily dominated by other powers.

Despite this resurgent strength of conservatism and Austrian overlordship, there were continuing, albeit small, signs of liberalism. Between 1815 and 1848, the focus of revolutionary ideology came together in Giuseppe Mazzini. Born of a middle-class family in Turin, this patriot was the foremost intellectual not only on Italian unity but possibly on the subject of nationalism throughout all of Europe as well. He acted as the great propagandist, a pamphleteer who aroused the young Italians (the most liberal of all Italian groups) to a frenzy, and instigated revolution wherever he could. His role in the attempted overthrow of Charles Felix of Piedmont led him to be sentenced to death in absentia in 1821. He fled Italy to reside in exile on the British Isles, where he continued to devote his considerable talent to revolutionary dogma (Mack-Smith *Italy* 41). It was while in route to England that Mazzini first met another young patriot, Giuseppe Garibaldi, also fleeing Piedmont. Garibaldi, greatly impressed by Mazzini's ideas, was to play a critical role in the successful unification in later years.

Mazzini's beliefs were absolute. He felt that the executions of young reactionists in Italy by the governments of Austria, Piedmont, and Rome would only serve to make the deceased men martyrs for the cause. He theorized that in this way the Risorgimento would grow. "One cannot execute ideas," he stated, "but ideas ripen quickly when they are nourished by the blood of martyrs" (Mack-Smith *Italy* 41).

Mazzini's feelings and activities withstanding, the revolutions that did occur in Italy were weak and uncoordinated. The revolt of Romagna in 1831 against the Papal States was an excellent example. Put down quickly by the Austrians, this attempt at autonomy was virtually still-born, mainly due to the fact that the intellectual leadership of the revolt tried to capture the hearts of the people with academic reasons for revolution, ignoring the very real spiritual aspect of the revolt. The populace, faced with ideology they could not "feel," soon cooled toward the revolt, and without their support the leaders quailed in the face of adversity (King 124). However, one important aspect of these early insurrections was that, despite their weakness, a common call to arms was heard in each case....an innate hatred of the Austrian domination. This

disaffection was to grow through the 30's and 40's and became the tool for other revolutionaries to continue their work.

Italy's most important early attempt at throwing off the yoke of monarchical tyranny and foreign rule was the famous revolt of 1848. Throughout the decade of the 40's unrest had grown, particularly in the backward Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Nobles, priests, and the king combined to set back the clock to the days of divine right and serfdom. Government oppression had taken its toll for too long, and it was in this kingdom that the first new spark of rebellion took place. On the isle of Sicily, in its largest city, Palermo, the mafia, disaffected poor, and the outlying brigands rose in singular revolt against the Neapolitan government. A surprising victory was won by this motley collection, and the Neapolitan troops fled in disarray.

Other events occurred which helped induce the revolutionary fire. The conservative government of Metternich in Vienna was toppled and a constitution was created in Austria. Reacting to this startling development, Charles Albert of Piedmont, never a liberal but a firm believer in Italian unity, granted a constitution for his own country, and he called upon all Italians to join the "war of liberation." Mazzini, returning from England, helped to overthrow the government in Rome and created a republic, over which he was the most important and able leader. In Naples, reacting to the distressing news from Palermo, King Ferdinand II issued a second constitution, just as his father had done, hoping that this would stem the tide of rebellion.

Though the revolt seemed to be underway and initially succeeded, it was destined to fail, for politics and personal ambitions began to fragment the effort. Austrian forces rallied to defeat those of Piedmont, and Charles Albert fled to Turin and ultimately abdicated. The rebellion began to lose its impetus. Mazzini, faced with a sudden desertion by Pope Pius IX, who now condemned what he originally supported, tried to unite his forces with those of Tuscany, but he too failed. His republic, deemed by the great English diplomat Lord Palmerston as "far better than any government Rome has had for centuries" (Holt 165), was defended ably by Garibaldi and his troops, but in time the mass of Austrian troops began to tell and Mazzini had to flee again to England, while Garibaldi was exiled to Tangiers. The rebellion in Venice fell next, and in 1851 the Neapolitans reconquered the Sicilians. The First War of Liberation was over, a victim more to

internal disorder than to counterrevolution.

Once again restored to the status quo, a still divided Italy fell back into the morass of political oppression and foreign interference. A disillusioned Mazzini, crushed by the fall of his ephemeral republic, was uncertain as to whether his life's work would ever come to fruition. But all was not lost. Emerging from the clouded battlefield, the Kingdom of Piedmont, under an able Victor Emmanuel II, was to take the forefront in the fight for unification. Signing a peace treaty with the new Austrian king, Piedmont, with her armies still relatively intact, began a new foreign policy, casting a friendly eye toward non-Austrian powers. It was apparent to the government in Turin that unification could not come about without the help of foreign administrations, and the policy of Piedmont gradually changed to accommodate this view, anticipating that support could be found.

One of the prospective allies from which support was sought by the government of Victor Emmanuel was England. Throughout the years, English policy toward Italy was one of non-committal support. During the Napoleonic Era, Britain had done much to help force the troops of France out of Italy, but after the Congress of Vienna her eyes turned elsewhere for a time. She did send ambassadors to each capital in Italy, and these envoys watched events and dictated English policy. This policy, in the early 19th Century, was somewhat simple. England declined to get very involved in the peninsula but occupied herself more intensely in Turkey and Spain, carefully protecting her control of the Mediterranean trade routes. Her preoccupation with the Spanish Civil War and the Turkish war in Greece showed she was very interested in maintaining some sort of balance in the Mediterranean Basin so that no single power would become too powerful. She did not want anyone interfering with her monopoly on trade. With this in mind, a watchful eye was also cast on the peninsula of Italy.

Overall, Britain's involvement in Italy was not much more than advice and some political maneuvering. The British basically wanted reform for Italy. A demonstration of British interest could be seen in a letter from Lord Palmerston, the new Foreign Secretary for the government of Prime Minister Grey, to a fellow diplomat in 1831. In it, Palmerston, who was to play a vital role in Anglo-Italian relations, referred to the possible Austrian intervention in the Papal legates as "wrong and foolish. It will be impossible to take part with

Austria in a war entered into for the purpose of putting down freedom and maintaining despotism" (Ashley I 239-240). It was mainly due to this diplomatic pressure that the Austrians did back down. These early events marked the renewed British concern for affairs in Italy and also marked the beginning of a growing tension between the English state and the Hapsburg leaders in Vienna.

With the revolutions of 1848, the British were forced to take a sterner view towards the volatile situation in Italy. At first the British watched and advised, hoping to avert war, as the British felt, and rightfully so, that the Italian states would not stand together. Two events greatly hampered their approach. The first was the aforementioned fall of Prince Metternich's conservative government in Austria. The second was the fall of Louis Philippe and the election of Louis Napoleon as President of France.

The relationship between England and France had been, since the fall of Napoleon I, one of cooperation and cautious friendship. The recovering French had not wanted to aggravate England in any way, and, despite a few minor disagreements, their relations had been congenial. But the old hatred and rivalry still simmered at times. England feared the geographic power of France, and any policy decision made by the French that was seen in any way by the British as imperialistic was met with utmost discouragement. Issues such as the French construction of new warships for her Mediterranean fleet caused quite a stir in England (Ashley I 365). However, relations were never cut off.

With the return of a Napoleonic politician to the leadership of the French government, the tension mounted from natural fears. Though not at first, Louis Napoleon did help to seal the coffin on the 1848 revolution by landing French troops at Civite Vecchia, April 24, 1849 (King I 334), with the pretense of helping Austria defeat the Republic of Mazzini. In addition, the newly appointed and very able Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Schwarzenberg made it very clear that Austria was not pleased with Palmerston's pretence to "play Providence," stating "we never pressed him on our advice concerning the affairs of Ireland..." (Ridley 350). Faced with this turn of events, and denounced by The Times in London for aiding Sicilian brigands by allowing British arms manufacturers to sell them weapons (which was later proved to be true), Palmerston, still protesting loudly, was forced to let the issue run its course, and the Italians were beaten into submission.

It was an experience the British politician would not forget.

When the Turin government came forth from this chaos searching for aid, Palmerston was somewhat reluctant to give it. The new administration of Victor Emmanuel II did not ask outright, but rather looked for any concessions toward Italy. Victor Emmanuel was anxious not to test the recovering Piedmont monarchy, fearing that its weakened position could not take another fiasco such as the one brought upon Charles Albert. Piedmont had been greatly discredited during the War of Liberation in 1848. But within the new king's government there were other forces wishing to continue the fight, and at the head of this movement was the Prime Minister appointed in 1852, Count Camille Benso di Cavour.

Because of the Prime Minister's methods, Cavour was not a favorite of the king. But Victor Emmanuel could see that the new minister had considerable skill as a diplomat. Born of a marquis family in Turin during the Napoleonic years, Cavour was an ardent anti-Austrian and envisioned a new unified Italian state with Piedmont at its forefront. He began to implement this policy as soon as he entered office. Cavour enacted laws to strengthen the position of the Parliament in Turin, legal acts which succeeded at that time because of the underlying weakness and lack of faith in the monarchy. Cavour's idea was to weaken the monarchy so that its rule would cease to be so absolute. The Piedmontese Prime Minister also began a policy of thoroughly training young diplomats and military leaders, preparing them for the next move in the struggle for unification (Mack-Smith *Italy* 177). Cavour was neither a radical like Mazzini nor an extreme conservative like his arch-rival in the Parliament, Solaro della Margherita, who felt Piedmont should be an autonomous state but should refrain from joining other Italian states, as this would weaken Piedmont's innate national strength (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 71). Cavour sought to choose a comfortable middle ground where Austria would be expelled from the peninsula while Piedmont held a joint Parliamentary-monarchical rule over her own territories and at least those of northern Italy, if not the entire area. He would not resort to violent Mazzinian revolts, though, if at all possible. Cavour also was certain that secure outside help would be a prerequisite to possible unification, for he felt that Piedmont could not perform the task alone.

Cavour's first important foreign policy step

came with the Crimean War in 1854. Despite the fact that the alliance against Russia at least nominally included Austria, Cavour offered the services of 18,000 Piedmontese troops to Great Britain and France, hoping this would gain recognition for Piedmont and might gain some concessions at the peace conference that would surely follow. By following this course, Cavour's state might be able to make some land claims toward Lombardy and Venetia. The great difficulty lay in the extent of Austrian involvement. Were she actually to commit soldiers to the field of combat against Russia, her status at the peace table would potentially be too dominant for any such bargaining. In addition, public opinion in Turin was strongly against any involvement in a war in which Piedmont would fight alongside the hated Austrian overlords (Holt 190).

Despite the sheer recklessness of such a policy, and ignoring its hidden dangers, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour declared war against Russia. But things did not go well for the Italians. Piedmontese troops, 18,000 strong, landed too late to be of any effect, and more than 2,000 died of disease. More importantly, Austria's actual intervention in the war brought it to a close sooner than anticipated, and Austrian delegates took a major role at the peace conference. It seemed as if Cavour's impetuous policy was a complete failure, but this was perhaps not altogether true.

First, at the Congress of Paris, Cavour did his utmost to speak on behalf of Italian desires, and his voice was heard by most of Europe for the first time. Second, he gained the ear of the British once more, although he misread their intentions. Cavour, for some reason, came away from the congress believing England would be willing to commit herself in a war against Austria to liberate Italy. This was far from the truth. English non-intervention policy, though broken in the case of the Crimean War, still remained in regard to the rest of Europe (Mack-Smith *Italy* 203). In addition, the animosity between England and Austria had greatly decreased. England had no wish at this time to alienate the Hapsburgs, though she still did not agree with all of that nation's policy (King II 18). So, Cavour left Paris with no tangible gains. France and England were both interested in assisting Piedmont, but not in a war. Piedmontese gains at Paris and after the end of the Crimean War were restricted to the great impression Cavour left upon the rest of Europe, in particular on Napoleon III. This was the single most important gain of the whole affair.

Cavour, upset at this dead-end policy, decided to continue to harangue the leaders of Europe for help. He felt certain that Austria could be beaten if any ally could be found, but the outside help must cost Piedmont as little as possible. The ejection of the Austrians was a requirement for any hope of a successful unification, and Cavour's policy reflected this. He gained a possible (albeit unlikely) ally in the recent enemy, Russia, whose ambassador reflected a desire to strike against Austria. This was greatly frowned upon by England, which expressed to Victor Emmanuel and Cavour that such a friendship would be very hypocritical in light of Piedmont's former position against Russia (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 135). England had undergone an unfortunate (at least in the interests of Piedmont) political change as well, in that Lord Derby had been elected Prime Minister, and his conservative government, well liked by Queen Victoria and Parliament, had taken over in February 1858. This boded ill for Anglo-Italian relations, for Lord Palmerston, serving as the Prime Minister at the time, was now out of power. The new Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, was not unfriendly toward Cavour, but was very cool toward any thought of war against Austria. Facing this disinterest from the British government, Cavour, out of sheer necessity, turned to France.

Emperor Napoleon III, though not nearly as talented as his uncle, was nonetheless an able politician. The peace achieved after the Crimean War, due in part to the intervention of the Austrians, was still considered to be a major achievement for Napoleon III, and it had done much to assuage his considerable pride. Yet he was not content to leave France as just one powerful player in a group of powerful players. Rather, he was as ambitious for overseas imperialism and French dominance in Europe as Cavour was toward a united Italy. Cavour, understanding this completely, began a methodical approach, which was from the start nearly foiled by a near-miss assassination attempt on Napoleon III and Empress Eugenie in Paris on January 15, 1858.

The assassins, as it was later discovered, were led by a former Mazzinian disciple and an ardent revolutionary, Felice Orsini. Seeing that an Italian was involved, Cavour trod his ground carefully. With England's interests briefly shifting elsewhere, Cavour's only hope seemed to be France. At first, the news seemed appreciably grim. Victor Emmanuel's emissary to Paris, General Enrico Della

Rocca, was told by Napoleon III "if nothing is done there (Piedmont), if you cannot find means to muzzle the press, to protect morality and religion, and if you have no police, well, my friendship will cool and I will be forced to close an alliance with Austria" (Whyte 247). He made certain that Della Rocca told his king that at this time France was her only hope, and that Piedmont must do everything necessary in his (the emperor's) eyes to right this wrong (Whyte 247).

It was Victor Emmanuel, and not Cavour, who responded to Napoleon's message. Sending Della Rocca back to Napoleon III with a letter addressed to the Italian ambassador (which Della Rocca diligently let Napoleon read), Victor Emmanuel denounced his ties with England (which he did not really mean but merely proclaimed out of expediency) and stated that France did not have the right to abuse such a faithful ally, one that only wanted to be a friend. The effect was immediate. Napoleon III, waiting for an adequate excuse to pursue a pro-Italian policy, was won over by the honesty and bravery of Victor Emmanuel, and he declared that he was now ready to support Italy in her struggle against Austria (Whyte 249).

Cavour, delighted, was determined to iron out the details himself, and his famous "secret" journey to the spa at Plombieres, France, July 20, 1858, was set up to do just that. Using a false passport, he traveled to Plombieres and met Napoleon III for a single day. There the two leaders decided upon their plan and its prerequisites. Napoleon III wanted a loose confederation of Italian states rather than one single nation, and he desired to see his nephew Lucien Murat replacing the inept Ferdinand II in Naples (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 141). He also stated that he would not condone a war if it were an open Mazzinian revolution, for encouraging such a rebellion would get little support from the leaders and people of France. Cavour and Napoleon III then went on to delineate how the war would begin. Beyond retaining the aid of the populace, Napoleon was aware that England would see his own naked aggression as a sure sign of Napoleonic intentions, despite how strongly he would insist that such was not the case. Given the continued strained relations between the two nations, Napoleon's diplomatic maneuvers would almost guarantee a war. So, it was decided that a Mazzinian strategy would be adapted to fit the situation. The city of Massa-Carrara, always in revolt against the leaders in Modena, would be incited to rebel. The city would demand to be

annexed by Piedmont with the movement having been directed by Cavour's agents. Victor-Emmanuel would then demand that the Duke of Modena grant the wishes of the city, and he would threaten the smaller state with armed intervention. The Duke of Modena, an Austrian princeling, would certainly appeal to Austria, which would in turn threaten Piedmont. Victor-Emmanuel would then send troops into Massa-Carrara, thus instigating the war (Whyte 256). In this way, Napoleon III could respond as a defender of freedom, doubly negating English protest and the dissatisfaction of the French people.

The two leaders subsequently decided that Italy would be a loose confederation, with Naples going to Murat, Rome remaining independent, and the states of the north going to Piedmont. Napoleon would provide 200,000 men and most of the needed resources and materiel. In return, France would receive the Piedmontese holdings of Savoy and Nice. To seal the alliance, the Emperor's son, Prince Napoleon, a strong pro-Italian, would wed the eldest daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, Clotilde (King II 49). With this promise, Cavour quickly left Plombieres and met with several emissaries and nobles of Russia and Prussia in order to gauge their feelings. Sensing no hostility toward Italy's freedom, Cavour dispatched a letter to Victor Emmanuel, his words betraying his enthusiasm. "I beg your pardon for the liberty and length of this report. In so important a question I could not be more reserved or more brief. The sentiments which inspire me and my motives will be enough to excuse my conduct" (Letter from Cavour to Victor Emmanuel, July 24, 1858, Mack-Smith *Italy* 247). Cavour shortly returned to Turin to set the gears in motion.

The English were not in any position to do much of anything. When the news of Plombieres broke, Lord Derby's government was in charge, but their strength was by no means solid, as they were recently in power and had as yet proved little of their potential cohesiveness and competence as a government. As a result, much of the administration's attention was directed to internal control, not to Plombieres. So the machinations of Napoleon and Cavour were allowed to continue. But the course of events leading to the fulfillment of the Plombieres agreement was a very rough one, and the progress of Cavour nearly came to a stop.

By the end of January 1859, Europe as a whole was becoming increasingly alerted to the activity in the peninsula. As it became more apparent to the other states that Napoleon III was

going to war soon (through his belligerent attitude toward Austria), the Emperor of France became more reluctant to continue. Cavour, under a tremendous amount of stress, was unsure whether to proceed with his plans. He made appeals to England again, but, as always, Lord Derby's regime felt war should be the last resort. Additionally, the fear of Napoleonic conquest had redoubled after the news of Plombieres, and England began to do all in her power to prevent the planned conflict, though it had taken her some months to react. The stand-offish attitude of the Conservatives began to sway in the Austrian direction. Foreign Secretary Lord Malmesbury sent for Lord Cowley, the British ambassador in Paris, who felt strongly that Cavour was an unprincipled villain (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 153). Malmesbury instructed Cowley to see the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Buol, in Vienna and settle the matter (Malmesbury 466), with the idea of stopping France and retaining the status quo.

It was at this time another shift in the British leadership would render this nation unable to take a more active role in preventing the war, for, with the Italian question occupying the primary position in foreign affairs, the way was paved for the resurgence of Lord Palmerston. Many English leaders on both sides recalled his aggressive policy in keeping in touch with Italian affairs, and he began to gain support from the Radicals, who favored a liberated Italy. Perhaps an even more important issue (at least where England was concerned) also began to affect his fortunes--electoral reform in Parliament. Lord John Russell and others supported Palmerston on the reduction of the property qualification level in the boroughs, and Russell saw this as an opportunity to attack the Conservative government on an issue all the Liberals could support, reform (Ridley 485). A vote was taken in Parliament, and with no clear-cut victor in the issue Lord Derby dissolved the Parliament and called for an election. Reform became the primary issue, but the support of the Italian states was a close second, and on both counts Palmerston had considerable backing.

Meanwhile, Cavour continued to struggle with his own difficulties. Public opinion still supported liberation, but there was a strong opposition to war in the Turin parliament, mainly because the leaders remembered the fiasco of 1848. In addition, Cavour could see that he was going to need the services of Giuseppe Garibaldi, whose skill at guerrilla warfare had been brilliantly displayed in his 1849 defense of Mazzini's Republic. His 'very name served as a

rallying point for many young Italians. Upon hearing of the progressing events in Italy, Garibaldi agreed to aid Piedmont and Cavour, for in Garibaldi's own words, "It was true that his ally (Napoleon) inspired me no confidence, but what was I to do? There was no help for it" (II 69). With that, the patriotic Garibaldi began to get his irregulars together, and Bolton King states that their strength probably numbered around 20,000 before the war began (II 59). For Cavour this was a more delicate matter. Many Piedmontese did not want Garibaldi's irregular forces to help, for they felt they were substandard as military units and would serve only to enhance a Mazzinian revolution. The problem ran deeper for Cavour. He had to balance Garibaldi's capacity as a great leader of men and his ability to recruit manpower from central Italy (giving the entire affair a more national feeling) with the important aspect of total government supervision. The prospect of Garibaldi's gaining too much power was a very real possibility, and Cavour, who was not a great supporter of Garibaldi's ideology, kept a watchful eye on the activities of the patriot (Mack-Smith Cavour 154).

Despite his problems, the Piedmontese Minister continued to prepare the nation for war. He also instructed the Tuscan liberals to try to gain the support of the Duke of Tuscany, who Cavour felt might be a strong ally, but this was to no avail. A lack of interest seemed to prevail over Italy, and Napoleon was not ignorant of it. He therefore declared that he would postpone the war for at least a year. This decision was made in light of increasing pressure from England and Prussia (the latter threatening military intervention on behalf of Austria). Napoleon had not done well in his preparations inside France, either, as the nation continued to demonstrate against war with Austria. Based mainly upon his fear of a potential war with Britain (which was always a concern), the vacillating actions of the emperor served to hearten Austria, whose inept ambassadors (she had not been served well by any member of her foreign service since the untimely death of Schwarzenburg in 1851) felt they had cowed Napoleon into renouncing his decision. This was to be of great importance later. Napoleon's wavering also served to galvanize Cavour into hastening his preparations. Timing was essential, and the longer they waited, the less likely Napoleon would support the plan.

In March, Russia called for a European Congress to settle the issue, and despite attempts by

Austria to prevent Piedmont from attending, Cavour went to the conference in Paris. To prod France into acting, he pulled every trick he knew: from denouncing their pacifism to threatening Napoleon with blackmail (Mack-Smith Cavour 158). Desperately he looked about for anything that would help his position. Nothing was beyond him. He wrongly abused Sir James Hudson, still the English ambassador in Turin, accusing him of egging on the government with false hopes. Cavour had his heart set on war; nothing else would do (or work). He gained nothing from the congress, and he left Paris without any guarantee from Napoleon. He stated to General Lamarmora that although war was going to come, he felt that it would be delayed for some time, and that it might be fought against Prussia as well (Mack-Smith Italy 273), as that German state was seemingly siding with Austria against France.

The situation in the second week of April was still very cloudy. Nothing had really been decided at Paris, but it seemed that both Austria and France were prepared to stand down their forces. Certainly in the rather distracted British government there was a feeling that war was going to be averted. Malmesbury's memoirs state that he was visited by Hudson on April 11. Greatly alarmed that his status as minister had been seemingly ruined by Cavour's cruel remarks, Hudson was yet confident that there would be no war (475), a view not shared by all in Britain, as evidenced by the election debates. Queen Victoria and the Conservatives supported Austria's position, while the re-united liberals, behind Palmerston and Russell, supported Piedmont and, should war come, Napoleon and France as well, albeit reluctantly. First and foremost, the English as a whole still feared the possible Franco-Austrian campaign would be the prelude to a second Napoleonic Era, and by all means this had to be avoided. Trevelyan writes that "hostility for France at this moment dampened our enthusiasm for Italy, just as six months later it served to greatly enhance it" (Garibaldi and the Thousand 79). As for Cavour, he went ahead with his plans, despite British appeals, staunchly refusing to believe that his far-sighted policy would not lead to war.

Just when the situation was at the point of stabilization, the Austrians ineptly brought the house down on themselves. Emperor Francis Joseph was not a distinguished diplomat in any sense, and his foreign ministry was served by incompetents and lackeys who definitely were not of the calibre of Metternich or Schwarzenberg. The man who was

perhaps most at fault was Count Josef von Hubner, the Austrian ambassador to Paris. Hubner met with Napoleon, trying to discern his real motives. The incompetent ambassador agreed whole-heartedly with the English Lord Cowley that Napoleon was ambivalent about going to war, and Hubner, certain that Napoleon would do nothing, urged Francis Joseph to force the issue and to play a more aggressive role (Arrivabene 6). Hubner felt certain Napoleon would do nothing. Francis Joseph listened to Hubner and, influenced not by his uncertain Foreign Minister Buol but rather by the war party in Vienna, he decided to write an ultimatum in which he demanded that Piedmont stand down her army or face armed invasion. The Italian state would have three days to comply. Austrian leadership agreed that Napoleon would follow this course of action and would ask Piedmont to comply in order to save his own reputation (Mack-Smith *Italy* 276).

No one expected this move, and above all not Napoleon III. He had already decided to act. Contrary to the Austrian Minister's incorrect predictions that Napoleon would remain lethargic, the French emperor sent his own recommendation, backed by England, that Piedmont should stand down. Cavour received the message, according to King, as if it were the final move in his losing game of chess (II 67). Then, on April 19, after consulting with Malmesbury, the Austrians sent their message (Whyte 297). The ultimatum arrived on April 23, five days after Napoleon's recommendation. Suddenly everything Cavour had been working for fell into place. The demand, made on a false pretext, came as a welcome shock, and Cavour immediately sent to Massimo d'Azeglio, his emissary in Paris, telling him to inform Napoleon as soon as possible. Azeglio did so, and suddenly, as Cavour and Napoleon had foreseen at Plombieres (only in a slightly different fashion), the aggressor could become the defender of freedom. Because of this serious Austrian faux pas, the way was cleared for Napoleon to come to the rescue of "hapless" Piedmont. Cavour's plans were successful; the war was nigh. Ignoring a frantic appeal from Malmesbury to stop the conflict and wait for outside help to mediate, Cavour sent his message that Piedmont would not yield to the demands of the tyrants in Vienna, and Napoleon declared war on April 29, 1859.

The government in England, still divided, was now faced with creating a successful policy to deal with the new turn of events. Eager to contain the

war to the Po Valley, Malmesbury immediately dispatched a letter through the Prussian minister Kielmansegge to the King of Prussia, declaring that England wished Prussia to remain neutral if at all possible. Prussia complied, declaring they would stay out of it as long as the war was not carried into Austrian territory itself, for they would see this as a violation of the peace of the German Confederation and as a symbol of Napoleon's secret imperialistic desires. Malmesbury instructed Lord Cowley in Paris to ask Napoleon for permission to patrol the Adriatic and Baltic Seas, with emphasis on the Baltic. The reason behind these requests was to keep Britain out of the conflict. If her fleets patrolled the Adriatic, Malmesbury wrote, Austria would be less likely to make any nondescript moves toward any Turkish territory "and so have us into it" (482). The patrol of the Baltic would be a pre-emptive move to possible Prussian aggression in defense of Austria, for if France or even Russia were to blockade the Prussian ports, this "must eventually drag us into the war, as our trade would be ruined" (482). Malmesbury also conferred with Persigny, the new French ambassador to London, who was very alarmed at Prussia's warlike stance. Malmesbury assured him that the actions of the government at Berlin would depend on just how far Napoleon went. Meanwhile, Malmesbury kept in direct touch with the progress of the war through the ever-present James Hudson.

Piedmont was, thanks to the efforts of Cavour and his best generals, Lamarmora and Cialdini, better prepared than either Austria or France. France, for example, had to contend with crossing the Savoyan Alps, where the snows made the passage difficult. Austria, contrary to the leaders in Vienna, was not quite as prepared as they believed. Largely due to Malmesbury's last efforts to prevent the war, the commander of the Austrian armies, Marshal Gyulai, did not move until the day Napoleon declared war. It was believed that a more aggressive commander would have driven forward until his armies held Turin, which could have been done before French troops arrived. As it was, Gyulai dallied at the Ticino River for over a week, allowing great numbers of French troops to cross into Piedmont (Whyte 303).

Meanwhile, the revolts and demonstrations Cavour had largely wanted to avoid began. Some of these revolts called for immediate union with Piedmont, and in Tuscany the Austrian Grand Duke fled. A provisional government was formed, and the

new administrations called for Victor Emmanuel to become their new king. He appointed in his stead certain advisors to the posts of Tuscany, but the situation was very volatile, and these measures were insufficient to stabilize the province. One of the local leaders, Vincenzo Salvagnoli, was so concerned with the situation that he went not to Cavour but directly to Napoleon, who had stated at one time that his son, Prince Jerome Napoleon, would be desirable as the leader of a Central Italian state (Whyte 309). Upon speaking with Salvagnoli, Napoleon dispatched orders for his son to take the French V Army Corps into Tuscany.

This action angered Cavour, who had believed Napoleon might alter the deal they had made at Plombieres, and now he felt he was right. Cavour went to the French emperor and demanded an explanation, but Napoleon's evasive remarks did not satisfy him. Napoleon's intentions were not clear; he might not have wanted to set up Prince Napoleon as ruler in Tuscany, but he certainly did not want the Piedmontese to annex the area (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 166). The damage had been done, and the falling out between Cavour and Napoleon had begun.

The war progressed in favor of France and Piedmont. Early skirmishes were won by Piedmontese soldiers. When Napoleon's lead elements arrived, the allied army began its advance in earnest. First blood went to Piedmont at Montebello on May 20th (Whyte 311). Garibaldi's guerrillas were very active, winning their first victory at Varese on May 26th. His subsequent gallant maneuvers in the lakes area of the lower Alps in northern Lombardy baffled the Austrian general Urban, who was defeated again at San Fermo by the 5,000 irregulars under Garibaldi's command. Urban was ultimately recalled to effect the juncture of the Austrian army behind the Ticino, where the incompetent and uncertain Gyulai had retreated.

On June 4th, with only 80,000 men, Gyulai was informed that the French main army was advancing in two columns toward his position at the town of Magenta. Gyulai decided to attack while the French were separated. The French, however, under Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, fought valiantly and bought time for the French reserves to arrive. Gyulai was pushed back. Though the Austrian was able to withdraw with most of his army the next morning, Magenta was an important French victory, for now the path to the capital of Lombardy, Milan, was open (King II 74).

The French emperor and his army basked in

the glory of their victory, and they hastened to bring the Austrians to bay again. As a result of Magenta, the Austrian dukes of Parma and Modena fled back to their mother country, and the new governments of the duchies declared their intention of joining with Piedmont. On June 8th, with his triumphal entry into Milan, Victor Emmanuel announced the annexation of Lombardy to his kingdom. The fervor for unity began to spread rapidly. Soon, Romagna was in rebellion, and most of the Papal legates soon followed. Though Papal troops put down the new rebellions in the legates, Romagna remained independent, and it quickly declared in favor of Victor Emmanuel (King II 74). This was somewhat of a dilemma for the allies. Napoleon had certain ties he had to maintain in Rome, but he did not want to deal with them now. So the impatient French sovereign decided to let Cavour handle the situation. While Cavour wanted to reduce temporal power, perhaps to abolish it from Italy completely, he also could not deal with it at this time, though Napoleon, by withdrawing French troops from the area, was trying to force it on Piedmont. There was simply too much else going on to concern the two nations, so the situation was left alone for the present.

The Austrian army's performance had been poor. They were in full retreat, with Napoleon's French and Victor Emmanuel's Piedmontese in pursuit. On June 24th the final climactic battle took place at Solferino. Emperor Francis Joseph had taken personal command of the Austrian army and had arrayed his soldiers on a series of hills around the towns of Solferino and San Martino, east of the Mincio River, 110,000 strong. Napoleon drew up his army, 135,000 men, opposite the Austrians while the Piedmontese engaged the smaller force at San Martino. The resulting battle was an unimaginative slugging match, with the allies repeatedly throwing their men up the bloody slopes. The French and Piedmontese suffered heavy casualties, and were it not for the interference of Francis Joseph and the smaller number of Austrians present, the battle might have gone the other way. As it was, the Austrians again withdrew their battered army, defeated but not decisively so. They still had a reported overall strength of 250,000 men. But they were in a bad position. Lombardy was taken, and the way lay open for the conquest of Venetia, though the strong fortresses around Mantua remained in Austrian hands. It seemed to Cavour that victory, complete victory with Austria expelled from Italy, might now be a possibility. It was at this moment that, for the

second time this year, the political events took a dramatic turn: Napoleon III decided to settle for a conclusion to the war.

Napoleon's reasons were many. Nothing about this enterprise had gone well for him. He was very upset with Cavour's limitless scheming and intrigues; they were a constant source of irritation to him. He had also learned quite a bit from the war itself. He had become aware that he was not nearly as great a commander as his famous uncle, and his two victories, Magenta and Solferino, had both been far from decisive. The horrors of Solferino had struck him hard, and he was sick of the bloodshed. More battles like Solferino were certain if the war were to continue, for despite her poor financial situation and the revolts in Hungary that had just begun again, Austria still had a large field army and fortifications. Napoleon was also angry with the apparent lack of interest in the movement from the Italians; Cavour had promised him much more, but it seemed slow in coming. The events in Rome were disturbing to him as well, for he had strong links with the Catholics there and in his own country. Above all, the threatening storm in Prussia was building, and the mobilization of Prussian troops had become a very real threat. For these reasons, a disillusioned Napoleon III decided to get out while he could. On July 11th, he met privately with Francis Joseph at Villafranca and discussed peace terms.

This meeting was set up without the knowledge of either Cavour or Victor Emmanuel. The terms decided upon there were that there was to be an Italian Confederation (much to Napoleon's delight) and that because of Austria's retention of Venetia, the Hapsburgs would sit on the council. Lombardy would officially go to Piedmont, and the duchy states would be returned to their Austrian princelings. France surprisingly announced its claims to Nice and Savoy. The document was then shown to Victor Emmanuel, who signed it but stated that his predecessor, Charles Albert, could have gained more without any outside help (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 174).

It was not until late that evening that Cavour was made aware of the proceedings. His reaction was expected by the king and his colleagues to be bad, but Cavour was near insanity. He stormed in to see Victor Emmanuel and made quite a scene. He demanded that Piedmont go on with the war alone, an idea that was quite absurd. He flustered for a prolonged peace so that time could be taken to prepare an army to force Austria beyond the Alps, but no one agreed to this. When Prince Napoleon

arrived, Cavour complained that "a promise was a promise" and that Piedmont had been betrayed, to which the strongly pro-Italian prince replied, "Would you have us sacrifice France and our dynasty for you?" (Mack-Smith *Italy* 288). Cavour hounded the other Piedmontese there, exhorting that they had indeed been betrayed, but most of the others reluctantly saw the logic behind Napoleon's move. "For my part, I trusted in Napoleon III," wrote Della Rocca, now the king's chief of staff. "The ability with which he had prepared the Franco-Sardinian alliance, and gained his end, convinced me that necessity, and not caprice, induced him to abandon us" (Mack-Smith *Italy* 288). Cavour, furious that he had no support, and crushed because his plans seemed all for naught, resigned his position then and there.

In England these events were watched while the country was undergoing a change in government. The election had gone against Lord Derby by thirteen votes, and the Liberals returned to power, June 12th, 1859. Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston put their differences aside and agreed to work with whichever leader was chosen by the Queen as the new Prime Minister. Queen Victoria first sent for Lord Granville, but after hearing that Russell refused to work under him, she sent for Palmerston, who accepted the post and once again became Prime Minister. His first and perhaps most important appointment was to make Russell his Foreign Secretary. Another vital appointee was William Gladstone as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for although this powerful Liberal seldom saw eye-to-eye with Palmerston, he supported Italian freedom (Ridley 490). The Italians were, of course, very pleased at this turn of events, as all three men were firm believers in keeping touch with Italian issues as closely as possible, supporting her right to freedom. The Queen and her officials were anti-Italian, and they at first feared that Palmerston's cabinet would support Napoleon III even if he went all the way to the Alps. It would be seen shortly that this was not to be the case; Palmerston was quite upset with Napoleon's apparent imperialistic attitude.

Solferino was fought twelve days after Palmerston took office. The British government did not cheer it publicly, but Russell and Palmerston were satisfied that it was a victory for Italy. A few days later the French ambassador Persigny came to see Palmerston with a proposal that his (Palmerston's) government intervene to mediate in the war. The new Prime Minister quickly refused,

informing Lord John Russell of his reasons. He declared England should not agree to mediate between two warring nations who "ought to have settled in their own minds the outcome of such an arrangement" (Ashley II 366) before he himself had decided on a course of action or a suitable outcome. He denounced the idea of having Austrian archdukes on the thrones of Venetia and Modena because the "same Austrian influences....which have been the bane of Tuscany would soon affect this new state" (Ashley II 366). He declared that the freedom of Piedmont would agitate Venetia, placing the latter in the position occupied by Piedmont earlier in the year. Nothing would be solved. Additionally, Palmerston stated to Russell that Napoleon was just trying to get himself out of a bad situation by placing some of the responsibility on England.

If the French Emperor is tired of his war and finds the job tougher than he expected, let him make what proposals he pleases, and to whomever he pleases; but let them be made from himself formally and officially, and let him not ask us to father his suggestions, and make ourselves answerable for them. (Ashley II 366-367)

It can be seen by this letter that England was indeed interested in the welfare of Italy, but she was not going to intervene or sacrifice herself on behalf of France.

Of course, Napoleon did take the affair into his own hands. The English were informed of Villafranca on June 12th, and the leaders immediately began to ponder exactly what the treaty would mean. It appeared Napoleon was still looking for England to help extricate him from his predicament. What he was facing was an Italy which resented the ever-present Austria on the new council, and he saw no way to resolve the problem. He apparently made his decision in the belief that the sympathies of Palmerston and Russell would get England involved. This was not to be. As Ashley states,

their enthusiasm was not the ill-regulated and unreflecting enthusiasm of youth, which often leads men to be imprudent, but it was the firm sympathy of experienced statesmen who recognized in the Italian cause

not only a just cause, but one destined by the very nature of things to win in the end. (II 370)

England was not going to be led down the garden path by anyone on this issue. She would act when she was ready and then only on her own declared policy.

The problems in Italy were not going to go away. While France, Austria, and Piedmont politically skirmished about the ratification of the Treaty of Villafranca, the duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany refused to take back their Austrian archdukes. By popular action they were once more ousted from power and provisional governments were organized. Two important men took the reins of power in this area, Bettino Ricasoli as the "Dictator of Tuscany," and Carlo Luigi Farini, dictator of Parma, Modena, and later Romagna as well. These men became vital figures in preventing Italy from sinking into chaotic anarchy. Both spread pamphlets abroad and encouraged patriotism, and both encouraged a union with Piedmont, with the understanding that there also must be a unification of all Italy. France vetoed any such annexation but also put pressure on the wounded Austria, stating that if the Hapsburgs attempted to reinstall the archdukes, Napoleon would be prepared to go to war to support them. England, for the most part, encouraged these ad hoc governments and saw Piedmont's union with them as a necessary step toward stability. "A Kingdom of Italy, strong and compact, including Florence and Modena," wrote Russell, "would, I believe, be an excellent thing for that mechanical contrivance, the balance of power. At all events it is enough for us that the Tuscan people wish it, and that there is no strong reason against it" (Gooch 238-239).

The situation in Central Italy had caught Napoleon again in a bad way. He had announced he would forgo annexing Nice and Savoy, but he wanted these two provinces badly. Additionally, he was aware that he had told Austria at Villafranca that the archdukes would be restored, but he had recently declared in favor of the now independent duchies. Through his own incompetent bungling, he had compromised himself once more. He now realized he had to extricate himself. He tried to get Victor Emmanuel to accept Austria's reestablished rule over these areas, but the king was against this. Napoleon then turned to England once more, proposing that her Majesty's government should allow France to annex

Savoy as a salve to "heal the wounds of 1815" (Whyte 338). England refused. With England aligned against him and Victor Emmanuel stubbornly refusing to see the duchies back under Austrian rule, Napoleon turned to Austria, taking a domineering tone with them over the issue; the Hapsburgs finally relented. With that, negotiations went forward and the Treaty of Zurich was signed on November 10, 1859. The treaty was intended to seal the agreement at Villafranca as it was, but there were considerable changes concerning the duchies and the end of the idea of an Italian confederation (due to great anti-Austrian sentiment). Napoleon also surprisingly supported Romagna, declaring that the Pope should let the area become "secularized" (Mack-Smith Cavour 180). It would seem that these moves were made largely to appease England and Italy more than anything else.

England's interest in Piedmont's welfare and policy was waxing as the French position was waning. Piedmont had expressed twice the sentiment that Austria should be entirely expelled from Venetia, and looked to England for support. Some critics believed that Palmerston held an innate hatred for Austria and that the policy would probably gain support in England. Palmerston, however, denied any such allegation. In a letter to Lord Cowley, Palmerston stated he was not an enemy of Austria. Rather, he was "an enemy to bad government, aggression, and tyranny, and, unfortunately, Austria's rule in Italy, as elsewhere, has been marked by those evils" (Ashley II 371). But Austria's complete ejection from Italy did not serve the balance of power at that time, so England did nothing to further her expulsion. However, the English did come out publicly to say that they would support Piedmont if she desired to annex Central Italy, seeing this as a necessity for stable rule, though the English did not yet feel certain they wanted to see all of Italy under one rule. As it was, England's growing concern was greeted warmly by Piedmont. England was rapidly replacing France as the friend of Italy.

The new year saw Piedmont growing in power in the north, and Victor Emmanuel facing an impasse. He set Garibaldi to recruiting volunteers for the next step in the unification process, but the king was unsure as to where this would occur. In due time conservative forces in Turin compelled him to order Garibaldi to cease recruitment. The king was also under considerable pressure to recall Cavour to his old post, though he was unsure if he wanted to do this. Urbano Rattazzi was Cavour's replacement,

but his administration was plagued by indecision over vital issues such as educational reform in Lombardy and new government structures in the duchies. The English were also pressuring him to recall Cavour. The final push came from Sir James Hudson, who intervened actively in the capital on behalf of Cavour (Mack-Smith Cavour 182). On January 16 the ministers of Rattazzi's government resigned. Four days later, Cavour, ready to begin the second stage of his campaign, was reinstalled as Prime Minister.

The great central theme of 1860 began to unfold, the struggle between Cavour and Garibaldi. It is essential to understand the positions of these two influential men in order to further study the relations between England and Italy, for each man was dealt with in a different manner. Each greatly affected the reaction of England and the other major powers, and each was considered, at one time or another, as potentially dangerous in his own way to the ideas and policies of the English government.

Prime Minister Cavour's position in relation to his own monarch was tenuous at best. He and Victor Emmanuel did not always see eye to eye, and although the king was no Mazzinian, he did have a strong self-will and a certain rashness which helped to endear Garibaldi's character to him over Cavour's. The king deeply resented Cavour's embarrassing tirade on the night of Villafranca, but though Cavour's resignation left Victor Emmanuel in somewhat of a pinch, he did feel somewhat less burdened, for Cavour was always plotting and planning. Even after his reinstatement, Cavour was viewed very objectively by Victor Emmanuel, who considered Ricasoli or Rattazzi (again) to replace him at one time (Mack-Smith Cavour and Garibaldi 25). Cavour was not blind to this, and, like the accomplished and shrewd diplomat he was, kept this situation in mind throughout 1860.

Cavour also kept in mind his old "friend," Napoleon. It would be difficult to say that Cavour actually trusted him, but he did put considerable faith in his powers, even after Villafranca. He was cautious toward France, as always, for he did not want outside help to cost Piedmont too much. Cavour was also aware that Napoleon had certain goals of his own he wished to see accomplished in Italy, and that he (Cavour) must do his utmost to appease those wishes to prevent angering the French. He would not be afraid to sacrifice certain things to do just that.

Toward England, Cavour held a reserved admiration. He had always respected the island

nation, and his policy from 1854 to 1858 had been consistently pro-English. He was aggravated when the English did not react to his pleas for their intervention in Italian affairs and publicly had denounced their policy, but his close friends felt certain he still retained his admiration of the English. His abuse of one of Italy's greatest friends in the Foreign Office, Hudson, did not mean his policy had shifted against England, but rather at the time it was an expedient political move for Cavour. Cavour's verbal assault on Hudson sheds light on his unscrupulous morals...he was first and foremost a politician. But he was beginning to understand that England's hands-off policy would probably continue, and that with Palmerston in power and men such as Hudson, Russell, and Gladstone working under him, England's pro-Italian policy would be stronger than ever. It had occurred to Cavour that perhaps England would be a better friend to Italy than Napoleon, or at least a less expensive one. England would be less likely to ask something of Italy in return for her Majesty's government's approval of Piedmontese action, as Italy had no colonies and England no continental possessions. It was somewhat due to this reasoning that the bond between England and Piedmont was growing.

Giuseppi Garibaldi had his own ideological and emotional ties which would affect the events of this critical year. He was a firm believer in Victor Emmanuel. Though a Mazzinian at heart, embracing ideas of democracy and republicanism, he also saw, as Trevelyan observes, that a Dictator or some form thereof was necessary in times of great upheaval. Through such an officer the necessary leadership for change would be represented (Garibaldi and the Thousand 65). In addition, Garibaldi felt a strong affinity for the honor of Victor Emmanuel, for his courage, his gallantry, and his nobleness of heart. For these reasons he accepted the decisions of Victor Emmanuel at face value, even when the king was trying to hamper his progress. Garibaldi held the king in high regard until his death.

Garibaldi had strong ideas about the status of Italy. Much of this was shaped by his revolutionary background. He saw as his goal the unification of the entire peninsula under one rule, with himself proclaiming victory in Rome on behalf of Victor Emmanuel, who would be the king of all Italy. It is necessary for the student of history to understand that Garibaldi wanted the Italians to act for themselves. He was fond of repeating the motto that he lived by: "Where any of our brothers are fighting for liberty,

thither all Italians must hasten" (Garibaldi II 145). He did not favor the intervention of France, nor was he pleased by the fact that Cavour had invited them into the War of Liberation. He believed Italy was to win her own freedom with her own zealous fire, and he stuck to this. His mind did not comprehend the shrewd politics of Cavour and the other nations; perhaps these thoughts were too treacherous for his beliefs, or perhaps he just did not think about them because he cared little for the intrigue and power-play. This is important in recognizing his relations with England.

Garibaldi was always cordial with Englishmen he met. While he campaigned in South America during his early years, he had been saved twice by the excellent timing and goodwill of the English commanders in the area. He held their professionalism, particularly in their navy, in utmost regard. He also appreciated their support of the endeavors of men seeking freedom and peace. He once wrote,

England is a great and powerful nation, independent of auxiliary aid, foremost in human progress, enemy to despotism, the only safe refuge for the exile in Europe, friend of the oppressed; but if ever England, your native country, should be so circumstanced as to require the help of an ally, cursed be the Italian who would not step forward with me in her defense. (Garibaldi III 124)

The English were well aware of his feelings. The public opinion of Garibaldi had always been good, and so to support him was looked upon as a good thing. This was to play a major role in the events to come.

Of course, central to this issue was the relationship between Garibaldi and Cavour. Garibaldi never did trust Cavour (soon his feelings for Cavour would worsen), and he was disillusioned by Cavour's constant political maneuvering. During 1860, Garibaldi would blame the Prime Minister for any political setback originating in Turin, even in the rare cases where Cavour was not at fault. Cavour, on the other hand, feared Garibaldi. The Prime Minister had his own plans and they did not necessarily include the reactionary. Cavour wanted to see the Bourbons in the south ousted in favor of a more pro-Piedmont government, but he was intent

upon seeing this happen without help from Garibaldi. He feared the republican's natural ability with men and the great support and love given to him by the populace. Cavour could never understand this phenomenon. Garibaldi would never betray his belief in Victor Emmanuel, but this was not apparent to Cavour, and thus he feared Garibaldi would take the power of the people in his own hands. Garibaldi did not have such political ambitions; Cavour could not imagine that Garibaldi felt that way. The stage for their great struggle and the crisis of 1860 was set, and England would be involved at every turn.

The first great battle began soon enough. Napoleon, despite his announcement to the contrary, was still intent on annexing Nice and Savoy. He watched the developments impatiently. The general populace of the duchies were clamoring for annexation by Piedmont, and this greatly vexed the Emperor. He had certain obligations to the Pope and the Catholics in general that he had to maintain in order to keep their support, and he had treaty obligations to Austria that would be breached if he allowed the annexation to take place. On the other hand, if he vetoed the annexation, his chances to annex Nice and Savoy would be destroyed.

Russell and Palmerston were watching as well, and it was at this point that Russell decided to put forward England's official policy on the situation, issuing his decree known as the Four Points, January 15, 1860. Designed to settle the issue peaceably, this declaration outlined four basic premises: the admission of the principle of non-intervention by France and Austria unless invited by the "Great Powers" to do so, the withdrawal of the French garrisons from Papal territory, recognition of the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of Venetia by Piedmont, and a guarantee that Piedmont would not send troops into Central Italy unless the countries there desired it (Whyte 348). Russell believed that through these measures the states of Central Italy would be able to join Piedmont peacefully. Of course, at that time Britain was still suspicious of Napoleon's motives, but most diplomats thought him sincere in regard to leaving Nice and Savoy alone.

Cavour was very pleased with Russell's Four Points, while Napoleon accepted them reluctantly. Cavour felt now he could avoid losing Nice and Savoy, but more and more Napoleon desired the two provinces, and, due to domestic pressure, he decided he would not be able to do without them. Therefore, he sent his envoys secretly to Turin, demanding action. Napoleon declared he would not allow

Piedmont to annex Tuscany and Emilia (the area of Romagna, Parma, and Modena) if France did not get Nice and Savoy as they had agreed at Plombieres. Now Cavour was in a quandary. If he were to refuse the calls of Tuscany and the others, he might alienate them and set back his plans for years if not indefinitely. In addition, Savoy was Piedmont's frontier, containing the Alps from which she could defend Turin from France if the need ever arose. It was also the home of Victor Emmanuel's family; the current ruling house was the House of Savoy. But Cavour had to look at the alternatives. He could not afford to alienate Napoleon, for the Prime Minister saw in the Emperor the power to make or break the unification process. Napoleon was adamant; something must be done. On March 11 and 12 Tuscany and Emilia held a plebiscite in which they voted almost unanimously to join with Piedmont. On March 12, Cavour reluctantly signed a secret pact with France at Turin, ceding Nice and Savoy. Because Cavour was not truly resigned to this course, he set in motion his agents in Nice to try to save the area for Piedmont through popular vote.

England, meanwhile, had received word of the proceedings and, greatly alarmed, did its utmost to stop Cavour from making the mistake of allowing Napoleon to have his way. Russell wrote Hudson stating, "In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the King of Sardinia (Piedmont) will besmirch the arms of the House of Savoy if he yields to France" (Whyte 350-351). The English called for a vote in both provinces. Cavour felt this would be an acceptable measure, but he also told Hudson that Savoy, being largely made up of French lineage, would probably declare for France anyway. Russell did not care. He felt Napoleon was way out of line. It was not long before Napoleon heard of Cavour's attempts to retain Nice, and he called on Turin, demanding a public treaty, one Cavour could not hope to break from. Trapped, Cavour had no choice but to comply, and on March 24, 1860, he officially ceded Nice and Savoy to France, signing the Treaty of Turin.

The initial reaction to this announcement place Cavour in a difficult position. The Piedmontese Parliament rose up in fury, declaring that the minister had signed away their only hopes of defending Turin, and the call of "Fini Pedemantii!" rang out in the capital (Holt 225). Garibaldi, a native of Nice, was furious, completely disillusioned with the government and, in particular, with Cavour. England was upset as well. Russell wrote the Queen, stating that

Cavour had, by this singularly treacherous act, canceled all his past services. "To submit to force in one thing, to participate in a measure lowering and degrading one's country is another" (Gooch 258). In addition, the English disenchantment with Napoleon was now complete. Palmerston remarked that he had until recently felt Napoleon did not truly intend to expand his boundaries, but with this cession he began to lose all trust in the French leader, "and to suspect that his formerly expressed intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant" (Aronson 99). Russell directed Hudson to convey his displeasure to Victor Emmanuel and his wily minister.

Cavour was not overly discouraged, for he had reasons to remain optimistic. With Piedmont apparently now militarily indefensible, even the conservatives in Parliament would be forced to see that to survive they would have to see a strong, united Italy. It had now become a political necessity. He had also appeased Napoleon and could fear less the loss of French support in the future. And he had reason to believe that, despite England's indignation over Nice and Savoy, the pro-Italian ministers would remain steadfastly behind Piedmont. A letter from Azeglio in London bolstered his attitude:

There is an essential distinction to be made here. The English people and government blame some of the leading politicians in Italy. But Italy itself remains, as it always has been, a favorite country for them, and they watch its progress and education with lively sympathy. (Letter from Azeglio to Cavour, April 14, 1860, as quoted in Mack-Smith *Italy* 307)

Azeglio was correct. Throughout the chaos surrounding the progress of the unification, the liberal populace of England remained staunch supporters of Italian unity. In addition, as Cavour stated, Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone, going against the Queen, Parliament, and the majority of the cabinet, would provide enough strength to carry any pro-Italian policy.

Cavour was at this time unsure how he wanted to proceed. He was not against unifying with Naples some time in the future, but he did not want to hurry the issue as he was certain the Bourbons would not agree. As for Rome, toppling temporal power, as much as Cavour desired to see it happen, would cause far too strong a response in opposition by the Major Powers. Cavour concentrated on successfully incorporating Tuscany and Emilia while he contemplated his next move.

The tide now shifted, and for the moment

control of the course of unification slipped temporarily from Cavour's hands. On April 4, 1860, the revolutionaries in Palermo on Sicily rose up in hatred against the alien and abhorred Neapolitan garrison. Led by a plumber, Francesco Riso, the discontented peasants, subject for decades to a degrading, serf-like existence which bore some similarities to the English land ownership system but without any of the same rights or advantages (Trevelyan *Thousand* 145), fought violent and futile actions against the superior-armed Neapolitan soldiers. These poor men had previously appealed to Garibaldi (in 1859) to come and lead them, but he had shrewdly declined, encouraging them to follow their plans but refusing to go to Sicily as it would not be a wise plan in the eyes of the King. However, Garibaldi's very name was enough to inspire many of the peasants and the mafia bosses to join the little rebellion. The situation remained precarious. It was at this moment that Rosalino Pilo, a noble Sicilian in exile with Mazzini and espousing his cause, arrived in Sicily, landing near Messina on April 10 (Holt 233). Pilo immediately went to Palermo and, to bolster the rebels, told them that Garibaldi was coming to lead them.

Cavour was not prepared to deal with the Sicilian situation, as he had not decided what policy would be the best to follow. His immediate concern was Garibaldi. He had feared for some time that the General was going to lead his men to Rome (Garibaldi had expressed his wish to do so), which would be disastrous for Piedmont. Now the Prime Minister was faced with the possibility of Garibaldi and his volunteers going to Sicily. Cavour realized that public opinion was swaying away from himself to Garibaldi, as everyone was still angered over Nice and Savoy (the final ratification was just barely passed much later on June 10). He also realized that if Garibaldi wanted to go and was stopped by the military, the situation inside Piedmont itself would rapidly destabilize. Cavour and the King were not altogether against the idea of sending Garibaldi to Sicily, as they both loathed the Bourbons and would welcome the island as part of the new Italy, but feared the other European states would be certain to object.

Garibaldi had been at first disinclined to go, as the news from Sicily impressed him that the minor revolution was doomed to fail. But he began to become agitated because the Turin government refused even to acknowledge the rebels, much less send them political support. He saw this as proof

that Napoleon still held a mesmerizing control over the government and that his presence did more to determine policy than did vital Italian national interests. He viewed this as dangerous for the success of unification. After struggling for several weeks, Garibaldi finally announced, during the last week of April, that he would go to Sicily and support the rebels (King II 138). This news was not allowed to go very far, as secrecy was essential. Cavour and Victor Emmanuel met and decided they would let him go, but Cavour was by no means sure of himself. There was no truth to the later released statements that Cavour was secretly behind Garibaldi and that he felt the General could succeed. It was only after Garibaldi had landed that Cavour felt open enough to say the expedition might work. Publicly, he and the King disassociated themselves from Garibaldi so that when the diplomatic pressure began to build they could claim no involvement in the plan.

The very idea of such an expedition was fraught with danger. Garibaldi called for volunteers, and he had some excellent ones, including the fiery captain Nino Bixio and the political leader for the annexation of Sicily, Francesco Crispi. But despite the quality of the men, there was a basic lack of quantity. Only 1,089 men would ultimately land on Sicily (Holt 235). At best estimates the Neapolitans had 23,000 soldiers on Sicily and another 100,000 more on the mainland (King II 141). At such odds Garibaldi's venture seemed nothing more than a gallant but futile gesture. Additionally, until April 27, Garibaldi only had one potential steamer, the Lombardo, gaining the second, the Piemonte, on the morning of the 27th (Trevelyan Thousand 189). Against these two small vessels were arrayed the large frigates and cutters of the numerous Neapolitan navy. To make matters worse, Garibaldi was treated treacherously by one of Cavour's supporters, La Farina, who would not allow Garibaldi to take the superb Enfield rifles made available by the patriots of the National Society* (a group of politicians and businessmen dedicated to seeing the unification of Italy), but instead Garibaldi received a thousand ill-repaired smoothbore muskets. La Farina also refused to allow any ammunition to be taken, and only because of the industriousness of Garibaldi and Bixio did they procure their own. Despite these setbacks and the daunting military situation, Garibaldi valiantly decided to go on with his plans. His men embarked on the two vessels on the night of May 5, 1860, and they sailed to glory. Avoiding the Neapolitan patrols, the ships came in sight of the city of

Marsala, on the western tip of the island, at sunrise on May 11 (Trevelyan Thousand 229).

The stage was now set for one of the most curious occurrences of the campaign. The Neapolitan cruiser squadron at Marsala, consisting of six large ships and numerous auxiliary craft, had left the port to head south just five or six hours previously. At least three of these vessels had been at Marsala on the evening of May 10. In the harbor itself were two British steam-and-sail warships, HMS Argus and HMS Intrepid. These two ships had been dispatched from the harbor at Palermo to protect British shipping in the area and to protect the English businessmen on shore from the not-so-friendly Sicilians, who resented the English operations there, "the wine trade...being almost exclusively in our hands" (Forbes 25). The Lombardo and the Piemonte hurriedly sailed into the harbor, much to the interest of the British sailors there. The Neapolitan squadron, now on the alert, sent three ships scurrying back to Marsala. Now there ensued a most controversial incident. The Neapolitan ships, in particular the lead frigate of sixty guns, arrived just as the Thousand were disembarking. One ineffective broadside was discharged, and then the cannonade became sporadic and poorly aimed, presumably because they did not want to hit the two British warships (Holt 238). Garibaldi's men, after scuttling the Lombardo (the Piemonte was captured later by the Neapolitans), marched proudly into the city. Garibaldi had arrived.

The effect of the two British ships remains a hotly-debated topic. Count Charles Arrivabene, present for most of Garibaldi's campaign, only mentions the presence of the vessels and does not attribute any credit to them for detaining the Neapolitans (II 42). Charles Stuart Forbes, an Englishman who joined the Thousand, stated that the Neapolitans "cannot blame their stupidity on the English" (27) as they did the following day (the English ambassador at Naples, Sir Henry Elliot, demanded they renounce their accusation, which they promptly did). Garibaldi himself also denied any allegations that the ships were pre-arranged to be deployed to aid the expedition (II 160).

This seems to be the case, but the presence of HMS Argus and HMS Intrepid is symbolic of the British involvement in the unification. Garibaldi, never short on praise for his English friends, wrote "the British colours flying from the two men-of-war...made the Bourbon mercenaries hesitate, and, I might say, impressed them with a sense of shame at pouring fire of their imposing batteries into a handful

of men...." (II 160) Indeed, many scholars, including Denis Mack-Smith and George M. Trevelyan, feel that the British ships were intimidating to the Neapolitans. By simply being present and flying the time-honored Union Jack, they unnerved the Neapolitans (by chance and not pre-arranged) so that they failed to do their duty. Thus, just as the British government was to stand silently by Piedmont as unification proceeded, allowing through their own approval the Italians to pursue their goal successfully without fear of outside intervention, these two warships, just by silently lying at anchor, aided Garibaldi in a dangerous hour to land successfully on Sicily.

The British government reacted to the expedition as soon as they heard of its landing at Marsala. Though strangely silent for the two weeks prior to Garibaldi's debarkation, they now swiftly sent unassuming dispatches to Turin, asking Cavour to clarify the situation. While the other nations of Europe furiously denounced Piedmont, England's officials listened to Cavour's response and then quietly approved. The English public, however, was vociferously behind Garibaldi. Palmerston and Russell, still against the Queen's wishes, quietly rejoiced that Garibaldi was carrying the process onward, though both realized the political difficulties Italian unification could cause. Furthermore, Russell was not sure that the Sicilian expedition would not come to grief. "Garibaldi, I suspect, will not succeed" (260) was the Foreign Secretary's comment. Officially the British denied the allegations that they aided Garibaldi, and they proclaimed their official position as "entirely neutral."

Garibaldi, upon his arrival, announced he was in Sicily on behalf of Victor Emmanuel. The local revolutionary leaders and the rulers of Marsala expressed their desire that Garibaldi should assume the position of Dictator, which he did at once on the grounds that such a move was politically acceptable in that time of crisis. He began to plan his campaign. Heading inland, he first met a major body of Neapolitans at Calatafini on May 15, 1860. His men, now numbering over 1,200 thanks to Sicilian volunteers, soundly thrashed over two thousand Bourbon troops, routing them ignominiously. This was a major feat. The victory put fear into the hearts of the Neapolitans, who had fought well. The battle stirred the hearts of the local populace, and for the first time the citizens became zealous with revolutionary fire. Garibaldi's victory also showed the outside world that the redshirts were a force to be

reckoned with and that they might succeed.

And succeed they did. Garibaldi's Sicilian campaign was a masterpiece. He managed, through the help of locals, to avoid the Neapolitan patrols. On May 26, 1860, he arrived at Palermo, the ranks of his little army swollen with new volunteers. There the redshirts won a great victory, and after a few days holed up in the royal palace, the Neapolitan commander retreated across the straits of Messina. Garibaldi at once set up a new government structure. New recruits and volunteers arriving from Genoa had increased his force to over 20,000, including liberals from all over Europe. Many young men like Charles Stuart Forbes followed their impulse and left England to help the Garibaldini. It was a popular cause for those who believed in freedom.

It was at this time Cavour sent Giuseppe La Farina to Palermo, intent on letting that Sicilian help Garibaldi in governing the island and subsequently annexing it. The choice of La Farina was a poor one: because of the man's underhanded dealings in respect to the ammunition and rifles (an act which Garibaldi assumed was made on the orders of Cavour), few of the redshirts trusted him. Garibaldi and Crispi, who hated La Farina, were not certain that Sicily should be annexed at this time anyway. First, they were still in the midst of a campaign; the Neapolitans had been defeated but not yet ejected from the island. Second, they felt if Sicily were annexed, they could not continue to the mainland, as Cavour would find some reason they could not use the area as a base of operations (Holt 241). Cavour, however, did wish to contain Garibaldi, but that was not his major concern. Sicily had, in its history, proved itself to be a difficult province to maintain. One of Cavour's compatriots, a Sicilian by the name of Francesco Ferrara, informed Cavour that the best chance to obtain Sicily had come, as they were apt to change their minds (Mack-Smith *Cavour* 218). In addition, Cavour wanted to gather the island to the arms of the growing Italian state before the building international political opposition would prevent him from doing so.

Those very political forces were moving. Prussia looked to the situation as becoming unstable. Russia, too, was watching carefully. Austria, of course, always a firm supporter of the decadent Bourbon regime, was indignant and sent her envoys to Turin, expressing their extreme displeasure with Piedmont for allowing Garibaldi to proceed. Napoleon was looking at Sicily thoughtfully, unsure if he wanted the revolution to continue. He had not

forgotten his plans to place Lucien Murat on the throne of Naples, nor had he forgotten his ties to Rome (the ultimate destination, or so he feared, of Garibaldi). If Garibaldi succeeded in Sicily (and it looked as if he were going to do so) and continued to Naples, Napoleon would have little chance of seeing his nominee on the throne; he would be forced to rethink his plans currently underway, namely the withdrawal of French garrison troops from the Papal states.

England was caught at the crossroads. Many of the nations of Europe were looking to the British to make a decisive move for or against Garibaldi. As the month of May progressed, Lord Palmerston was torn between his suspicions of Cavour and Napoleon and his pro-Italian policy. Always constantly alert for signs of French expansionism, Palmerston remembered well the recent trade of Nice and Savoy for Tuscany and Emilia. Wary of Cavour, he now believed the Prime Minister and the French emperor had agreed upon another secret treaty, this time involving the cession of Genoa and Sardinia in return for allowing the annexation of Sicily and subsequently Naples (Ridley 493). This would not do at all. England had fought for years to hold the French to their natural harbors and to stop any growth of French naval power in the Mediterranean. If Genoa and Sardinia went to France, her ability to range further into the Central Mediterranean and prey upon shipping would be greatly enhanced.

Palmerston was also measuring the effects of Italian annexation of the south on the balance of power. Judging by the rising power of Prussia and her near belligerent status toward Italy, he feared the German state would either intervene militarily or assist Austria to do so. Though Prussia had no stake in the south and was not tied to it politically, culturally, or geographically, it was currently friendly toward Austria, and the northern German state was assisting that troubled country in extending her policy. England, still mistakenly believing that Austria was the real balance to France (the British view had not yet shifted to Prussia) and Palmerston feeling that the Hapsburgs had temporarily had enough, had to regard very carefully their relations with Naples, Austria's ally. Her Majesty's Government had to make a choice.

The relations between England and Naples had been less than cordial. In 1838 a dispute over the British trade of Neapolitan sulfur nearly caused a war between the two. Ferdinand II had given a French business a monopoly on all Neapolitan sulfur. This

being an obstacle to British trade, the English reacted violently, demanding the trade to stop. Ferdinand promised to comply, but for two years nothing was done. The British thus ordered their Mediterranean squadron to enforce the decision, and several Neapolitan ships were captured (Ashley I 402). Naples did finally acquiesce, but the bad blood continued. The English were repulsed by the decadence of the Bourbons. Forbes commented in his memoirs "that habits considered foul in Britain were fair in Naples, and a stench that would kill an Englishman would fatten a Neapolitan" (252).

Palmerston did not want to see Naples under a pro-French Piedmont, but he also found it very difficult to defend the hated Neapolitans. It was generally hoped that the new king, Francis II, would be more liberal and would begin reforms to help the poor people of his country. It did not take long for Francis to dispel their optimism. He was just as inept and vile as his father. The disillusioned Russell agreed with Palmerston in his hatred of the Neapolitans. "I cannot stomach defending Bombino (Francis II)," wrote Russell to Palmerston in May, 1860 (260). Yet to defend or not to defend this bastion of monarchial absolutism was the choice the English were going to have to make.

On May 17, 1860, Palmerston proposed his first plan to Russell. It involved a treaty with Cavour to ensure no further French involvement in the peninsula. The British Mediterranean fleet would be sent to the straits of Messina between Sicily and Naples' mainland. Their orders would depend on Cavour's reaction. If Cavour complied by signing the treaty with England, by which Piedmont would be agreeing that no further land in Italy would go to France without English consent, then the ships would take no part in stopping Garibaldi from crossing to the mainland. However, if Cavour would not sign, then, after securing the promise of Francis II that he would initiate reforms, the British would send their ships under orders to stop Garibaldi at all costs (Ridley 493).

Russell did not like this idea. It called for too much intervention. In addition, Russell had another idea with which he was toying. He was somewhat in favor of putting a new prince on the Neapolitan throne, one that would definitely begin reforms and would be better able to rule Naples effectively. Russell wrote to Sir Henry Elliot, declaring that Naples and Sicily must be kept from Piedmont for the time being if not for good, "and if the Neapolitans could agree on a prince, worthy to wear the Crown,

then we should be glad to recognize him...he must be the choice of the Italians of the south themselves" (262). He also reemphasized to Elliot that Garibaldi should be "persuaded to stay with Sicily--do not provoke it any further" (Hibbert 257). Palmerston, rebuffed by Russell, went back to the drawing board. It was beginning to look as if the only way to succeed in a peaceful solution was to play the pro-French Cavour off against the pro-Italian, anti-French Garibaldi. By doing so the British hoped to forestall the situation until a better solution could be achieved. In this regard they misread the situation. Cavour was not necessarily pro-French; he would use whatever ally would give him a measure of support.

On July 10, 1860, Palmerston wrote to Russell with his second plan, centering again on the aforementioned treaty. As Garibaldi's Sicilian campaign was drawing to a close, he proposed to Russell that they play upon Garibaldi's hatred of France. The English would communicate to the leader of the Thousand that it would not be to Italy's advantage if the state unified and, as a result, were simply to be a pawn for France. To this end, Garibaldi should wait for some time before annexing Sicily. If Cavour assented to the British treaty, then Garibaldi could go ahead. If not, then the autonomy of Sicily would have to suffice. Russell looked more kindly upon this course of action, but because of pressure from within the government, it too was abandoned.

Throughout this difficult period the two men responsible for keeping Russell up to date more than any others were Hudson in Turin and Elliot in Naples. These two ambassadors, more importantly the former, because of Garibaldi's exploits, had come to the conclusion that the unification of Italy was both a necessity and a very real possibility. Hudson began to work on Russell, coaxing the Foreign Secretary toward his viewpoint (Trevelyan Garibaldi and the Making of Italy 28). As the diplomatic crisis began to come to a head, these two diplomats were very important in finally changing Russell's view on Italian unification.

The crisis was rapidly nearing. Crispi managed to force Cavour to recall La Farina as he was unacceptable. Cavour sent a replacement chosen by Garibaldi and Crispi, Agostino Depretis, who was to be the civil administrator until annexation was complete. Meanwhile, Garibaldi continued his successful campaign. On July 20, 1860, the Dictator won the final battle of the Sicilian expedition at Milazzo, routing the Neapolitans after a particularly

sanguinary struggle. The Neapolitans surrendered (except for the fortress at Messina). The island belonged to Garibaldi.

Napoleon III acted. After receiving a desperate cry for help from Francis, the French emperor's ambassador to London, Persigny, at the behest of his master, proposed on July 22 that the French and the British should combine their fleets to prevent the crossing of Garibaldi, which was feared to be imminent. Apparently Persigny felt Russell was interested, though it was unclear what Russell's initial response actually was. Persigny then proposed the move to Palmerston, who was suddenly very confused. The Prime Minister was under the impression that Garibaldi's activities were under the joint approval of Cavour and Napoleon III. If Napoleon were now presenting a plan to stop Garibaldi, then the situation was different from what he thought (Ridley 494). Palmerston was still anxious about upsetting the balance of power in southern Italy; he therefore told Persigny that the offer might have some promise. Persigny duly noted this to Napoleon.

On the same day, Cavour, with growing fear of Garibaldi's strong popular support in southern Italy, decided to act. At his insistence the king wrote Garibaldi a letter in which he outlined the policy of Piedmont and requested that Garibaldi should stop in Sicily and go no farther. According to Bolton King, the letter was so worded that Cavour and Victor Emmanuel knew Garibaldi would refuse (II 155). Banking on this refusal, Cavour wanted to harness the great surge of unity that even the conservatives were beginning to exude. The goal of the cunning minister's life was almost within his grasp, but he had to maintain his semi-alooof dissociation from Garibaldi just a little while longer. Secretly he sent a message to Garibaldi, lying that he (Cavour) was behind the Dictator 100% (he truly was watching for a way to topple Garibaldi safely), but publicly he could not afford to let others see that Piedmontese policy was officially revolutionary. Cavour carefully nurtured his relationship with Napoleon, hoping the French emperor would not assist Naples. Cavour also knew that if England or France intervened, it would be very costly to Piedmont, emphasizing her "servile status" in European affairs (Hibbert 257) and greatly endangering her chances of success.

Russell tarried. Hudson, realizing that something must be done, worked diligently to assuage the Foreign Secretary's fears and to turn his policy.

He convinced Russell that French designs on Genoa had no validity (which was true) and that England could gain prestige by supporting Italy now, taking a strong stand for freedom by doing nothing more than allowing Garibaldi to continue (Trevelyan *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* 30). Russell, however, was unconvinced. The breaking point finally came with a leak in Paris by the Empress herself of the possible joint English-French naval operation. Nigra, Cavour's representative in Paris, upon hearing of this, sent the news to Azeglio, who at once called upon the assistance of Sir James Lacaita, an Italian-born civil service worker in England. Lacaita was to go and plea on behalf of Italy to Russell, begging, if necessary, for the Foreign Secretary's compliance to Italian unity.

Lacaita, upon his arrival, found that Persigny and Russell were speaking privately. Unable to see him and hearing that Russell's wife was ill, Lacaita persuaded Lady Russell to send for her husband, stating that he should come to her immediately. When Russell hurriedly arrived, Lacaita made a prostrating and emotional appeal to the Foreign Secretary, asking him for the sake of freedom and his love for Italy to allow Garibaldi to cross. It was the turning point. Russell sent to Palmerston his rejection of the French plan, and Palmerston and Gladstone agreed to support him (Ridley 494). Bereft of English support, and fearing that his action would force Piedmont irretrievably into the English camp, Napoleon decided not to act. The fate of the Bourbons looked grim. On August 18-19, 1860, Garibaldi, once again eluding Neapolitan patrols, crossed the straits, and entered Calabria to the joyous welcome of the Neapolitan citizens (Holt 245).

With the crisis if not beaten completely at least temporarily dispelled, Cavour set his own plans in motion. He was still nervous about the power Garibaldi held in the south. He was almost certain, as he wrote Nigra, that if Garibaldi succeeded he would become the "absolute master of the situation...King Victor Emmanuel loses almost all of his prestige..." (Letter from Cavour to Nigra, as quoted in Holt 244). Dreading this, he attempted a pre-emptive revolution, led by his own agents, in the tumultuous Naples itself. His goal was to have the city firmly in Cavourian control before Garibaldi arrived, thus presenting him with a *fait accompli*, and taking much away from Garibaldi's prestige. Cavour's motives ran even deeper, for now he saw that unification of some type was a certainty, but in order for the state to be strong its borders must be

contiguous. If his revolt in Naples succeeded, then he would have a pretext for invading the Papal states...Italy as one, undivided state. Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, the rebellion was a complete sham and failed before it started because of the lack of initiative on the part of the Neapolitan conspirators. Cavour was thus temporarily stalled.

Garibaldi, meanwhile, marched onward. Francis II, seeing his throne crumbling around him, served incompetently by bickering ministers and generals, and most of his troops defecting to the Dictator, fled with the remainder of his troops to Gaeta, a port fortress north of Naples. Garibaldi, after a few skirmishes, entered the city unopposed on September 7, 1860, declaring himself Dictator of the Two Sicilies.

Cavour was still searching for a reason to invade the Papal States. He finally found it with the news that the French garrisons in Rome had been replaced by foreign mercenaries under the pay of Pius IX (Holt 248). He therefore sent an ultimatum to Cardinal Antonelli, demanding the disbanding of all mercenary forces in the Papal states. When the Papal government did not reply, the new Piedmontese army under Fanti, Cialdini, and Della Rocca was sent into Umbria and the Marches. The Papal troops had little chance and were repeatedly defeated. After the fall of the port city of Ancona, Victor Emmanuel himself took personal command. He then turned the army south. Rome would be bypassed; it was not the goal. They had to get to Garibaldi.²

Garibaldi's position was becoming untenable. Despite his brilliant victories, he still had only 23,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped volunteers against Francis' 50,000 men (Holt 250). An early skirmish did not go well and added to the growing friction between Cavourians and Garibaldini in Naples. The Neapolitans decided that the time was right to advance on their capital and retake it before Victor Emmanuel arrived or Garibaldi could secure his position. To this end they crossed the Volturno River October 1, 1860, and engaged Garibaldi's army in a two-day battle in which the Garibaldini, led ably and in person by Garibaldi, Bixio, and his captains, defeated the Neapolitans. The Neapolitans fled back to Gaeta and Capua. However, 30,000 Neapolitans remained in the two fortresses, and their positions were far too strong to assault. With all of Naples seething, there was fear of revolt. Garibaldi, meanwhile, angered at what he considered Cavour's double-faced dealings, petitioned Victor Emmanuel that the Prime Minister be removed from office.

Cavour was aware that Garibaldi was not as efficient an administrator as he was a revolutionary leader, so he urged the king to move quickly before the situation could get out of hand. Cavour was prepared to fight Garibaldi politically if he stubbornly refused to step down as Dictator. The Prime Minister set in motion a plebiscite which would annex Sicily, Naples, Umbria, and the Marches. On October 4, 1860, the government leaders in Turin agreed to this plan (King II 173), and Cavour proceeded, even though the European political opinion was shifting against Italy. With his goal nearly in sight, Cavour decided to go ahead anyway. The plebiscite took place on October 21, 1860, and all four areas voted overwhelmingly to join Piedmont.

Unification was a reality, or nearly so. There remained the political and the military forces of the Bourbons to deal with, and the issue of their fate and the "indignities" forced upon the Pope in the invasion of the Marches became the topic of international debate. The long-running uncertainty felt by the other European nations as to the goal of Piedmont was finally clarified. Italy was to be united. The other nations felt this had gone on long enough. Austria, Prussia, and Russia met in a conference in Warsaw, officially condemning Garibaldi's actions and his invasion of the Two Sicilies. It appeared these nations might go further: there was talk of re-arming and supplying the trapped Bourbons. Napoleon III, although not formally against the Italians, was showing some displeasure. As before, he had to hearken to the Catholics in the French population. But once again Russell came to the rescue. In a proclamation on October 27, 1860, he saved the Italians' foundering hopes:

Her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited upon the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence. (Holt 257)

Cavour and the Italians rejoiced at this proclamation, which eased substantially the international tension. Cavour had the dispatch distributed and posted throughout Italy.

On November 7, 1860, Victor Emmanuel arrived in Naples, where he took the reins of government from Garibaldi, who, contrary to Cavour's belief, gave up the power willingly. Garibaldi quietly left the scene and went to his home at Caprera, no richer than when he left. He was not gone for good in the political affairs of Italy, but for now he left the unification process and the development of successful government infrastructures to the politicians. His services had been invaluable. Meanwhile, Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy. Though there were many things left to be done, and though the political structure was in chaos, Cavour could look with satisfaction at the result of his political skill. He had attained the goal for which he had literally sold his life. His health shattered by the ordeal, Cavour contracted typhus and died on June 6, 1861.

The English government had done much to further the process of unification. Her "disinterested affection" had been of great importance in Cavour's embattled international policy. Twice the dispatches of and orders of Russell and Palmerston had expedited the situation, to make it or break it. The first time concerned Garibaldi's crossing the Straits of Messina, where the presence of hostile British warships could have stopped the Dictator's operation indefinitely. The second incident of salvation occurred with Russell's October 27 dispatch, holding back the nations of Europe, allowing Cavour the time he needed to solidify the Italian position. Both times the steady helm of English diplomacy held at bay the tumultuous seas that threatened to capsize Piedmont's uncertain ship of state.

A curious characteristic is notable in England's foreign policy during 1859 and 1860, and for that matter all of Palmerston's years in power. Professing to be a liberal government and state (though the Queen and her advisors were not), Palmerston's administration had the support of the citizenry in the diplomatic approval of Italy's endeavor. The liberal populace had given their leaders the support they needed to make such policy. Many notables, including the Duke of Wellington and Lady Byron, were reputed to have given money to the Italian cause. As Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg, a German prince, said, "the mystery of how 150,000 men were vanquished by a thousand red-shirts was wrapped in English bank notes" (Hibbert 257fn). There is not much more evidence pointing to such financial assistance: this is not the curiosity. The difficulty in gauging accurately the British policy in

this period lies in the non-liberal acts of a supposed liberal government. To smile upon Garibaldi and his fight for freedom was certainly not the game of the "old school" conservatives, but at the same time that England was supporting Piedmont, the revolutionaries in Hungary were looking to her for aid as well. None was forthcoming, even though Palmerston expressed his agreement with the Hungarian revolutionary leaders and felt their cause was worthy and honorable. Had it not been this same man who, as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, had supported Italy in her fight against the evil government and misrule of Austria, the same Hapsburg government from which the Hungarians were trying to gain autonomy? Ireland, the bedroom of England, at this time was also calling for her own freedom and home rule, but her pleas were regularly ignored (Ridley 540). Neither of these policies could be said to be very liberal.

The reason behind these seemingly "illiberal" acts lay with the Balance of Power. As England had served as the administrator of justice since the 1600's, she served still in 1859 and 1860, maintaining the status quo, not allowing one power too much of the spotlight. Thus it was fine for Palmerston to support Italy in her struggle, but, as the breakaway of the all-important Hungarian province in Austria would be far too devastating a loss for the Hapsburgs, Britain smiled upon the Hungarians, gave three cheers, and then turned away (of course, they could do little in the way of helping Hungary, for England had no means to project her power there, that country being landlocked) (Porter 23). By the same token, when it was agreed that Venetia would be retained by Austria, as much as the English detested the Austrian's rigid and unforgiving decadence, the government of Lord Palmerston refused to allow Cavour even to think about taking the province. At this time Prussia's star was rising and Austria's setting, and only a few men in Britain realized it. The majority mistakenly believed Austria would be the great counterbalance in their scheme of things.

Of course, the overriding factor in all British diplomacy at this time was Emperor Napoleon III of France. As Bolton King writes, "Stronger than love of Italy, distrust of France was supreme in English foreign policy" (II 117). This was the nation Austria was to act against as a balance. None of the British politicians of the time would forget the battles their forefathers had fought against Napoleon Bonaparte, with thousands of lives lost and millions of pounds

spent as a result of England's determination to stop the aggression of this overwhelmingly powerful national leader. Naturally, then, the British should be suspicious of the designs of Napoleon III. If the new French emperor had shown any sign of an expansionist policy, it would have been a sure sign to England that he was launching a war of conquest to avenge or rival his famous uncle (of whose talent Louis Napoleon had but a fraction).

Foremost in the English mind was the Mediterranean Basin. Only France had the navy to come close to the dominant Royal Navy, as Palmerston and Russell were very aware. Therefore the spread of French bases in Italy would have been considered very unsatisfactory. The English feared potential French bases at Palermo or Taranto from which French ships could control the central Mediterranean. When Nice and Savoy were annexed, it was entirely natural for the English to suppose that further deals would lead to the cession of Genoa or other ports. Russell had to be cautious. Such things were not going to occur, but if Victor Emmanuel could have given up Savoy, the defense line for Turin against any French attack and the ancient home of his own ruling house, then why would Cavour not forsake the name of the country he served, Piedmont-Sardinia, by ceding the island of Sardinia in return for national unity? At the time Palmerston and his ministers could not have looked at the situation with the idea that those areas were wholly Italian and would not want to be ceded to France. Truly, the English would go to great lengths to avoid allowing French footholds in Italy.

Another important aspect of British foreign policy in this time was the anti-Papal stance of the liberals under Palmerston. England had long been regarded by the Papacy as the greatest enemy of clerical power in the peninsula. English leaders had referred to Rome as the "plague spot of Europe" (McIntire 223). This point of view cannot be overlooked but must not be overemphasized. England did want to see Papal power weakened considerably (for the same reasons England opposed Austrian misrule and "feudalism" in Italy), but it would be misleading to say that this was the deciding factor in the changing policy of the Palmerston government.

The fear of France was the single most important issue in England's division of her foreign policy support. It was almost certain to the English that after Cavour's machinations and his "bare-faced treachery" over Nice and Savoy that Cavour was

the mind of Russell. Cavour was pro-French and pro-Italian (or so they thought); it followed that if Italy became a state, it would be a certainty that she would allow the French safe haven in her ports and all manner of trade restrictions. As Garibaldi was openly anti-French, supporting him was also a certainty, though the amount of support presented something of a quandary to the Foreign Office. In the end, it was only the persuasive voice of the Italophile James Hudson and the strong love for Italy that forced Russell to see that Italy was determined to become a state and that the situation had progressed so far that unification seemed an acceptable alternative. Russell was not blind to the fact that just perhaps the nationalists in Italy would prevail and Cavour's pro-French attitude would not have such a great effect. This is exactly what happened.

The value of the service of Great Britain to Italy during its unification has been greatly neglected by most historians, who for the most part correctly give the major credit to whom it belongs, Garibaldi and Cavour. Even so, in the European political world the Italian state needed recognition to warrant its existence, and Great Britain provided this. Given the general absence of distinct records (besides the myriad political correspondences) of the actions taken by Palmerston in regard to Italy, the effect of British support is difficult to measure. Perhaps the Italians know best, as some revere the leaders of unification to be Cavour, Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Lord John Russell. This may well be true. Russell's assistance and his decision to make his stand by Italy allowed the process to continue. The political aid of England during 1859 and 1860 should not be forgotten or underestimated. Though Cavour's adept and cunning politics and Garibaldi's revolutionary popularity and zeal were the most important factors, Great Britain, by silently standing by, acted as a protective shelter under which the new nation of Italy could be successfully created.

Footnotes

¹The French occupation was very important to the birth of the Risorgimento. All manner of reforms had been started. Custom barriers were removed, roads were built, legal codes became standardized based on French law (the Code Napoleon), and the privileges of the nobles and clergy were removed. These occupational reforms planted a seed that would germinate much later, but this marked the beginning of the unification movement. For further reference

see Holt 27-29.

²The Papacy went to considerable lengths to protect her ancient territory. Pius IX looked for any Catholic money and manpower he could get. Plans were underway for a reopening of the medieval Peter's Pence, and many small European groups answered the call to arms, including, curiously enough 1300 Irishmen in a unit known as the battalion of St. Patrick. See McIntire pp. 200-204.

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Though a rather general work, Porter's book casts a very discerning eye upon the political theory of the British government under Lord Palmerston.

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This is an excellent study of the career of this talented politician, looking critically at his beliefs and policies.

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Written by one of the two greatest Italian historians (together with Mack-Smith), this work covers in great detail the period of May to November, 1860, when the unification hung in the balance.

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Though an older work, this volume remains an excellent overview of British foreign affairs. Ward and Gooch present the view that the Anglo-Italian affairs shifted according to the changing situation and that it was not planned for Russell and Palmerston to support Italy with unity as their intended goal.

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Can Extra Fat Make Healthier Hogs? The Effects of Dietary alpha-Linolenic Acid on Antibody Production in Swine Following Stimulation by Red Blood Cells and by *Pasteurella Multocida* (Stereotype A)

Anne Elise Clark

Introduction

Disease is one of the major causes of economic loss in the livestock industry. Death, non-productivity, weight loss, and infertility caused by infectious diseases cost livestock producers millions of dollars each year. Indeed, epidemics can cause the loss of entire herds at one time. Present methods for disease control include veterinary services, vaccination programs, regular administration of parasite medication, widespread use of antibiotics (oral and injectable), isolation of individual animals or herds, and slaughter of infected or potentially infected animals. These methods require extensive amounts of time and money from careful managers. Because of the complexity of disease control and the incidence of human error (or ignorance), the aforementioned methods may occasionally result in contaminated animal products being submitted for consumption. In addition to potential contamination, widespread use of antibiotics can cause bacterial mutation. Current programs for disease control, therefore, necessitate the search for new programs utilizing the animal's own immune system.

This is especially true in swine which are often housed in close quarters. Overcrowding, poor ventilation, and warm, moist conditions can facilitate the rapid spread of disease throughout individual swine operations. Feeding of medicated feed is commonly accepted as a means of increasing weight gain within the herd. The fact that swine are monogastrics, however, reduces fermentation and detoxification of dietary antibiotics in the early digestive tract. This leads to greater amounts of product contamination in animals improperly fed antibiotics. Omega-3 fatty acids may provide a solution to this dilemma.

Omega-3 fatty acid is a general term for any unsaturated fatty acid containing its first double bond three carbons from the hydrocarbon end of the fatty acid chain. The term dietary omega-3 fatty acid usually refers to the long-chain polyunsaturated omega-3 fatty acids which include and are synthesized from alpha-linolenic acid (LNA), annotated 18:3n-3.¹ These include eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA), 20:5n-3, docosapentaenoic (DPA), 22:5n-3, and

docosahexaenoic (DHA), 22:6n-3. LNA is converted to EPA, DPA, and DHA by a series of desaturases and elongases in animal systems.

Omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids (n-3 PUFAs) are found in various animal and plant tissues. LNA is the primary n-3 PUFA found in plants, while EPA and DHA are the major n-3 PUFAs found in animals. In plants such as purslane, spinach, buttercrunch and red leaf lettuce, and mustard, n-3 PUFAs make up the majority of total fatty acid content. Vegetable oils—including rapeseed, rice bran, soybean, tomato seed, walnut wheat germ, and linseed oil—include various amounts of n-3 fatty acids (Simopoulos, 1990). Linseed oil, extracted from the grain of the flax plant (*Linum usitatissimum*), is the most highly concentrated terrestrial source of alpha-linolenic acid with a fatty acid concentration of fifty-five to fifty-eight percent (Cunnane et al., 1990). Unlike the higher plants, ferns, liverwort, mosses, and algae have the capacity to synthesize C₂₀ and C₂₂ n-3 PUFAs (Budowski, 1988).

N-3 PUFA sources are equally plentiful in the animal kingdom, both terrestrial and aquatic. Animals, with the exception of felines, can desaturate and elongate ingested C₁₈ fatty acids (Budowski, 1988). N-3 fatty acids are encountered in high concentration in aquatic life forms from phytoplankton and zooplankton through marine mammals and terrestrial consumers of marine products (Budowski, 1988). Oily fish is especially high in n-3 PUFA concentration; by far the major fish oil produced in the United States is menhaden oil, typically containing 14% 20:5n-3 and 9% 22:6n-3.

Alpha-linolenic acid has been shown to be an essential fatty acid. In the diets of catfish, it is required at 1.0-2.0% of caloric intake (Satoh et al., 1989), and in humans at 0.54% of calories in children (Holman et al., 1982) and 0.2-0.3% in adults (Bjerve et al., 1987). In the United States, the primary dietary sources of alpha-linolenic acid are cooking oils, salad oils, margarine, butter, salad dressings, and food-service fats and oils (Hunter,

1990). Recent research has concluded that levels of n-3 fatty acids can be enhanced in food animals by specific feeding of n-3 fatty acid rich substances. Omega-3 levels can be boosted in animal tissues such as eggs, chicken meat, pork, and farmed fish by feeding menhaden fish oil (Barlow and Pike, 1991). Flax-fed pigs show a higher incidence of 18:3n-3 in all body tissues except for the brain. EPA, DPA, and DHA levels vary among organs (Cunnane et al., 1990).

Many benefits to animals and humans have been observed upon the feeding of alpha-linolenic acid. Research has demonstrated the benefits of n-3 PUFAs in the treatment of atherosclerosis and other blood vessel diseases, in the development of normal nervous tissue, in the treatment of inflammatory diseases, and in the enhancement of resistance to infectious disease. Possessing strong platelet anti-aggregatory properties (Renaud et al., 1986), n-3 PUFAs have been shown to lower the incidence of thrombosis and myocardial infarction in Greenland Eskimos (Dyerburg et al., 1978), and lower blood pressure in human males (Berry and Hirsch, 1986). A review describing the relationship between atherosclerosis and fish oil was submitted by Connor and Conner, 1990.

Omega-3 fatty acids are important for normal brain and nervous tissue development. Deficient individuals have been shown to have slower nerve conductivity (Bjerve et al., 1982), distal numbness and paresthesia combined with visual blurring and mild tremor of the left upper extremity (Holman et al., 1982), and poorer electroretinogram responsiveness (Barlow and Pike, 1991).

Inflammatory diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and psoriasis also exhibit some relationship to n-3 PUFAs. The production of inflammatory mediators--Prostaglandin E_2 (PGE_2), Interleukin-1, and Tumor Necrosis Factor--is influenced by dietary levels of n-3 PUFAs (Lokesh, 1989). "...diets enriched with fish-oil-derived fatty acids may have an antiinflammatory effect by inhibiting the 5-lipogenase pathway in neutrophils and monocytes and inhibiting the Leukotriene B₄-mediated functions of neutrophils" (Lee et al., 1985). Patients on long-term gastric tube feeding have a tendency toward n-3 deficiency and scaly dermatitis (Bjerve et al., 1987). Menhaden oil and linseed oil have been shown to improve resistance to endotoxic shock in guinea pigs (Mascioli et al., 1989) and horses (Morris et al., 1989, 1991), respectively. According to Alexander et al. (1991), the PGE_2 production of nursing pigs is enhanced by

feeding fish oil (as opposed to lard) to the sow in late gestation.

Investigation of the effects of dietary n-3 PUFAs on infectious disease resistance is still in its initial stages, but several studies have demonstrated an enhancement of immune capabilities by feeding diets enriched with n-3 PUFAs. Fritsche et al. (1991) found that chicks fed fish oil had a higher antibody production to sheep red blood cells than chicks fed corn oil, linseed oil, or lard. The growth rate of the chicks was significantly lower at day 27 for the chicks on fish oil than the others. Lymphocyte proliferation was depressed 30-50% by linseed oil and fish oil. In rabbits, linseed oil has generally been found to enhance immune capabilities. After stimulation with several mitogens, the proliferation of peripheral blood lymphocytes and the increase in antibody titer levels were the immune capabilities most enhanced (Kelley et al., 1988) by a linseed oil-supplemented diet. In a 1990 study by Fritsche and Johnson, prostaglandin production in the spleen of mice was dramatically reduced by feeding a diet with high n-3 PUFA content. Cell-mediated cytotoxic activity against vaccinia virus-infected targets in the same animals was 10-23% greater in linseed oil-fed mice than in corn or fish oil-fed mice. Phagocytosis of SRBC in pulmonary alveolar macrophages in swine was enhanced by *in vitro* addition of linolenic acid to the culture solution (Caruso and Jeska, 1990).

Swine are good subjects for studying the effects of dietary n-3 PUFAs. Their large litters make possible the selection of large contemporary groups, thereby increasing the number of degrees of freedom and reducing some of the expected variance of the population. Being monogastrics, n-3 PUFAs are not subject to rumen oxidation activity but are directly incorporated into body tissues. In addition, pigs are widely used in biomedical research because of physiologic, anatomic, nutritional, and metabolic similarities between pigs and humans. Also, similarities between the nutritional needs of newborn pigs and neonatal humans make swine good models for the study of the human neonatal diet (Pond, p.40). The spontaneous occurrence in swine of such circulatory diseases as atherosclerosis makes research in that area beneficial for dietary control of adult humans as well. The possibility of translating the results for humans as well as livestock, in effect, doubles the usefulness of swine in research concerning dietary omega-3 PUFAs.

The goal of the present study was to

determine the effects of the alpha-linolenic acid present in ground flax on the humoral immunity of swine. The experiment was divided into two studies. The objectives of study 1 were to determine the effects of ground flax on the specific antibody production of lactating sows, to determine the specific passive immunity available to neonatal pigs through colostrum, and to determine the specific passive immunity obtained by neonatal pigs by one week of age. The objectives of study 2 were to determine the specific passive immunity retained by the young pig after weaning, to determine the effects of ground flax on specific antibody production of the weanling pig, and to differentiate between effects of feeding ground flax to sows and/or weanling pigs on final antibody titer to injected antigens.

Materials and Methods

Animals

Six litters, born at the Western Kentucky University farm in the late fall of 1991 and winter of 1992², were utilized in this experiment. The pigs were purebred Yorkshire (n=37), purebred Hampshire (n=12) and crossbred Yorkshire by Hampshire (n=10). Approximately 7 weeks before farrowing, dams were divided randomly into two groups. One group was maintained on a standard gestation diet, while the other was fed a similar diet supplemented with a 4% concentration of a ground flaxseed and vitamin E mixture (*Omega Gold*). Dams were housed in outdoor pens until a few days prior to farrowing, at which time they were moved into farrowing crates. Sows were fed twice daily. At farrowing, the dams were placed on a lactation diet with the flaxseed concentration remaining the same for the treatment group.

Neonatal pigs were provided with heat lamps and housed on the floor with the sows. They were allowed to nurse ad libitum. From 2 weeks of age until weaning, pigs were given complete access to standard creep feed (20% CP) to supplement nutrition gained from the sow.

At approximately six weeks of age, pigs were weaned and sorted randomly with regard to sex and weight into groups such that four experimental groups were formed (Figure 1). One group was placed on a control diet (18% CP), and the other was given a diet supplemented with a 2% concentration of ground flaxseed and vitamin E. Approximately four weeks after the initiation of the trial, the pigs were

switched to a standard 16% CP diet (ground flaxseed concentration in the diet remained the same). They were housed in a hot nursery maintained at 26 to 36°C. Pigs were randomly assigned to 1.22 m² wire floor decks and slotted floor pens. Pigs were given feed ad libitum and had access to fresh water at all times.

Antigens and Immunizations

Sheep Red Blood Cells (SRBC) and *Pasteurella multocida* (serotype A) (PmA) were the antigens selected for use in this study. SRBC were selected because they are commonly used in immunological studies and because they are non-pathogenic to swine. A killed PmA bacterin was selected because of its known pathogenicity to swine and because standardized procedures for measuring serum antibodies are commercially available.

SRBC were obtained from a single wether in the flock at the WKU farm by jugular venipuncture no more than 48 hours before use. Blood clotting was prevented by 5 ml of heparin per 60 ml of blood collected. Red blood cells were harvested by centrifugation at approximately 1100 g. They were washed and recentrifuged a sufficient number of times to remove hemolyzed cell fragments (0-2 times). According to the protocol designed by Seymour (1985), cells were diluted to a 5% solution in physiological saline for injectable antigen.

The PmA bacterin was obtained pre-diluted to a known concentration of 1×10^8 colony-forming units per ml. The diluent used was a 12% rehydrogel adjuvant (Ambico, Inc., Dallas Center, Iowa).

Antigens were administered at the start of each study. In study 1, approximately six weeks before farrowing, each sow was given intramuscular (IM) injections of SRBC (4 ml) and PmA (2 ml) in separate neck injection sites in order to stimulate the primary immune response. Booster injections were given three weeks later to stimulate the secondary immune response. In study 2, four weeks after weaning, each pig was given IM injections of SRBC (2 ml) and PmA (1 ml). Three weeks later each pig was given booster injections to stimulate the secondary immune response.

Pigs were weighed at the beginning and end of each study in order to assess average daily gain during the trial.

Sample Collection

Study 1:

At farrowing, colostrum (the antibody-rich fraction of milk that is secreted at parturition) was collected from each sow to determine the levels of antibody available for absorption by the pig. Colostrum supplies the major portion of passive immunity which is obtained within the first 24 hours of life (Miller, 1962). Blood samples were collected from each sow one week after farrowing to determine the secondary immune response of the sow. Blood was collected via the anterior vena cava with a 16 gauge, 10 cm needle attached to a disposable 10 ml syringe. At the same time, blood was collected from a random sample of the litter (approximately 6 pigs) to form a pooled litter sample with which to measure the average antibody titer (obtained passively) in the litter. Blood was collected from the anterior vena cava of the neonatal pigs using a 20 gauge, 2.5 cm needle attached to a 3 ml disposable syringe.

Study 2:

Blood samples were collected at the initiation of the trial to determine the level of passive immunity retained by the weanling pig to each antigen. Blood was collected again six weeks after the initial antigen injections to determine the secondary immune response demonstrated by each pig ($n=59$). Blood was collected from the anterior vena cava using a 18 gauge, 3.8 cm needle attached to a disposable 10 ml syringe.

Each blood sample was placed in a Serum Separation Tube (SST) and allowed to clot at ambient temperature. Sera were harvested by centrifuging each sample for ten minutes at 1100 g. Each sample was divided into two 10 mm x 75 mm polystyrene culture tubes and frozen at approximately -10°C until assay.

Colostrum was divided into samples and frozen at -56°C until assay.

Assays

The colostrum and serum samples were taken to the Ellington Agricultural Center (Nashville, TN) immunology lab to determine antibody levels by microtitration in Immulon 1 disposable round-bottom 96 well microtiter plates. Samples were thawed in a 37°C water bath for thirty minutes. Antibody levels against PmA were determined by a direct PmA

agglutination assay (Ambico, Inc., Dallas Center, Iowa). Standard positive and negative and all test samples were pre-diluted 1/10 in PAST diluent composed of 5% NaCl, 1/1000ml formalin, 0.05% bovine serum albumin, and distilled water. Twenty-five microliters (ul) of diluent were placed in wells in columns B through L of each microtiter plate. Each sample was assayed in duplicate by placing 25 ul of the sample in columns A and B in two rows of the microtiter plate. The samples were then serially diluted from columns B through L. Bulk PmA antigen was diluted 1 to 170 in PAST diluent, and 25 ul of diluted antigen were added to each well to give a final dilution scheme of 1:20 to 1:40,960. The plates were then shaken to mix the antigen and antisera before being incubated at 37°C for two hours and approximately 4°C overnight.

Antibodies to SRBC from each sample were determined by microtitration hemagglutination assay. Samples were placed in a 56°C water bath for thirty minutes to deactivate the complement prior to assaying for SRBC antibodies. Twenty-five ul of each sample were serially diluted in duplicate with 25 ul of physiological saline to give a final dilution scheme of 1:2 to 1:4,096. Twenty-five ul of a 2% SRBC suspension were added to each well, and plates were shaken before being incubated at approximately 25°C for one hour and 4°C overnight.

Antibody titer in each assay was recorded as the reciprocal of the highest dilution at which visible agglutination occurred. If the end-points of the duplicated assays were not equal, the highest titer value was recorded. End-points which were more than one well apart were considered invalid and were disregarded.

The reciprocal of the highest dilution at which a visible agglutination occurred was then transformed using \log_2 (because the assay utilized a serial doubling dilution scheme) to normalize the distribution. The General Linear Models procedure (GLM) of the Statistical Analysis Services (SAS), (SAS, 1989), was used to analyze these data. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on these data to determine significant differences. Duncan's Multiple Range (DMR) test was used to separate treatment differences.

Results and Discussion

Study 1:

Results for study 1 are found in table 1. No

statistical differences ($P > 0.05$) were found in ADG or any of the antibody titers measured according to differences in treatment of the sow. The antibody production of the experimental group of sows to PmA was higher than the production in the control sows ($F = 3.77$, $P < 0.07$).

Study 2:

Results for study 2 are presented in table 2. Transformed values for the baseline titer to PmA were not found to be statistically different ($P < 0.14$). Antibody titers in treatment group 4 were higher than titers in group 1, but neither were statistically different from groups 2 or 3. Baseline titers to SRBC were statistically different ($P < 0.0001$) among treatment groups. Group 2 showed the highest titer and was significantly higher than groups 1, 4, and 3.

No statistical difference was found for ADG among treatment groups.

Data for the end titer to PmA was highly significant ($P < 0.001$). Treatment groups 3, 2, and 1 demonstrated higher antibody titers to PmA than treatment 4. Secondary titers to SRBC were not statistically different ($P < 0.12$), but antibody titers in treatment group 1 were higher than titers in group 4.

Although not statistically different, the sows in study 1 that were fed a diet supplemented with the ground flax / vitamin E mixture, demonstrated higher mean transformed titer values than the sows fed the control diet. These results appeared to be translated to a lesser extent to the neonatal pigs, resulting in higher (though not statistically) mean transformed titer levels in colostrum and pooled litter serum samples when antibody response to PmA was measured. Antibody titer to SRBC was inconsistent with this trend in pooled litter serum samples and showed a lower mean transformed value for sows fed the supplemented diet than those fed the control diet.

Statistical insignificance of the values in study 1 could be the result of small numbers in the course of the study. The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that transformed titer levels in the colostrum samples were normally distributed (Figure 2), while distribution for serum samples was not normal. Differences in the mean transformed titer levels of PmA antibody in sow serum approached statistical significance ($F = 3.77$, $P < 0.08$). Future studies should be conducted with a larger number of experimental animals.

Mean transformed titer levels for study 2 showed statistical, or approaching statistical

differences. The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that transformed titer levels of baseline and end titer to PmA were normally distributed (Figure 3). The responses to SRBC and PmA were not similar in either baseline or end titer values. Groups 1 and 4 were statistically different in both the baseline and end titer levels to PmA. As seen in Figure 4, baseline titer showed an inverse relationship to the end titer. This apparently negative effect could be due to inhibition of active antibody production by the presence of maternal antibodies lingering in the serum of young pigs. Documentation of this effect in other studies was not found.

Response to SRBC showed a different trend. When transformed baseline titer was analyzed, group 2 was found to be statistically higher than the other three groups, and group 1 was statistically higher than group 3. An analysis of the end transformed titer values showed that group 1 was statistically higher than group 4. The end titer seemed to have no dependence on the baseline for this aspect of this trial.

A recently completed study by Stalder et al. (1992), using the same antigens, demonstrated that there was little correlation between titer levels produced in response to PmA and SRBC. They concluded that SRBC, a non-pathogenic antigen uncommon to the environment of swine, was not a suitable measure for immune response in swine.

Results indicate that no statistical differences were found when the effects of the experimental diet on average daily gain were measured. Even if future research should demonstrate that aspects of the immune system are enhanced by feeding a diet supplemented with ground flax and vitamin E, an increase in market weight of the hogs must be demonstrated to make the discovery economically useful.

Several aspects of the present experiment could have led to the lack of statistical difference observed among the treated groups. The type of omega-3 fatty acid used may be an influencing factor in the biological usefulness of the substance. Many sources indicate that alpha-linolenic acid is an enhancer of immune capabilities. Kelley et al. (1988) found the immune systems of rabbits to be more responsive to diets supplemented with linseed oil than those supplemented with menhaden (fish) oil. Fritsche et al. (1991), on the other hand, found that chicks fed fish oil demonstrated higher antibody production after challenge with sheep red blood cells than corn oil, lard, and linseed oil-fed chicks,

respectively. No reports of immunological studies using flaxseed as a dietary source of alpha-linolenic acid were found, but Ratnayake et al. (1992) reported that the "alpha-linolenic acid in flaxseed is bioavailable and converted by rats into long chain n-3 fatty acids." Conflicting results may be due to differences in the type of omega-3 fatty acid used or the type of animal species studied.

The source of omega-3 fatty acid itself may have led to suppression of reported benefits from the alpha-linolenic acid on the humoral immune response. Flaxseed is a rich source of alpha-linolenic acid, but the presence of several potential antinutritional factors has eliminated its use as an edible grain in the United States. The anti-nutritional factor linatine is a vitamin B-6 (pyridoxine) antagonist (Ratnayake et al., 1992). Vitamin B-6 deficiency has been shown to have adverse effects on cell-mediated immunity in elderly adults. Upon recognition of vitamin B-6 depletion, a significant decrease in the percentage of lymphocytes (the cells responsible for antibody production) was observed (Meydani et al., 1991). The levels of vitamin B-6 in the pigs studied is not known, but the influence of linatine should not be discounted when effects of flax on the immune response are being studied. Care should be taken to ensure that the concentration of linatine present in the feedstuff is not sufficient to negate the benefits that alpha-linolenic acid could have on the immune response.

The addition of vitamin E to the ground flax could be a confusing factor in the observed effects of alpha-linolenic acid on humoral immunity. Vitamin E has been found to be effective in stabilizing omega-3 fatty acids against oxidation. Omega-3 PUFAs, like other polyunsaturated fatty acids, are highly susceptible to autooxidation upon storage or exposure to heat. In addition, Langanieri et al. (1990) demonstrated that vitamin E depletion and membrane lipid peroxidation occurred in mice that were fed diets supplemented with fish oil. Peroxidation was inhibited when vitamin E levels were replenished by supplementing fish oil diets with high levels of vitamin E. Consequently, vitamin E stabilization is commonly accepted as a means of increasing the shelf life of omega-3 PUFAs and preventing adverse effects to the experimental animal.

Ratnayake et al. (1992), however, determined that the structure of flaxseed protects alpha-linolenic acid from oxidation due to long-term storage and thermal treatment. Flaxseed heated for one hour at 100 and 350°C showed no significant

evidence of oxidation.³ In addition, after storage at room temperature and 4°C for 44 weeks, the fatty acid composition of the flaxseed remained unchanged. They also observed that detrimental lipid peroxidation in organ tissues of rats only occurred when rats were maintained on high levels of flaxseed for an extended period of time. These findings question the need for vitamin E stabilization of flax.

Superfluous vitamin E has been found to affect the humoral immune response. The immune responses of suckling and weaned pigs were enhanced when sows were fed high levels of vitamin E (Babinszky et al., 1991). Higher antibody titer to ovalbumin was found in pigs from sows fed high levels of vitamin E (136 ppm) than those whose sows were fed low to medium levels of vitamin E. These results suggest that extra vitamin E in the diets of experimental pigs in the present study would influence antibody titers.

It should be noted that a feed-grade antibiotic was utilized in the diets of the weanling pigs. Researchers that wish to determine the effects of omega-3 fatty acids as compared to antibiotics on general immunity of swine should substitute the antibiotic source with a source of omega-3 fatty acid.

Implications

Health of livestock is of utmost importance to producers in the swine industry. In the face of possible legislation limiting the feeding of low levels of antibiotics to swine, methods of disease control that utilize the animals' own immune systems will become more essential to the industry. These methods could help eliminate the problems of product contamination and bacterial mutation currently observed if they are applied properly. The researcher must keep in mind, however, that enhanced immune systems will be worthless to producers if they are not accompanied by enhancement of economically important traits such as average daily gain or feed efficiency.

Concerning the usefulness of swine as animal models to determine benefits of omega-3 fatty acids to humans, transferring experimental results across these lines would not be recommended until more consistent results are obtained from studies comparing effects on different animal species. Further research with regard to the effects of omega-3 fatty acid on indices of the immune system is warranted.

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TABLE 1
MEAN TITER VALUES (LOG₂) TO PmA AND SRBC
STUDY 1

Treatment groups	PmA			SRBC		
	sow serum	pig serum	colostrum	sow serum	pig serum	colostrum
1	11.32 ^A	11.61 ^B	14.04 ^C	2.00 ^D	2.29 ^E	4.00 ^F
2	12.49 ^A	12.16 ^B	14.16 ^C	3.00 ^D	1.33 ^E	4.67 ^F
F value	3.77	0.41	0.03	1.82	1.92	1.18
P <	0.08	0.54	0.87	0.21	0.19	0.30

^{A-F} Numbers in the same column with the same superscripts are not significantly different.

TABLE 2
MEAN TITER VALUES (LOG₂) TO PmA AND SRBC
STUDY 2

Treatment groups	PmA		SRBC	
	BASELINE	END	BASELINE	END
1	5.99 ^A	12.2 ^C	1.08 ^E	3.36 ^H
2	6.60 ^{A,B}	12.2 ^C	1.67 ^F	2.94 ^{H,J}
3	6.32 ^{A,B}	12.6 ^C	0.46 ^G	2.50 ^{H,J}
4	7.13 ^B	9.99 ^D	0.56 ^{E,G}	2.19 ^I
F value	1.89	6.28	8.51	2.06
P <	0.14	0.001	0.0001	0.12

^{A-J} Numbers in the same column with the same superscripts are not significantly different.

TABLE 3

ANOVA--ANTIBODY TITER TO PASTEURELLA MULTOCIDA (SEROTYPE A)
Study 1

Source	Degrees of freedom	Sum of squares	Mean squares	F	P <
Total	12	17.23			
Model	1	4.40	4.40	3.77	0.08
Error	11	12.83	1.17		

TABLE 4

ANOVA--BASELINE TITER TO SHEEP RED BLOOD CELLS
Study 2

Source	Degrees of freedom	sum of squares	mean squares	F	P <
Total	58	46.98			
Model	34.90	14.90	4.97	8.51	0.0001
Error	55	32.08	0.58		

TABLE 5

ANOVA--END TITER TO SHEEP RED BLOOD CELLS
Study 2

Source	Degrees of freedom	Sum of squares	Mean squares	F	P <
Total	56	101.51			
Model	3	10.58	3.53	2.06	0.12
Error	53	90.93	1.72		

TABLE 6

ANOVA--BASELINE TITER TO PASTEURELLA MULTOCIDA (SEROTYPE A)

Study 2

Source	Degrees of freedom	sum of squares	mean squares	F	P <
Total	58	106.68			
Model	3	9.96	3.32	1.89	0.14
Error	53	96.72	1.76		

TABLE 7

ANOVA--END TITER TO PASTEURELLA MULTOCIDA (SEROTYPE A)


Study 2

Source	Degrees of freedom	sum of squares	mean squares	F	P <
Total	58	233.48			
Model	3	60.41	20.14	6.28	0.001
Error	55	173.07	3.21		

Notes

¹The annotation denotes the number of carbon-carbon bonds in the fatty acid, followed by the number of carbon-carbon double bonds, followed by n designating the hydrocarbon end of the fatty acid chain as the beginning, followed by the carbon after which the first double bond is found.

Ex. alpha-linolenic acid (18:3n-3)



²Eight sows due to farrow in late January/early February were added to this experiment to increase the experimental number for study 1 to n=14. The titer values for one sow were considered invalid due to assay errors.

³The thermal stability that is here demonstrated would make possible the destruction of any anti-nutritional factors through heat treatment without the loss of alpha-linolenic acid concentration in the seed. This would make flax an ideal source of omega-3 PUFAs were sufficient benefits found.

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: A New Look At An Old Problem *Victoria Gottfried*

Visits to any elementary school playground across the country would reveal much the same scene in each case: children running, jumping, yelling, laughing, playing, and making quite a lot of noise. When recess would end, approximately 95 percent of those children would quickly return to their classrooms, sit in their seats, and in a very short time would be ready to resume their academic work. However, the other 5 percent would continue talking, making noise, moving around the room or in their seats, and disturbing the children around them. The teachers' verbal reprimands would have little effect on these unruly children. Who are these children, and why don't they behave as the others do? Are they "bad" children, or perhaps the victims of poor parenting? For decades, these misunderstood children have been labelled as "bad," and their parents blamed for their disruptive behavior. But in the last twenty years psychiatrists and other researchers have reevaluated this assessment, probing deeper into this perplexing problem. While no miraculous cure has been found, their discoveries have greatly increased the understanding of the condition from which these children suffer and have offered hope for them and their often distraught parents.

In 1987, the American Psychiatric Association gave the new name Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) to this very old problem (Buckhoff, 1990, p. 86). In former years, it has been called minimal brain dysfunction, hyperactivity, attention deficit disorder, and attention deficit disorder with or without hyperactivity (Garber, Garber, and Spizman, 1990, p. 5). The latter name was adopted after researchers discovered that Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) can occur with or without hyperactivity (Buckhoff, p. 86). Furthermore, Garber, Garber, and Spizman assert that "changes in terminology, though confusing to all of us, reflect the evolution of thought about the causes of this disorder and more recently, the relative importance of the symptoms" (p. 6). For the sake of clarity, the current name, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, will be used throughout this paper.

Although only about five percent of American children suffer from ADHD, the actual number is approximately five million, according to Paul

H. Wender, M.D., (1987, p.3), who is a Professor of Psychiatry and the Director of Psychiatric Research at the University of Utah Medical Center. This disorder is a problem of growing concern for parents and educators and is receiving increasing attention from the educational and medical communities. The following statistics reflect this development:

By 1980 hyperactivity was the single most common condition for which youngsters were referred to child psychiatry clinics. And the number of articles published on hyper-activity in the scientific literature grew from 31 in the last three years of the 1950s to 7,000 in the last three years of the 1970s. (Divoky, 1989, p. 603)

Fortunately for these five million children and their families, ADHD is finally being recognized as a legitimate disorder and is being treated as such by increasing numbers of mental health professionals, physicians, and educators.

Wender describes ADHD as a "syndrome"--"a group of difficulties that tend to clump, cluster, or move together" (p.25). In addition, he lists the following characteristics which typify ADHD: easily distracted, short attention span, impulsive, hyperactive, crave attention, have difficulties in school, "poor coordination," resist authority, try to dominate others, have "emotional difficulties," "immaturity," and "changing problems with age" (pp. 7-23). The first signs of ADHD may be noticed by parents when their children are infants or toddlers; these youngsters need little sleep, are even busier than most toddlers, and may be accident-prone (Wender, p.10). However, since hyperactivity is only one of a number of possible characteristics which may occur with ADHD, this is not always the case (Wender, p. 4). Wender asserts that hyperactivity often subsides with age, while other ADD symptoms persist (p. 12). Or, in later years, hyperactivity may be expressed in less obvious behaviors, such as fidgeting or foot-tapping, or in socially acceptable high-energy pursuits, such as dancing or sports (Wender, p. 12). The full-blown syndrome usually emerges in the pre-school or early

childhood years. Some of these children, though not all, have poor coordination which particularly affects their fine-motor skills. This often manifests itself in difficulty with "coloring, cutting with scissors, tying shoelaces, and buttoning" (Wender, p. 19). The older child is apt to have illegible handwriting and despise the task (Wender, p. 19). As children with ADHD develop, they may demonstrate wide and frequent changes in mood which are unpredictable, low frustration tolerance and a tendency toward outbursts of temper, as well as a lack of "stick-to-itiveness" (Wender, pp. 21-23). In addition, they become noncompliant, resistant to rules, and authority, and seemingly "immune to any form of discipline" (Wender, p. 19-20). Most are extremely independent, although a few are quite dependent for their age (Wender, p. 20). They are usually quite friendly and socially aggressive, "but their style drives other children away" (Wender, p. 20); they tend to be immature, functioning emotionally like a child four or five years younger (Wender, p. 23). Impulsivity, one of the hallmarks of ADHD, manifests itself in "poor planning and judgment," as well as disorderliness and disorganization (Wender, p. 9). When impulsivity is extreme, it may lead to lying and stealing (Wender, p. 9). "Conduct disorder [CD]--which includes lying, stealing, fighting and vandalism--is another psychiatric condition; it affects up to half of ADHD patients" (Wender, p. 12). Wender uses the unique but apt phrase "spiraling loss of control" (p. 104) to describe the tendency of many ADHD children to become more and more wild once they get going. He adds that "what is so different about the ADHD child is that when he is requested to turn off his motor, he cannot do so for very long" (p. 11). Wender also maintains that while normal children need adult involvement and attention, the ADHD child is "insatiable" (p. 12) in this regard. This may drive him or her to "whine, badger, tease, and annoy without stop;" (p. 12) or he may become a dare devil or class clown, driving parents, teachers, siblings and classmates crazy (Wender, p. 12-13). Wender emphasizes that the intensity, the persistence, and the patterning of these symptoms is what distinguishes ADHD children from normal children (p. 6). Robert J. Resnick, Ph.D., director of the Attention Deficit Disorders clinic at the Medical College of Virginia, explains the difference between the normal exuberance of childhood and that which characterizes ADHD in these words, "'essentially it is the recurrent presence of nondirected, goalless energy that typifies the hyperactive youngster'"

(Rubin, 1989, p. 193).

Research consistently confirms that significant academic underachievement is associated with ADHD (Frick, et al., p. 292). Buchoff summarizes the problems which ADHD children and their teachers encounter in the classroom setting:

Perhaps the single most disturbing behavioral feature of ADD children is the problem they have obeying classroom rules. Usually possessing a low frustration level, ADD children behave impulsively without considering the consequences of their actions. The lack of self-control displayed by these children can cause the most patient teacher to feel helpless. (p. 88)

Because of the associated characteristics, ADHD sufferers are poorly adapted to the classroom. Buchoff, citing an article by Barkley, 1981, states that ADHD children have "difficulty remaining seated," tend to talk out of turn, interrupt others, and may talk excessively. Since they are "easily distracted," disorganized, deficient in fine motor skills, likely to shift from one uncompleted activity to another and have limited attention spans (Buchoff, p. 86), they experience boredom and frustration and may often incur disapproval from their teachers and classmates. According to Wender, ADHD spans the range of IQ. However, ADHD children "may have an 'unevenness' of intellectual development," being advanced in some areas and slow in others (Wender, p. 13). Furthermore, ADHD children experience secondary problems as a result of their various deficiencies. For example, Buchoff notes that "because of their noncompliant behavior and unfulfilling interactions with others, ADD students are prone to develop negative attitudes about themselves" (p. 89). Consequently, they need plenty of positive feedback about themselves and their work, and will cooperate and work harder for teachers who demonstrate genuine concern and regard for them (Buchoff, p. 89). Parker points out another problem which involves their social relationships; because of their lack of self-control and emotional immaturity, they usually have few real friends (Buchoff, p. 87).

Because ADHD is a complex disorder, it is often difficult to diagnose; there is neither a simple diagnostic measure nor a simple cure (Garber, Garber, & Spizman, 1990, p. 17). Several factors contribute to the difficulty in diagnosing ADHD.

First of all, children with ADHD are characteristically more attentive when someone works with them on a one-to-one basis. Therefore, it is rarely detected during a physical exam or during individual psychological testing (Wender, 1987, p. 8). In addition, Steven R. Pliszka, M.D., Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio who received a National Institutes of Mental Health Physician Scientist Award to study the neurochemical basis of ADHD, asserts that there are no "neurological 'soft signs' unique to [this] disorder" as was once thought (1991, p. 1267). He adds this valuable insight, which addresses the myth that if a child can focus on any particular activity for an appreciable length of time, he must not have ADHD:

Children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder often engage enthusiastically in activities that do not require much attention or impulse control, such as watching television, playing video games, riding bicycles and participating in other outdoor activities. (1991, p. 1269)

Wender further asserts that the ability to do these things does not preclude the diagnosis of ADHD (1991, p. 1269). The Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders establishes the following criteria for ADHD:

- A. A disturbance of at least six months during which at least eight of the following are present:
 1. Often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat (in adolescents, may be limited to subjective feelings of restlessness).
 2. Has difficulty remaining seated when required to do so.
 3. Is easily distracted by extraneous stimuli.
 4. Has difficulty awaiting turn in games or group situations.
 5. Often blurts out answers to questions before they have been completed.
 6. Has difficulty following through on instructions from others (not due to oppositional behavior or failure of comprehension), e.g., fails to finish chores.
 7. Has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities.

8. Shifts from one uncompleted activity to another.
9. Often has difficulty playing quietly.
10. Often talks excessively.
11. Often interrupts or intrudes on others, e.g., butts into other children's games.
12. Often does not seem to listen to what is being said to him or her.
13. Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities at school or home (e.g., toys, pencils, books, assignments).
14. Often engages in physically dangerous activities without considering possible consequences (not for the purpose of thrill-seeking), e.g., runs into street without looking.
- B. Onset before the age of seven.
- C. Does not meet the criteria for a Pervasive Developmental Disorder. (Wender, 1991, p. 1269)

Based on the above criteria, several instruments have been developed to aid in the diagnosis of ADHD. The first three are questionnaires for parents to complete: the Werry-Weiss-Peters Activity Rating Scale, the Conners Parent Rating Scale, and the Home Situation Questionnaire. The other three are to be completed by the child's teacher(s): the Conners Teacher Rating Scale, The Child Behavior Checklist, and The ADD-H Comprehensive Teacher's Rating Scale. These must all be evaluated by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist (Garber, Garber, & Spizman, 1990, pp. 26-29). Garber, Garber, and Spizman emphasize that "a diagnosis of ADHD requires the coordinated efforts of several professionals asking the right questions and using a variety of tests to eliminate problems that mimic ADHD" (1990, p. 18).

The cause of ADHD has been the subject of great speculation and controversy over the years. It was once believed that sugar caused hyperactivity; however, the behavior of most ADHD children is not affected by ingesting sugar or food additives (Garber, Garber & Spizman, p. 14). Moreover, ADHD behaviors are not common among children with brain damage. However, "some evidence exists that damage to certain parts of the brain can lead to ADHD-like symptoms" (Garber, Garber & Spizman, p. 12). Furthermore, research suggests that heredity may be a component in ADHD, and some researchers believe that immaturity in the cortical area of the brain may cause impulsiveness and difficulty in

sustaining attention' (Garber, Garber & Spizman, p. 13). In addition, in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, Alan Zametkin and his colleagues found a positive link between ADHD and a specific brain abnormality. Using positron emission tomography scanning, a state-of-the art brain-imaging technique, the researchers found that overall brain glucose metabolism was 8% lower in hyperactive subjects than in a control group, but the largest differences was in the premotor cortex and the superior prefrontal cortex, areas which regulate attention and motor control. Although the cause remains unclear, this confirms that the problems associated with ADHD are most certainly a function of brain chemistry. Furthermore, Wender brings out the important point that while the individual with ADHD "does have psychological problems . . . they are physically caused" (p. 79). In addition, Pliszka also emphasizes that "increased motor activity is a function of difficulty with attention" (p. 1268).

The most effective and widely-recommended treatment which has been found to date involves a combination of stimulant medication and behavior management for school children. According to Garber, Garber, and Spizman, the drugs which are usually used to treat ADHD are stimulants, not tranquilizers (p. 75). These drugs work by stimulating the areas of the brain which affect concentration and attention. Garber, Garber, and Spizman explain that the children are not being sedated; rather, because they are able to concentrate and focus on something, their bodies calm down (p. 76). Farley uses the following metaphor to describe this phenomenon: "As blinders filter out distracting stimuli for a racehorse, so does a stimulant given to a child. The result is increased concentration for the task at hand: running a horse race or learning a math problem" (p. 12). The drug most commonly prescribed for ADHD is Ritalin. Divoky reports that "RiGarber, and Spizman recommend using stimulant medication for school, for any activity which requires self-control and concentration, and for a child who needs to do homework after school hours (p. 80). They describe their observations of the effects of medication on a group of ADHD children with whom they worked, in the following words:

The difference between these children on medication and the same children off it was striking. When they were off medication, there was a marked deterioration in their schoolwork and

other functioning. When they were on medication, their ability to control aspects of their behavior improved markedly and their attention and concentration also increased. Cautiously and reluctantly we came to the conclusion that for these children, the appropriate use of the right medication was more than simply helpful—it made a real difference for that child. (p. 73)

Many others are cautious as well, and some criticize the magnitude of the use of Ritalin in dealing with difficult children. One of these critics is Dr. Lester Grinspoon, an Associate Professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. According to Grinspoon, "Ritalin works very well for some children, who are well-diagnosed. On the other hand, it gets abused by school authorities and doctors. My biggest problem with the drug is who makes the decision to introduce it" (Divoky, p. 601). Garber, Garber, and Spizman claim that "of those children who are properly diagnosed as ADHD, approximately 75 percent show a positive response to medical intervention;" among these "the amount of improvement varies tremendously. . . . Of the other 25 percent . . . most show only temporary improvement or no effect at all" (p. 74). In addition, they say that too high a dosage of medication will usually make a child lethargic and unable to concentrate on anything. Buchoff summarizes the beneficial effects of drug therapy for ADHD children, and points out that even though medication can only reduce some of the symptoms these children experience, with the help of stimulant medication they can make and keep friends more successfully; they receive more affirmation from teachers; and they feel better about themselves, other people, and "their environment" (p. 87).

Garber, Garber, and Spizman dispel many of the concerns parents voice about possible side effects of stimulant medication for their children. Although side effects are possible with any drug, they say that most of the side effects associated with Ritalin are usually temporary. Many believe that appetite suppression will result from taking Ritalin; however, Garber, Garber, and Spizman contend that "no significant differences in growth curves on and off medication were found in most youngsters when they have been followed through adolescence" (p. 77). Insomnia is another concern, and indeed a "rebound effect" may occur as the drug is wearing off, making the child hyperactive and unable to sleep; the simple

solution to this is to give the medication early enough that this does not occur. Other side effects which were reported less frequently are headaches, dizziness, stomachaches, moodiness, irritability, and crying spells. However, many children experienced these problems before taking stimulant medication. Tics have also been known to occur as a side effect of stimulants. They may be transient and harmless, or they may be a sign of Tourette's syndrome, a serious neurological disorder. Children with Tourette's syndrome should never take stimulant drugs. Pliszka also addresses the issue of side effects and adds that "there is . . . no contraindication to weekend medication if the child is experiencing substantial difficulties at home. The issue of summer drug holidays [--medication-free periods which were recommended in the past--] often centers on fear of growth retardation, much of which is unfounded" (p. 1273).

Many people are critical of the use of stimulant medication for the treatment of ADHD, fearing that it will lead to drug abuse on the part of the patient. These fears are unfounded for many reasons. First of all, ADHD patients taking stimulants do not "get the euphoric effect that abusers do," (Farley, p. 12) and they experience no withdrawal symptoms when they stop taking the drug, according to Josephine Elia, M.D., a researcher at the National Institute of Mental Health. Furthermore, Wender argues that abusers of amphetamines must take from 10 to 100 times the therapeutic dose of methylphenidate to experience the desired euphoric effect. In addition, Garber, Garber, and Spizman point out that "no research has found a clear relationship between taking medication for ADHD earlier in life and a propensity to become an abuser of alcohol or drugs later on" (p. 79). They also assert that "effective treatment for ADHD, which may include medication, open communication and careful supervision, remains your family's best safeguard against drug abuse" (p. 79).

Dr. Meller, a psychiatrist at the University of Minnesota who prescribes Ritalin for his ADHD patients, says that children with ADHD will not benefit much from Ritalin alone and stresses the importance of "structured classrooms" for these children (Divoky, p. 603). Children with ADHD need educational programs which are tailored to their unique needs; they must include "realistic expectations, clear behavioral limits, frequent change of activities, moving around during the day--all tenets of good teaching for young students" (Divoky, p. 600). Buchoff adds that rules must be behaviorally

specific and clearly stated or posted, correction should be quiet and discreet; punishment must occur immediately; and a reward system should be employed to reinforce desired behavior (p. 89). Many ADHD children, especially the more severe cases, may need smaller classes or groups, tutoring, or private teaching sessions with their teachers (Rubin, p. 194). In a unique study, researchers Sydney Zentall of Purdue University and Theresa Kruczek of Ball State University have found that when color is used to highlight important words, ADHD children's comprehension is increased (Farley, p. 15). Wender suggests three treatment principles which are appropriate for ADHD sufferers: "(1) making the patients responsible for their behavior; (2) rewarding them for good behavior; (3) punishing them (in a special way) for bad behavior" (p. 79). He also stresses the need for "a firm, consistent, explicit, predictable home environment" (p. 81). Wender further asserts that although good discipline and behavior management can help the child improve certain aspects of his behavior, most will retain the "psychologically unchangeable symptoms" of "short attention span, distractibility, moodiness, lack of stick-to-itiveness, school underachievement, and immaturity" (p. 80); these will only improve with stimulant medication (p. 81). Support groups for parents of children with ADHD are an integral part of the treatment plan at the Eisenhower Army Medical Center ADD clinic. The directing psychiatrist, Robert E. Shervette, reports that this is often more effective than counselling with the staff. As parents share their struggles with parenting their ADHD children, they gain more compassion for their children and gain valuable insight into their own family's dynamics. Shervette takes a non-blaming stance toward the parents, stating that "'these kids can put even the most patient clinician in a ballistic mood'" (Bower, 1988, p. 399). In conclusion, experts agree that parents, school personnel, physicians, and, when needed, mental health professionals should all work together to help the ADHD child; they should strive to enhance his strengths and de-emphasize his weaknesses" (Farley, p. 15).

Until recently, it was widely believed that ADHD children would outgrow their disorder at puberty. However, research clearly shows that "hyperactive children generally continue to experience behavioral and academic difficulties in adolescence and young adulthood" (Fischer, Barkley, Edelbrock, and Smallish, 1990, p.580). Their

eight-year study comparing hyperactive children with normal children evaluated academic skills, attention, impulsivity, and "other select frontal lobe functions" (p. 581); it "reports the adolescent outcome on formal testing for one of the most rigorously selected samples of hyperactive children reported to date" (p. 581). They found that hyperactive (ADHD) adolescents had significant deficiencies in "basic reading recognition, written spelling, and arithmetic skills" (p. 585), varying significantly from control groups matched on IQ. The researchers also found impairment in "general academic adjustment and conduct at school . . . as reflected in more grade retentions, suspensions and expulsions, and dropping out of school" (p. 585). Their research also suggests that attention span often improves throughout adolescence, as do problem-solving skills and the "inhibition and regulation of activity level . . . as reflected in significantly less fidgeting, vocalizing, and out-of-seat behaviors" (p. 587). Another study conducted by Fischer, Barkley, Edelbrock, and Smallish revealed the following:

To the extent that all of these [behaviors] reflect neuropsychological aspects of frontal lobe functions, these results suggest that abilities mediated by the frontal lobes continue their maturation well into late adolescence and perhaps into young adulthood, consistent with patterns of neuranatomical maturation of these brain regions (p. 587).

Their findings suggest that in children with ADHD, the "primary symptoms" (p. 587) will not disappear or simply be outgrown; subjects as old as 20 years displayed difficulty in inhibiting behavior. The researchers conclude that "these persistent impairments will very likely have significant ramifications for the occupational, marital, and general social adjustments of many hyperactive individuals in adulthood, much as they have already negatively affected their educational performance in childhood and adolescence" (p. 587). Wender brings out the important point that the problems associated with having ADHD, as well as the awareness that he is "different" from his peers, are a threat to the already tenuous self-esteem of the ADHD adolescent. However, he is also more capable than the child of understanding the true nature of his problems (Wender, p. 115).

The outlook for adults is not much brighter than

the outlook for adolescents. According to Wender, the symptoms which commonly affect adults with ADHD are quite similar to those experienced in childhood: short attention span, distractibility, impulsiveness, impatience, and disorganization. He adds that research has left little room for doubt that many adults not only continue to experience the symptoms of ADHD, but also continue to receive benefit from stimulant medication. "The official [psychiatric] designation for the adult form of ADD is attention deficit disorder, residual type (ADD,RT)--that is, attention deficit disorder leaving a residue" (Wender, p. 118). Wender further explains that adults with ADD,RT often continue to be "obstinate, bossy, strong-willed, and stubborn" (p. 126), experiencing underachievement at work, problematic relationships, and consequently, low self-esteem. He adds that stimulant medications have been highly effective in two-thirds of the adults whom he has treated. He further asserts that it is essential for the adult ADHD sufferer to learn about his behavior and the problems it creates; then he can learn to deal with them in the context of marital and group therapy (p. 138). In conclusion, William Meller, M.D. and William Yates, M.D. assert that with good treatment, including medication, an appropriate education experience, and counselling when needed, the outlook for most victims of ADHD is not too bad. Under these conditions, it is possible for ADHD sufferers to learn to compensate for their handicaps and lead successful and satisfying lives (Farley, p. 15).

One of the greatest advantages of living in this time is the many ways our lives are improved by scientific discoveries. Thanks to the dedication and compassion of many men and women who have worked devotedly with the victims of ADHD and their families, millions of children and their families can be spared the pain of failure, ridicule, rejection, and judgment which ADHD children and their families have suffered in years gone by. Sadly, many skeptics continue to reject what is now known to be true about ADHD--that it is a complex problem with a physiological basis. Furthermore, many physicians and educators are ignorant of the facts about ADHD. Thus, many ADHD children who need compassion, understanding, and treatment go undiagnosed year after year. As time goes by, they slip further and further behind, their fragile self-esteem deteriorates, and they fall deeper into anger and depression, while their bewildered and frustrated parents stand by helplessly, trying to cope with their own shame and

anger.

In this age of children's rights, our society--and particularly our educational community--needs to become more aware of and responsive to the needs of these promising young people. As much as any children with any kind of disability, these children need the medication which can restore their brains to near-normal functioning, flexible educational programs which will equip them to succeed, as well as respect, compassion, and dignity. If society will grant them this, it will reap from them one-hundred fold in the form of unique contributions they will make as they realize their full potentials.

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The Stereotype of the Female Athlete

Christy Halbert

Introduction

Even though women in American society are finally beginning to be recognized for their achievements and talents, the female athlete remains an object of discrimination. Greatly affected by our society's prescribed gender characteristics, women involved in sport are on the edge of gender role conflict. This conflict continues to affect female athletes both in their sporting careers and in everyday life.

In the last 20 years, women have seemingly been afforded the same opportunities as men in the world of sport. With the initiation of Title IX, schools have been required to change their former treatment of female athletes by instituting regulations to insure that women in sport are no longer subjected to discrimination. Although these regulations are theoretically sound, women's programs still lack adequate funding, facilities, and competition opportunities. Facets of women's involvement in sport are improving and female athletes no longer just struggle for equality or against discrimination. Now, instead, they fight for the right to compete without being labeled as a deviant, or for going against prescribed norms, or simply for the ideas of equality and independence represented by female athleticism.

It is the purpose of this paper to describe from a sociological perspective the gender-role conflict and oppression to which contemporary female athletes are subjected. In addition, the paper reports on the results of an anonymous survey of 23 female athletes at Western Kentucky University which indicate that two additional dimensions to the traditional stereotype have emerged in recent years.

The Sexual Dimension of Women's Athletics

Since the modern Olympic games first began in 1896, gender has played an important role in international competition. In the first Olympic games male competitors would walk naked past guards to insure that no women would enter the competition. When women were finally allowed to compete, they were tested to make sure they were not men disguised as women. And since their involvement in modern Olympic competition, "women have been medically examined far more frequently than men" (Blue, 1987: 21-22).

In the history of the Olympics, there is only one documented case of a man masquerading as a woman. In 1957, Hermann a.k.a. "Dora" Ratjen, from Bremen, Germany, made public the news that he had been forced to pose as a woman for three years by officials of the 1930's Nazi Youth Movement. Ratjen was entered in the women's high jump in the 1936 Berlin Games, where he qualified for the finals and finished in fourth place (Carlson, 1988: 40-44).

Between 1938 and 1965, many female athletes were subjected to questions about their femininity and even accusations of supposed sex-changes. The need for proof of women's femininity resulted in "sex-testing." In 1966, at the European Track and Field Championships in Budapest, women were required to prove their femininity by participating in what the press had termed "a nude parade" (Carlson, 1988: 40-44). By 1968, a new test was administered to female athletes: the "buccal smear test." A tissue sample was taken from the inside of the athlete's cheek to determine the presence of male sex-chromosomes. Since a female's chromosomal pattern is XX, and a male's pattern is XY, the presence of a pattern XXY indicates to analysts that the athlete is "really" a male. Many critics of the test believe the whole theory and practice of sex testing is inherently discriminatory. This is true not just because men are not tested, but also because women are disqualified on "the basis of a postulated advantage that may not be an advantage at all" (Carlson, 1988: 40-44). It has been suggested by Albert de la Chapelle, a Finnish geneticist, that because the overabundance of male hormones causes increased muscle mass, the chromosomal test should be replaced by a test that measures the amount of male to female hormones present in the body (Carlson, 1988: 40-44).

Athletes who pass the sex test are issued a "fem card" that must be presented whenever they compete in a major competition (Blue, 1987: 21-22). Athletes who fail the buccal smear test must then undergo further clinical and gynecological examinations. But an ethical question must be considered when a woman fails the chromosome count test. There may be devastating psychological effects for an athlete who has lived her entire life as a woman but who finds out from clinicians that she

is really a "man" with a rare chromosome pattern of XXY: "These are the six women in a thousand who look like women, think they are women, and whose body composition, strength and muscle seem entirely female -- but who fail the test because they have Y chromosomes" (Carlson, 1988: 40-44).

Thomas Tutko, an American sports psychologist, was one of the first to pin-point the underlying message of the sex test when he said, "It's a way of saying, 'If you're this good at sport, you can't be a real woman.'" And heptathlete Jane Frederick summed it up best when she said, "I think they are just saying, 'You are so good, we can't believe you're a woman. So prove it'" (Carlson, 1988: 40-44). It might be interesting to note that in events where women have a gender advantage, such as long distance swimming, men do not undergo sex tests (Blue, 1987: 21).

The Stereotype of the Female Athlete

Of all the ramifications of the sex test, it is the latent and psychological message that is crucial to an understanding of the test's impact of the female athlete's psyche. The hidden meaning behind taking the test is of much more significance than the test itself. Some wonder if, in fact, women are scared to perform better than men for fear that some might question their femininity (Carlson, 1988: 22). Our patriarchal society has traditionally used stereotypes to label women as being gentle, yielding, gullible, shy, soft-spoken, compliant, emotional, and even child-like in comparison to men. The athlete (whether female or male) represents the elite in society by being strong, aggressive, ambitious, tough, competitive, and independent (Graydon, 1987: 54-77). Because these traits have traditionally been reserved for characterizing men, the female athlete who has these qualities is labeled as having masculine qualities and thus as being man-like. This label leaves her vulnerable to personal attacks that question her femininity. Also, the athlete is especially vulnerable if she possesses qualities such as defined or large muscles or large stature.

There are several dimensions of the stereotypes of female athletes. Four of the most popular are as follows: 1) athletic participation masculinizes women; 2) sports participation is harmful to the health of females; 3) women are not interested in sports and do not play well enough to be taken seriously; and 4) women in sports are all lesbians.

1) First is the stereotype that athletic participation masculinizes women.

According to sociologists Eitzen and Sage, "masculine" refers to body structure and behavioral patterns, not biological considerations. The idea that a masculine body is a result of sport stems from the "fact that some female athletes are indeed muscular and exhibit movement characteristics more commonly found in men" (1989: 297). It should be obvious that the characteristics of muscularity and good motor skills would cause a person to enter sport, rather than result from participation in sport. Eitzen and Sage also reveal that efficient motor movements have been reserved as characteristic of males. In actuality, the proficient movement itself is unrelated to gender. If it is more efficient to throw or run a certain way, then because men were introduced first to sport and given such a head start on women in athletics, these efficient motor skills are labeled as male characteristics.

It should also be noted that female athletes, in an attempt to elude those characteristics or labels she finds undesirable (such as masculinity), will emphasize impressions that society deems appropriate for women. This could account for the fact that many female athletes are very aware of and concerned about their physical appearance both on and off the court (Watson, 1986: 443).

2) Another common stereotype is that sports participation is harmful to the health of females.

Eitzen and Sage note that in the past many people were concerned with the impact physical activity would have on the woman's reproductive organs and breasts, as well as on the menstrual cycle, pregnancy, and the psychological well-being of women (1989: 299). The concern for injury to a woman's reproductive organs seems illogical, since it is the male whose reproductive organs are vulnerable outside the body while the female's are protected inside the body. Physicians through the years have conducted studies that dispel these beliefs that athletic involvement is harmful to female participants.

3) Many people believe that women are not interested in sports and do not play well enough to be taken seriously.

Defenders of the status quo claim lack of interest and lack of ability as explanations for the low numbers of females involved in sport. But most feminists agree that the major reason for the lack of women in sport is discrimination. It is important to note that discrimination is not always obvious as in the case of overt social barriers or obstacles.

Instead, it can be covert and subtle, since it is embedded in cultural ideology (and therefore, seems quite natural) (Boutilier, 1983). Susan Greendorfer suggests that "female interest and involvement in sport is not a chance occurrence that depends mainly on innate skill or motor talent," but rather "it is a consequence of social learning which directs women away from sport instead of predisposing them toward sport." When they are young, children learn those behaviors (from parents, especially) that are most "appropriate" for their sex (Boutilier, 1983).

4) A fourth commonly held belief is that women in sports are all lesbians.

There has been no evidence to date that suggests that all women involved in sports are lesbian or that athletic participation itself causes lesbianism. However, the stereotype that female athletes are homosexual is one of the most popular of all. One athlete recounts her experience when playing college field hockey:

Well you always have people who talk about women's sports, you know, all them lesbians and all that kind of stuff. That's about the only thing that I don't like... call you butch and all that cuz you're an athlete. You know how many times people drive by the field and scream 'Dykes on Spikes'. They don't even know us. I mean people would drive by our field and out the back of the trucks, screaming that. (Blinde, 1990: 7-8)

The idea of gay men in sport is not an issue nor is it a stereotype of male athletes. This is probably due to the belief that sport is masculine, and that by definition, masculine men are heterosexual. This ill-logical notion conflicts with the idea of women in sport. If men are attracted to women (who are feminine), then female athletes (labeled as masculine) must be sexually attracted to feminine females (ill-logic does get confusing).

As a result of these stereotypes, female athletes appear systematically to avoid those sports which portray them negatively. Consistently, research indicates that women's involvement in some sports is more socially acceptable than their involvement in other sports. Athletes themselves often report that labels attached to certain sports persuaded them to choose a different sport which would be less stigmatizing (Blinde, 1990: 6).

Tennis, Golf, Swimming, and Gymnastics seem to be the sports most accepted by society, and therefore carry less stigma than do other sports. The less accepted sports include basketball, volleyball, track & field, softball, and field hockey. Some studies have suggested that women's participation is becoming more acceptable; however, it is not clear whether this is due to the increased publicity of women in sport, a suppressed notion in the academic community (Graydon, 1987: 54-77), or if society is actually changing its traditional imagery.

The female athlete herself undergoes considerable gender-role conflict: a conflict between what society sees as female-appropriate characteristics and the characteristics that are athlete-appropriate. In a study by Desertrain, Solomon, and Weiss, "multivariate analyses revealed that athletes experienced significantly higher levels of role conflict than non-athletes." The female athlete must abandon her prescribed stereotyped gender role, if just temporarily, so as to experience success in sport (1988: 567-579).

Whether female athletes are consciously aware of it or not, they appear to develop several means for dealing with prescribed labels and gender-role conflict that results from athletic competition. Resolution of a role conflict for a female athlete can take several forms. These include 1) withdrawing from social situations that demand feminine role behavior, 2) integrating the orientation of the athletic role into other social life, 3) becoming "apologetic" for possessing "masculine" qualities by emphasizing the use of feminine accessories including make-up and jewelry, or by de-emphasizing the importance of her athletic achievement, and 4) the dropping out of sports when the conflict becomes too great (Desertrain, 1988: 569-570). Ways to specifically deal with labels from others include 1) reaffirming heterosexuality by being seen in the presence of men or having a boyfriend, 2) emphasizing femininity by dressing in skirts, wearing make-up, and growing long hair, and 3) by de-emphasizing the role of athlete (Blinde, 1990: 8).

The Source of the Stereotype

The overall gender stereotypes that prevail in contemporary American society have evolved over an extended period of time and they have been produced by a variety of interrelated social forces. With respect to the gender stereotyping of female athletes, all of the traditional agents of socialization appear to

be involved in the process. Of particular importance, however, is the role of the mass media, which, by its very nature, makes the most constant and visible contribution to the process.

For example, newspapers rarely report on women's athletic contests, perhaps in part because there are not any professional women's teams to attract reporters' attention. Rarely will a newspaper devote the same amount of space to the box scores of women's contests as they do men's.

Sports-related magazines also contribute to the continuation of stereotypes. *Sports Illustrated*, the leading sport's magazine, might more appropriately be named *Men's Sports Illustrated: with a token article about women in almost every issue*.

Perhaps the most influential of all media is television. Television might also be held responsible as a socializing agent that encourages stereotypes of female athletes. Only figure skating and gymnastics competitions are regularly televised. And, in team sports, it is typical for only championship games to be televised, if any games are televised at all.

It can be argued that the lack of coverage by the mass media does as much or more damage to the image of the female athlete as it is perceived by non-athletes. Such damage extends to the athlete herself as she sees her unvalued role. As a result young athletes grow-up without female role models to identify with or to model themselves after. The lack of media coverage, the silence itself, clearly reflects how Americans really feel about women's sports—as second rate and not worthy of air-time.

Ironically, the television coverage that female athletes do get can sometimes be more detrimental than not getting coverage at all. Some commentators have been guilty of reaffirming stereotypes, such as emphasizing an athlete's feminine traits and stressing good looks and lifestyle, rather than her athletic accomplishments. Commentators do not develop the same amount of knowledge about female athletes as they do male athletes. There is also notable lack of women in the anchor booth (Halpert, 1988: 36-39).

Unfortunately, the nature of the commentary on the few women's sports that do receive television coverage does little to solve the problem. In an open letter to the producer of NBC Sports, during the 1988 Olympics, Felicia E. Halpert, addressed a problem with what many sports commentators and analysts have to say in the anchor booth. Halpert first pointed out the reference to 27-year-old females as "girls", while referring to 19-year-old males as "men." The

opening of the women's downhill skiing competition in Calgary featured a montage of female athletes, and as this montage flashed on the screen, "ABC's Al Trautwig chose to observe, 'At some point these were all normal little girls. Somewhere along the way they got sidetracked'." Trautwig then went on to note that female athletes could even be pretty, referring to the "glamorous" Maria Walliser, and informed everyone of Meschaela Gerg's confidence problem, soon to be resolved, "...she's been seeing a psychologist who has put some confidence in those strikingly blue eyes of hers." Halpert proves that there are incredible amounts of "babble on women's appearance, their unhappy personal lives, their vulnerabilities and jealousies - images that undermine their physical achievement" that can be analyzed. As Halpert says, "We see on our screens amazing feats of female strength, speed, and endurance. Yet there's a persistent buzz to suggest that this athleticism is somehow atypical, indeed abnormal." In describing the figure skaters Midori Ito and Brian Orser, Dick Button complimented Ito's performance with the words "a triumph of athleticism," adding, "she is adorable!" Moments later, Button described Brian Orser's style as "brilliant, really fine," and added that Orser is a "wonderfully confident and controlled skater." At this same time, when skater Carlyn Kadavy's program was ending, Button stated, "She is so lovely. You know she really has a vulnerability that makes your heart warm to her." (1988: 36-39). The importance of recognizing the stereotypic habits of commentators' lies in realizing the effects of the media upon children and their stereotypic views of athletic competition.

Theoretical Perspective

Although there are several sociological theories that purport to explain the process of gender stereotypes in society, symbolic interactionism appears to be the most relevant for explaining the experiences many females encounter while participating in sports.

Of particular interest is the symbolic interactionists' notion of reflexiveness, or the ability to respond to one's self as one does to others. According to Mead, reflexiveness:

is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of the mind. [In this way, the self is not an object but a] conscious process that

involves several dimensions: the ability to respond to one's self as others respond to it; the ability to respond to one's self as the collectivity, the generalized other, responds to it; the ability to take part in one's own conversation with others; the ability to be aware of what one is saying and to use that awareness to determine what one is going to do next (Ritzer, 1988: 296).

What kinds of symbols and meanings can a female athlete extract from language used to describe herself such as brute, dyke, butch, burly, bitch, and slut? Female athletes who are labeled cannot help but be influenced by the fact that they are labeled and by what they hear from others. Their self images and life-styles can therefore be the result of this reflexivity.

As athletes subscribe to that way of thinking, they interact with others and develop themselves with those stigma in mind resulting from experiences within a system that labeled them in the first place. Again, role-conflict plays an important part in the lives of female athletes. It is difficult to be a talented athlete while also trying to maintain behaviors consistent with what society sees as appropriate for women. Oddly enough, with all the negative labels and discrimination which confine female athletes, many still remain strong, and benefit from their involvement in sport.

The Survey

The survey was conducted at Western Kentucky University during the 1991 spring semester. The questionnaire included open-ended questions which allowed the respondent to thoroughly reply on issues most valuable to her particular experience. Questionnaires were distributed to 25 of the 53 female athletes participating in the six women's sports programs at Western.¹ Female athletes from foreign countries were excluded from the survey since their gender socialization processes may have differed significantly from those athletes from the United States. A total of 23 fully completed questionnaires were returned.

Due to the sensitive nature of the questions and the topic, anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed. Every effort was made to ensure anonymity and confidentiality so the respondents would feel free to

answer questions honestly. However, many athletes apparently still felt apprehensive about answering truthfully or fully. In one case, an athlete specifically indicated that she did not want her coach to see her answers.

Findings

Questionnaire data from contemporary female athletes provides the basis for substantiating the traditional stereotypes and the addition of two other stereotypes. For example, respondents confirmed the traditional stereotypes of the female athlete in answers to a variety of questions. The female athlete's own perceptions of male-athlete attitudes, attitudes of non-participants (male and female), and personal experiences on and off the court suggest that the stereotypes previously described are still accurate. The results of the survey suggest that two additional stereotypes have emerged in recent years and should be discussed.

1) Women in sports are all tomboys and want to be "guys." The stereotype that female athletes would want to be "guys" is related to the idea that only men are true athletes, and thus, women or girls who adapt behaviors and mannerisms like those of a good athletes (men, of course) must also want to be like men in all other ways. This label probably stems from the notion that if women want to be good at sport they must control their bodies efficiently and maintain a good physical condition. Again, because sport has been reserved for males in the past, these labels are attached to women who perform the necessary skill or possess characteristics formerly only associated with males.

2) Women in sports are unattractive, burly, or hairy. This stereotype, stems from the notion that women in sport are "deviant." If non-athletic women are petite, gentle, submissive, and dependent, then the female athlete who is not these things must be the opposite of women in general (which might also include being pretty, having smooth skin, etc.). Furthermore, a female athlete labeled as masculine will not see that label as a compliment. These negative perceptions of herself as well as other female athletes were frequently noted in the survey.

The results of the survey serve to reinforce the fact that stereotypes of the female athlete do exist and, further, emphasize the effects these stereotypes have on female athletes. It should be noted that many of the respondents reaffirmed popular stereotypes about female athletes -- stereotypes that

they acknowledge as being negatives when other people (non-athletes and male athletes) believe them. In this survey, respondents believe masculinity to be the most popular stereotype, followed closely by lesbianism. It should also be noted that the idea of female athletes being labeled as masculine might reinforce the notion that society reserves athletics and physical development for the male population -- an idea directly associated with female athlete gender role conflict. In comparing questions about how non-athletes might perceive male and female athletes, respondents report that non-athletes view male athletes as superior and attractive, especially in direct comparison to female athletes. This self-perception is important, and although respondents might not have admitted to being labeled or called names themselves, it is obvious that these athletes (whether consciously or not) modify their appearance and/or behavior to avoid stereotypes. Some respondents indicated that acting more "feminine" is a good strategy for dealing with these labels, again reinforcing the notion that feminine women have long hair, "dress-up" and are well-groomed, speak articulately, and have boyfriends. When asked to list stigma attached to specific sports, respondents again reinforced ideas revealed by previous research which suggests that contact sports are more stigmatized with negative labels by our society. Additionally, respondents had no problem listing stigma attached to sports that the university itself does not offer female athletes (like field hockey, softball, or swimming), suggesting that stigma is perceivable even if there is no personal experience in that sport or personal interaction with athletes associated with that sport. Finally, there is evidence that some female athletes are homophobic, and many athletes are disturbed by the attention this subject receives.

Discussion

Athletic participation opportunities for women has increased in the last twenty years. Females have more visibility now than ever before, however, despite these major advances, female athletes are still sent mixed messages about the value of their athletic participation. For example, while verbal support for female sport participation is on the increase, financial support has been lacking (Desertrain, 1988: 567-579). Even with all the negative labels and discrimination that athletes are aware of, research conducted by Ogilvie and Tutko indicated that female athletes tend to be more independent, creative, and

autonomous than male athletes. This increased self-confidence and security could be a natural reaction to her life, as the female athlete strives to overcome social barriers (Snyder, 1983: 164).

As of now, the idea of an androgynous athlete, one who is neither restrictively feminine or masculine and has both feminine and masculine qualities, is still difficult to grasp. The androgyny concept is particularly important for women in sport because it mitigates the role conflict assumption' (Desertrain, 1988: 567-581). The public continues to reinforce stereotypes by remaining ignorant. For example, many credit German athletes' superior athleticism to their "masculine" build rather than realizing that socialism allows those women to become professional athletes (Blue, 1987: 22). With the continuation of such ideas, there is little hope that the concept of an androgynous athlete will soon be adopted. As of now, in our society, we continue to point out the differences between people rather than expand our preconceived notions into an evolved concept, less stigmatizing and dangerous.

Although minimal progress has been made in some aspects of women's athletics, the overall issue of gender stereotyping of the female remains virtually unchanged. It will remain so as long as society considers women as second-rate or deviant in the patriarchal system in which we live. However, as in all cases of stereotyping, oppression, or suppression, negative views can be eliminated first by becoming conscious of the problem. Then, once our consciousness has been raised, progress can be made in areas of true equality, respect, and egalitarian living.

Footnote

¹ At Western Kentucky University (a Division I Institution) there are currently 6 women's sports as compared to 9 men's sports. The athlete ratio is 223 male athletes to 53 female athletes, or over four male athletes for every female athlete.

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Innocence and Corruption in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter and William Faulkner's Sanctuary *Kathleen Hannah*

William Faulkner is placed by most critics in the same league with Nathaniel Hawthorne. Frederick Karl, in his biography of William Faulkner, reports Malcolm Cowley was among these; Cowley, in 1945, placed "Faulkner into ethereal company, comparing him with such classic American authors as Hawthorne" (721). Daniel Hoffman sets Faulkner squarely "in the American imagination both high and low: in his creative and original appropriations from folklore, fables, and myths, and in his development of the tradition of the great experimental romancers of the nineteenth century, Hawthorne, Melville, and Mark Twain" (xv). Karl is not sure whether we can ascribe Hawthorne's influence on Faulkner, stating, "We have no conclusive proof of how well [Faulkner] knew Hawthorne" (221). Faulkner himself rejects Hawthorne as an influence, along with Poe and Longfellow, "because 'they were easterners, they were really Europeans'" (Karl 910). Yet in 1957, he addressed a group of young writers, explaining that many of the then-current writers were creating characters who did "not function, live breathe, struggle, in that moil and seethe of simple humanity as did those of our predecessors who were the masters from whom we learned our craft: Dickens, Fielding, Thackeray, Conrad, Twain, Smollett, Hawthorne, Melville, James" (Karl 982). Karl suggests Faulkner "was a picker and a selector . . . with his reading . . . with his thinking" (63). Perhaps Faulkner picked and selected from Hawthorne what suited him best. There certainly seem to be similarities in the works of the two authors which bear careful study. Two such works are Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter and Faulkner's Sanctuary.

In introductory essays to The Scarlet Letter and Sanctuary, Nathaniel Hawthorne and William Faulkner report they did not live among people of a literary set. Hawthorne says in "The Custom House" that none of his fellow Custom-House officers "had ever read a page of my inditing, or would have cared a fig the more for me, if they had read them all" (2146). Faulkner "had never lived among nor known people who wrote novels and stories and . . . did not know that people got money for them" (337). This is, of course, a bit of an exaggeration, as he had met

Sherwood Anderson in the early 1920s, he had contributed to the Double Dealer, and he knew a circle of writers associated with that New Orleans magazine. Faulkner and Hawthorne both indicate that the writing of their respective novels was triggered by a need for money. Hawthorne had just lost his job as a surveyor, and "brought himself to the comfortable conclusion that every thing was for the best; and, making an investment in ink, paper, and steel-pens, had opened his long-disused writing-desk, and was again a literary man" (2156). Faulkner "began to think of books in terms of possible money," so he "took a little time out, and speculated what a person in Mississippi would believe to be current trends, chose what [he] thought was the right answer and invented the most horrific tale [he] could imagine" (338).

Hawthorne's description of the Custom-House, "a sanctuary into which womankind with her tools of magic, the broom and the mop, has very infrequent access" (2135), is echoed in the title of Faulkner's book and in his own description of the crib at the Old Frenchman's Place, with its rats, cottonseed hulls, corncobs, and horse harnesses, hardly a sanctuary for a girl. Similarly, the female eagle which adorns the entrance of the custom-house "appears, by the fierceness of her beak and eye and the general truculency of her attitude, to threaten mischief to the inoffensive community; and especially to warn all citizens, careful of their safety, against intruding on the premises which she overshadows with her wings" (2134). Ruby Lamar may be the human parallel of Hawthorne's symbol, "a burning cigarette in her hand, watching the door" (46). Ruby warns Temple to leave the Old Frenchman's Place before dark (51), although she asserts that she herself lives there and walks twelve miles a day to fetch water "not because I am somewhere I am afraid to stay" (57). She is protective of Lee, going as far as to prostitute herself to get him released from jail. But with her child, she is much like the eagle, with "no great tenderness, even in her best of moods, and, sooner or later,—oftener soon than late,—is apt to fling off her nestlings with a scratch of her claw, a dab of her beak, or a rankling wound from her barbed arrows" (Hawthorne 2134). Yet Ruby is a victim herself, as we see in the stories she reveals about her

upbringing. These two introductions set the stage for novels in which there is no refuge for women; they are doomed to shame and devastation. Robert K. Martin offers the idea that Hawthorne's "separate sphere, like Irving's dream of life . . . is already a spoiled Eden, threatened, on the one hand, by the claims of women and, on the other, by Hawthorne's own sense of unworthiness to succeed his male 'progenitors'" (124). These "progenitors" would "have thought it quite a sufficient retribution" for their sins to have borne "an idler" like Hawthorne (Hawthorne 2137). Similarly, Faulkner felt his father suffered "outrage to his principles at having been of a bum progenitive" (337). This invocation of patriarchy by both authors sets up a framework for novels which seek to explain the relationship between fathers and daughters.

French feminist criticism holds that a child arrives at a gender identity "only by entering the 'symbolic' order of language, which is made up of relations in similarity and difference" (Selden 148). Jacques Lacan's Law of the Father, which avers that children accept sexual difference through the father, relates psychoanalysis to society through linguistics. Raman Selden asserts, "It is essential to recognize the metaphoric nature of the father's role. He is installed in the position of lawgiver not because he has a superior procreative function (though people have believed this in the past) but merely as an effect of the linguistic system" (148). This theory explains why patriarchal men would desire to keep women silent. An examination of key scenes in Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* and Faulkner's *Sanctuary* reveals this patriarchy of linguistics is present in both novels. jury will fix everything for her and encourages her to speak up: "Let these good men, these fathers and husbands, hear what you have to say and right your wrong for you" (299). But the district attorney wants a conviction, "a bonfire of gasoline" for someone, anyone, and a seat in congress, a rung up the patriarchal ladder, for himself. The Reverend John Wilson, in *The Scarlet Letter*, encourages Hester Prynne to speak up and entices her with a promise of removing her ignominy: "Speak out the name! That, and thy repentance, may avail to take the scarlet letter off thy breast" (2169). But Wilson more likely just wants to keep his good standing with Governor Bellingham and in the community. He is well-respected in the Puritan patriarchal society; Hawthorne describes him as "grandfatherly," and a man with a "long established and legitimate taste for all good and comfortable things" (2190). He does

not wish to upset the patriarchal order, no matter who is hurt. The victims of these societies, Hester and Temple, do not wish to speak. Temple is forced to speak, although, at the same time she is being asked to provide more than just "parrot-like" answers, she is being silenced whenever she wishes to elaborate. When Eustace Graham asks her about her family, he wants more:

"Where did you live before you went to Memphis?"

"In Jackson."

"Have you relations there?"

"Yes."

"Come. Tell these good men---" (300)

But when Temple wants to provide more information about the rape, Graham is afraid she will accidentally tell the truth and reveal the real murderer, and she is silenced:

"Was anyone else there?"

"Tommy was. He said---"

"Was he inside the crib or outside?"

"He was outside by the door. He was watching."

"He said he wouldn't let---"

"Just a minute." (302)

When she tries to elaborate again a few questions later, Graham reveals (suddenly for the court, finally for the reader), the instrument of the rape, the cornucob, and allows Temple's father, with his "neat white hair" to take his daughter from the room. Hawthorne's Dimmesdale appeals to Hester to reveal the name of her partner in crime, but his appeal is "tremulously sweet, rich, deep, and broken" (2169), and he seems almost happy when she remains silent: "Wondrous strength and generosity of a woman's heart! She will not speak" (2169). This statement effectively silences Hester, since it provokes a discourse on sin by Reverend Wilson.

The linguistic patriarchy is present in these two novels; Lacan's Law of the Father is twisted, however. The fathers and father figures of *Sanctuary* and *The Scarlet Letter* do not fully forbid the identification of the daughter with the father,¹ because they may desire the daughters themselves.

Dianne Luce Cox, discussing *Sanctuary*, sees the father as an obstacle to the daughter's happiness in her examination of the story of Ruby's first lover, who stands up to her father. From this anecdote,

Temple, the daughter of a prominent judge,

recognize[s] more clearly than before that the repressive man--the father--is a captor who would enforce innocence by denying sexual experience and love, and to conclude that the cost of gaining love and protection may be losing respectability. (308)

In addition, Cox believes the men in *Sanctuary* actually want the women to be corrupted. She says of the lawyer Horace Benbow,

Like Shakespeare's Angelo, like Milton's Satan, like Melville's Claggart, Horace (and perhaps Popeye) wants to see innocence defiled, because he believes that it is corruptible and therefore already corrupt. (306n)

These two ideas--enforced innocence and desired defilement--work together in both novels as the many different father figures attempt to repress desire while hoping for the defilement of their real and symbolic daughters.

Hester's father hopes to enforce innocence through marrying her to the ancient Chillingworth. Hester's family is an established one that has lost its money, as evidenced by her remembrance of "a decayed house of gray stone, with a poverty-stricken aspect, but retaining a half-obliterated shield of arms over the portal, in token of antique gentility" (2164). It is likely that Hester was one of many English daughters of good lineage married off to a wealthy man; there is no indication in the text that Chillingworth is of noble blood, although there is ample evidence that he is wealthy. Hester's stereotypically patriarchal father, with his "reverend white beard" (2164), married her to one whom he knew would provide for her, but also to one whom he knew would be more of a father than a lover.

Since he is so much older than Hester, Chillingworth can be considered a father figure to her, and one who obviously desires her fall from grace. It seems he expects to find her in Boston on the scaffold exactly as he does. His reaction to seeing Hester is horror for only "one little pause," and his emotion is "so instantaneously controlled by an effort of his will, that, save at a single moment, its expression might have passed for calmness" (2165). This reaction prepares us for Chillingworth's

descent into evil, but it also reveals that the cuckolded husband is not too surprised to discover his wife has sinned. The doctor allowed his young wife, whom he knew did not love him, to sail to America alone, thus placing her in the path of temptation. The townsman to whom Chillingworth speaks in the market-place alludes to the fact that Hester should never have been sent ahead: "his young wife, look you, being left to her own misguidance--" (2166); Chillingworth instantly understands. The townsman's use of the adjective "young" magnifies the difference between husband and wife, and Chillingworth seizes upon this during his interview with Hester in the prison, juxtaposing himself, "a man already in decay" with her, a woman of "youth and beauty" (2172). The old man intimates that he expected her to sin, saying,

I might have known that, as I came out of the vast and dismal forest, and entered this settlement of Christian men, the very first object to meet my eyes would be thyself, Hester Prynne, standing up, a statue of ignominy, before the people. Nay, from the moment when we came down the old church-steps together, a married pair, I might have beheld the bale-fire of that scarlet letter blazing at the end of our path! (2172)

Chillingworth also seeks to control her as a father would, as we see when he speaks to the jailer: "Mistress Prynne shall hereafter be more amenable to authority than you may have found her heretofore" (2170). And, he asks to take on an ostensibly patriarchal role, begging that Hester "breathe not, to any human soul that thou didst ever call me husband" but at the same time telling her "thou and thine, Hester Prynne, belong to me" (2173). Not husband, but owner, or father. Chillingworth's aim is to find his "daughter's" suitor and, if not kill him, make him wish he were dead, much like Ruby Lamar's father killed her suitor.

Hester is of roughly the same social class as Temple; her family arms prove this point. She might, like Temple, be unable to react in the face of real danger (to her soul). Reared as an aristocrat (albeit one without money), Hester may have been used to using some phrase like "My father's a lord" to protect her from harm. This pride in her noble birth may have transferred itself to the letter on her

breast. Since Hester is forced to wear the letter, it becomes part of her and thus she bears it with the pride she has carried all her life. Governor Bellingham's bond-servant deduces "from the decision of her air and the glittering symbol in her bosom, that she was a great lady in the land" (2188). In addition, the Indians of the area are fascinated by the scarlet letter. They believe "that the wearer of this brilliantly embroidered badge must needs be a personage of high dignity among her people" (2263-64). Thus Hester's single letter becomes the linguistic equivalent of Temple's phrase, "My father's a judge." Another danger which Hester may also be unaware of is trusting her pastor too much. Her trust turns to passionate love and, ultimately, to the downfall of both herself and Dimmesdale. She must live in public ignominy as a result of her passion; her fierce love of Dimmesdale keeps her from exposing him as Pearl's father, forcing him (since he is too weak to expose himself) to live out a private shame more destructive than her own. Hester could not have been aware of the first danger that confronted her in her young married life: that her father/lover, Chillingworth, actually hoped she would commit adultery.

Another of *The Scarlet Letter's* fathers is Arthur Dimmesdale. He is not only actual father to Pearl, but as Hester's pastor, he is her spiritual father (in the Anglican church, she may have even called him father). Dimmesdale desires the defilement of this member of his church family to the extent that he is the cause of it. While we are not exposed to the actual events of the affair between Dimmesdale and Hester, the nature of Dimmesdale's temptation is revealed in the description of the pastor's power over his people: "the virgins of his church grew pale around him, victims of a passion so imbued with religious sentiment that they imagined it to be all religion, and brought it openly, in their white bosoms, as their most acceptable sacrifice before the altar" (2209). Although Hester was married, she was still young and pure-looking even after the birth of her child, evidenced in Hawthorne's statement that she might remind a Papist "of the image of Divine Maternity" (2163). This "victim of passion" proves to be corruptible at the minister's own hands. Dimmesdale and Popeye, interestingly, achieve material success, but they do not take comfort in that success. In the forest scene of *The Scarlet Letter*, Dimmesdale answers Hester's question about whether his good works and the people's reverence bring him comfort, "More misery, Hester!--only the more

misery" (2235). He is certain his soul could have been kept alive if he had one friend in whom he could confide. Popeye is described at the end of *Sanctuary* as "that man who made money and had nothing he could do with it, spend it for, since he knew that alcohol would kill him like a poison, who had no friends and had never known a woman and knew he could never" (325). The father in a patriarchal society should be a good provider for his family; these corrupt fathers can take no joy in material success.

The father figures in *Sanctuary* might be even more twisted than those in *The Scarlet Letter*. Ruby Lamar's father hopes to keep his daughter chaste by killing her suitor. Ruby uses this harsh story to quiet Temple's pitiful whining about being on probation at school. Ruby's brother, as protective in his way as Temple's four brothers, threatens to kill Ruby's first boyfriend Frank; her father, fearing the usurpation of authority over his daughter even by his own son, says he can "run his family a while longer" and kills Frank himself (*Sanctuary* 61). Mr. Lamar accuses his daughter of being a whore while destroying the object of her desire.

In addition, Horace Benbow is both fascinated with and repelled by his stepdaughter Little Belle's relationships. Benbow is evidently attracted to his stepdaughter, shown when he gazes into her face in a photograph. Faulkner writes, "the small face seemed to swoon in a voluptuous languor, blurring still more, fading, leaving upon his eye a soft and fading aftermath of invitation and voluptuous promise and secret affirmation like a scent itself" (234). Since he is attracted to her himself, he "would like to curtail" her dating (Cox 312). Still, when she is with a boy, he "compulsively watches in the grape arbor" (312). And, significantly, following his defeat in the courtroom and his return to his wife, he phones Little Belle at a party, almost sure of the result he gets: a breathless stepdaughter and a masculine voice in the background.

Temple's father, Judge Drake, likely feels guilt over the death of her mother. Although Faulkner does not tell us the circumstances of this death, it is probable to assume that she died during Temple's birth. As a result, Temple has grown up in the repressive shadow of not only Judge Drake, but also her four brothers; in essence, she has five fathers. These protective/repressive men have taught her "how to act only through men--and, in addition, only through men who accept the conventions of her social world" (Cox 304). In other words, they have

taught her how to act among the college boys of Oxford, but not how to act in the face of real danger. It is this which causes Temple to flit about in front of the bootleggers at the Old Frenchman's place as if they are beaux at a college dance. Though Ruby warns her against such action, Temple cannot understand that these are not college boys or Virginia gentlemen. When Temple realizes she really is in danger, she has no way of reacting to it, so she spends the night praying to be changed into a boy, wishing she had a chastity belt, and imagining herself in a coffin, dressed in virginal white. This reaction, a result of her upbringing in a microcosm of patriarchal society, causes her downfall. She is too unprepared for taking care of herself to escape.

In *Sanctuary*, Popeye is the ultimate father/lover who wants Temple to fall for Red, else why would he have brought a man who "looked like a college boy" (248) to be the subject of his voyeuristic sex act with her? His name even suggests a paternal voyeur—Pop-Eye. He needs Temple to be in love with Red so that he can punish her for it. For the impotent Popeye, all men are Dimmesdales, and he uses Temple's innocence to attract them to him, that he might take revenge.² Since Popeye is impotent, he can remain a father without becoming an actual lover. Thus the cornucopia he uses to rape Temple is another "lover"; Popeye is able to distance himself and blame the cause of Temple's violation on the object and the daughter rather than on himself.

Popeye may also be seen as a father figure to Temple linguistically. She calls him "Daddy" in several places in the novel; he has become her protector. We first witness this "protection" when he gives her the sandwich (147), and Temple realizes he is not going to drive her back to town. He buys her an entirely new wardrobe and puts her in the care of a "nanny" in the person of Miss Reba. Popeye's paternal role reaches its full development in the scene in the Grotto, when Temple's "face drained, became small and haggard and sincere; she spoke like a child with sober despair. . . . Daddy" (248-249).

Harold Bloom is "embarrassed" by the ending of *Sanctuary*, saying that Faulkner "ought to have ended [it] with the hanging of Popeye, affectless and economical" (9). But if we look at Faulkner's coda along with Hawthorne's, we can see there is a connection, as with the introductions. Hester Prynne, a victim of patriarchal punishment, resumes "the symbol of which we have related so dark a tale" (2272). Although her life is happier at the end of the novel, Hester's position remains that of outcast.

Faulkner's placement of *Sanctuary's* conclusion in Europe brings out an interesting contrast with Hawthorne's. Temple Drake, in Luxembourg with her father, is "discontented and sad" (333). She retains the emotional scars of rape, and she knows the wrong man was punished for the crime. She also knows that both the district attorney and Judge Drake know it. She remains like the "tranquil queens in stained marble" (333); a statue, her life a series of "smart new hats." But Pearl, through her father's untimely death and the fact that she never knew any man as father (thus never passing through Lacan's Law of the Father), is the only woman in either novel free to be happy. She finds that happiness, coincidentally, in Europe, in "comfort and luxury," in a "relation between man and woman on a surer ground of mutual happiness" (Hawthorne 2271-72), and in motherhood. Faulkner and Hawthorne, fathers themselves,³ seem to agree that a father's view of his daughter as a corrupted innocent devastates his daughter and guarantees her downfall. Faulkner perhaps cannot accept that a woman can escape this fate; Hawthorne perhaps believes she can.

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'Notes

¹For a complete description of Lacan's view of the Freudian Oedipus complex, see Selden's A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory, page 148.

²It would seem that Faulkner made a rather deliberate comparison of Chillingworth and Popeye. Hester asks if her husband is "like the Black Man" (2174), Pearl calls him "yonder old Black Man" (2205), while Temple wants to know, "Does that black man think he can tell me what to do?" (43). "Both novels contain further numerous references to these characters as "black man" evoking, certainly, the devil, but also describing them and the looks in their eyes in a similar manner. Albert J. Guerard says of Popeye that he is, like Conrad's Kurtz, "a hollow man, bereft of any inner humanity to help him confront the void"; he has "a pleasureless need to control, humiliate, scorn" (Modern Critical Interpretations of Sanctuary 66). This description fits Chillingworth perfectly.

³Faulkner, at the writing of Sanctuary, was stepfather to Estelle Oldham's two children. Estelle was pregnant with the first couple's child, Alabama, during Faulkner's revision of the novel in 1930. Alabama was born and died in January 1931.

Chaucer Subverts Ovid's Love Tracts to Refute Medieval Antifeminism Susan Maertz

Many references to the love treatises of the Roman poet Ovid are included in the Wife of Bath's Prologue and Tale. One direct reference to Ovid's love tracts, specifically his Remedies of Love, is included in the Wife's portrait in the General Prologue of the Tales: "Of remedies of love she knew per chaunce,/For she koude of that art the olde daunce" (ll. 475-6). Chaucer's poetry as a whole includes more references to the works of Ovid than to any other author, according to Edgar Finley Shannon (318). Chaucer, writes Edward Kennard Rand in his book, Ovid and His Influence, "is professedly a student of Ovid in the art of love, and he deeply understands the master's teaching" (146). He adds that "Ovid contributed deeply to the development of Chaucer's genius" and that the poet "owes more to Ovid than any other poet, old or new" (145). Despite Chaucer's extensive study of and reference to Ovid, critics have studied his importance only in comparison to other antifeminists Chaucer consulted when writing the Wife's Tale. No extensive, individual study of Ovid's love poetry as a main source for the Wife of Bath has ever been written.

In the past, Shannon, Rand, John Dryden, Henry David Thoreau and others have discussed the relationship between Chaucer and Ovid, but none have looked specifically at Ovid's influence on the Wife. Richard Lester Hoffman and Helen Cooper list Ovid as an important source, but focus more closely on Jean de Meun's continuation of The Roman de la Rose as a more influential text, citing de Meun's La Vielle as a forerunner for the Wife, and ignoring the importance of Ovid's character Dipsas as a predecessor of both later characters. Hoffman writes that "the Wife and La Vielle are both descendants of Dipsas," but continues with a discussion of the Roman (131) without again mentioning Ovid. Robert P. Miller adds that the Wife "inherits much knowledge from La Vielle, a great quoter of Ovid" (276). The Wife refers directly to Ovid several times during her Prologue and Tale. Her husband's antifeminist book includes "Ovid's Art" (l. 160). When relating the story of Midas in her Tale, the Wife attributes the story to Ovid and advises, "The renmenant of the tale if ye maye heere, /Redeth Ovyde and ther ye may it leere" (ll. 981-2). Other

uncited references are scattered throughout, and are drawn from Ovid's mythological and courtly writings, love poetry, classical imagery and other portions of his works.

Ovid's intention when writing his love treatises--The Amores, The Art of Love and The Remedies of Love--was that they be used as a manual of courting and lovemaking, a handbook for courtly lovers. Rand writes that Ars Amatoria should be considered "a textbook on the subject of love and matrimony...a companion volume to an ars grammatica or ars rhetorica" (35). He divides Ovid's text into three easy-to-read sections: "A. How to Find Her; B. How to Win Her; C. How to Keep Her" and asserts, "Nothing could be more comprehensive" (35). Ovid himself refers to The Art of Love as a "system" (464) and to himself as "the master" (447); it is in this instructional sense that readers should view Ovid's works when reading the Wife's Prologue. The Art of Love was a text most medieval courtly lovers consulted about questions of sex, marriage, class, wealth, and other topics, and the Wife would have used the tracts in this capacity, while not always agreeing with or accepting Ovid's advice.

It must also be considered that, due to the nature of Jankin's book of "wikked wyves" (l. 685), the Wife would have had access only to Ovid's writings intended for men--The Remedies of Love, The Amores and the first two books of The Art of Love--and not to Book III, which was intended to instruct women in the pursuit and capture of men, or to any other pro-feminist writings of Ovid (or anyone else) available at that time. Despite this omission, the Wife discusses many of the same topics Ovid approaches in his tracts, and her Tale includes many references of Ovid's ideas on courtly love, although many have been altered to change or reverse their original meaning. The Wife's repeated references, misquotations and subversions of Ovid's antifeminist writings "call attention to a pattern of approved doctrine that she signally fails to obey," according to Cooper, who calls the Wife "every antifeminist's nightmare come true. Her Prologue is a misogynist male text rewritten from a female point of view, where the men get all they deserve" (149). Because it is Chaucer who has done the rewriting, the Wife's

rejection of the commonly accepted antifeminism of her day may equal a rejection of it by the poet himself.

Cooper points out that the Wife's Prologue is unlike any other prologue in the Tales, or in "medieval literature at large" (140). Its main sources are religious and secular antifeminist tracts, she points out, but the Wife's Prologue "is no tract" (140); it is far more complex than the writing that inspired it because the Prologue views issues from all sides. Although the prologue and tale are written from the Wife's perspective directly, the Wife's first four husbands, her fifth husband Jankin, the knight, the queen and the hag (at least the Wife's perceptions of them) are also represented. Cooper divides the Prologue into three sections: a defense of multiple marriage, life with old husbands and Jankin's antifeminism, and attaches to them the following themes: sexuality, behavior in marriage, and dominance (147/9). In the edition of *The Canterbury Tales* which he edited, John H. Fisher explains that "the tension between 'experience' and 'authority' is the essential theme in the Prologue" (107); clearly this overall theme can be applied to Cooper's three part system. The Wife rejects religious authority over sexuality, her old husbands' authority to tell her how to live, and Jankin's authority in the form of physical dominance and antifeminism, in favor of her own experience. Her choice is apparent from the first lines of the Prologue: "Experience thogh noon auctoritee/ Were in this world is right ynogh for me/ To speke of wo that is in marriage" (ll. 1-3). She dismisses men's attempts to know and understand the will of God on topics of sex and marriage--"Men may devyse and glosen up and doun" (l. 26)--as speculation not applicable in the real world: "Glose whoso will and speke both up and doun...The experience woot it wel it is nought so" (ll. 119/124). The teachings of celibate saints mean nothing to the Wife: "After that text...I wol not wirche as muchel as a gnat" (ll. 346-7); she has more faith in her own authority: "Of tribulation in marriage...I am expert in al myn age" (ll. 173-4). However, had the Wife studied all of the tracts of Ovid--specifically the ones he intended for women--she may have agreed with him in some respects; his philosophies and experiences are not unlike her own.

Ovid and the Wife share similar views of sexuality, chastity and multiple marriage, although they approach the topics from very different perspectives. Ovid asserts in *Art of Love*, Book III: "Follow, o race of mortals, the example of the

Goddesses; and refuse not your endearments to the eager men. Even though they should deceive you, what do you lose? All remains the same. Were a thousand to partake thereof nothing is wasted thereby. Who would forbid light to be taken from another light presented?" (437). The Wife quotes this passage in her Prologue, when chastising her old husbands for demanding her chastity, rephrasing Ovid's passage to represent her opposing viewpoint:

"Have thou ynogh, what thar thee
recche or care
How myrily that othere folkes fare?
For certyn, olde dotard, by your
leve,
Ye shul have queynte right ynogh
at eve.
He is to greet a nygard that wolde
werne
A man to lighte a candle at his
lanterne;
He shal have never the lasse light,
pardee.
Have thou ynogh, thee thar not
pleyne thee" (ll. 329-336).

She adds that, rather than decreasing the value or capacity of woman as wives or lovers, relationships with various men add to women's experience, which she values above all else: "Diverse praktyk in many sondry werkes/ Maketh the workman parfit sekirly;/ of fyve housbondes scolei yng am I" (ll. 44b-f). George Lyman Kittredge writes that the Wife "expounds her views...with all imaginable zest. Virginity, which the church glorifies, is not required of us. Our bodies are given us to use. Let saints be continent if they will. She has no wish to emulate them. She has warmed both hands before the fire of life and exults in her recollections of the fleshly delights" (191).

Similarly, Ovid is an advocate of sex for pleasure regardless of religious restrictions, and encourages his students to do what feels good: "We will sing of guiltless delights and of thefts allowed; and in my song there will be nought that is criminal" (380). The Wife accepts this advice, ignoring the authority of the church and declaring that she will marry as many times as she likes, and "wol bistowe the flour of al myn age/ In the actes and in fruyt of marriage" (ll. 113-14). She adds, "In wyfhood I wol use myn instrument/ As frely as my Makere hath it sent" (ll. 149-50).

It is clear from these passages that Chaucer has appropriated Ovid's ideas and applied them to the situations he creates for the Wife. F.J. Snell explains that Chaucer's alteration of the works of Ovid disproves the theory of Chaucer as "a mere imitator" (260), and upholds the belief that, although Chaucer extensively used sources, he creatively changed them to suit his characters and themes. Like Chaucer, the Wife supports her beliefs through the alteration and subversion of sources, as well as her husband's own criticisms of her, which she twists into indictments of their behavior. Cooper writes that the Wife "is especially adept at seizing the initiative in accusing them of accusing her of all the standard antifeminist charges: she takes out of her husband's mouths the words they never spoke" (147).

The Wife advises this subversion tactic for all married woman, explaining: "Ye wys wyfs, that kan understonde/ Thus shul ye speke and bere hym wrong on honde" (ll. 225-6). She adds, "Baar I stifly myne olde housbondes on honde...And al was fals...O Lord, the peyne I did hem and the wo,/ Ful giltless, by Goddes sweete pyne!... I koude pleyne, thogh I were in gilt,/ Or elles often tyme hadde I been spilt" (ll. 380-387). This passage is also loosely derived from Ovid, who advises men to make vices of their wives virtues in order to control them: "There are good qualities to near akin to bad ones; a virtue has often borne the blame of a vice. If she is embonpoint, call her flabby. Leanness may be charged against her slender form. So far as you can, deprecate the endowments of the fair one" (474). Again, Chaucer has shaped an antifeminist theme to fit the Wife's opposing view. "The first thing to stress about the Wife's Prologue," explains Cooper, "is that she and Chaucer are dealing with commonplaces; the second that she turns them inside out. Her materials are part of the vast medieval stock of antifeminism, but she uses them as a triumphant vindication of herself and her way of life, at least to her own satisfaction" (141).

The Wife subverts an argument about shared assets into a debate on women's freedom in marriage in two ways. She begins the discussion by questioning his selfishness: "Why hydestow with sorwe The keys of thy cheste away fro me?/ It is my good as wel as thyn, pardee" (ll. 309-10). She shifts from this to the argument that he cannot possess her and hoard her as he does money: "Thou shalt not bothe, thogh that thou were wood,/ Be maister of my body and my good...I trowe thou woldest loke me in thy chiste" (ll. 313-17); because the Wife follows this

argument with Ovid's shared light metaphor, the reader may assume she implies sexual possession. She concludes her argument with a criticism of the restrictions her husband places on her: "Thou sholdest seye, 'Wyf, go wher thee lists...We love no man that taketh kepe or charge/ Wher that we goon; we wol ben at oure large" (ll. 318-22).

The Wife echoes a passage from *Elegy VII*, reversing Ovid's explanation of the way women see men to indicate the way men view women. Ovid's lines, "If my color is healthy I am indifferent to you; unhealthy I am dying with love for another" (315), are similar to the complaints of the Wife against her husband's suspicions: "If (a woman) be fair...Thou seyst that every holour wol hire have;/ She may no while in chastitee abide...And if that she be foul, thou seyst that she/ Coveiteth every man that she may se,/ For as a spaynel she wol on hem lepe/ Til that she fynde some man hire to chepe" (ll. 253-68). In another passage, the Wife satirizes the courtly lover's struggle by describing her four old husbands' sex/work. "As help me God, I laughe whan I thynke/ How pitously a-nyght I made hem swynke!" (ll. 201-2). The work the Wife makes her husbands do is farcical when compared to this passage from Ovid which describes his conception of the lover's work: "Love for a beautiful girl has bidden me to take service in her camp. For this you see me full of action and waging the wars of night" (288). In both instances, the Wife changes her sources--commonly accepted antifeminist or courtly conventions--and turned them to her own advantage, and to the disadvantage of her husbands, who tried to use the conventions against her.

The Wife is the master of the double standard; what is good for her is not always good for her husbands. If one questions her behavior or whereabouts she uses the maid to attest to her innocence--"A wys wyf, if that she kan hir good...(will) take witness of hire owene mayde/ Of hir assent" (ll. 231-4). However, if her husband "rowne with oure mayde" (l. 241), she accuses him. Chaucer may have pulled both of these references from *The Art of Love*, which included various tactics for the abuse of servants. Ovid encourages men, in their pursuit of the fair, "to make acquaintance with the handmaid of the fair one to be courted...Take care that she is deep in the secrets of her mistress...Her you do bribe with promises, her with entreaties; you shall obtain what you ask with little trouble, if she shall be willing...Let the handmaid, as she combs the lady's hair in the morning, urge her

on; and to the sail let her add the recourses of the oar" (393). Ovid also suggests that, despite "great risk," men may "find it of use to win the handmaid herself" and "make her entirely your own" (393). In such an event, "the boar does not readily get away from the loose nets; the wounded fish can be held by the hook it has seized...Guilty of a fault that is common to you both, she will not betray you" (394). He advises, however, men avoid such unions entirely: "your courtship must not be commenced with a servant-maid" (393). However, in *Amores*, Book II, Ovid uses a similar excuse to deny an affair with his lady's handmaid: "May the Gods prove more favorable, than that if I should have an inclination, a low-born mistress of a despised class should attract me! What free man would wish to have amorous intercourse with a bondwoman?" (316). In *Art of Love*, Book III, Ovid warns women to watch out for friends and handmaids who will steal their lovers: "If you are too trusting, other women will interrupt your pleasures...Do not let too pretty a maid wait upon you; many a time she has filled her mistress's place" (459).

Ovid often gives identical advice to men and woman in the pursuit of each other, and the Wife sometimes, but not always, accepts his suggestions. In *Art of Love*, Book I, Ovid rationalizes lying to women because they are liars: "Deceive if you are wise the fair with impunity. Deceive the deceivers, in great measure they are all a guilty race, let them fall into the toil which they have spread" (403). In Book III he gives women the same advice: "In my opinion, deceit is allowable for the purpose of repelling deceit, and the laws permit us to take up arms against the armed" (453). The Wife accepts these suggestions and asserts, "Half so boldly kan ther no man/ Swere and lyen as a womman kan" (ll. 227-8). A later statement indicates more clearly Chaucer's intended meaning: "Deceite, wepyng, spyngnyng God hath yeve/ To wommen knndely while that they may lyve" (ll. 401-2). The Wife asserts that women require lies and deceit in order to overcome possessive, controlling husbands; if men did not unreasonably suspect and accuse, women would have no reason to lie. Clearly, this is a subversion of the intended meaning of Ovid's original passages.

Ovid advises in *Remedies of Love* that women often deceive men with tears, and warns: "Take care not to be moved by the tears of the fair; they have taught their eyes to weep" (486). In *Art of Love*, Book III, he advises women "study how to weep with grace and cry at what time and in what

manner they please" (445). Although the Wife does not fake tears to trick her husbands, she does pretend to be bewitched to encourage Jankin to marry her: "I bar hym on honde he hadde enchanted me--My dame taught me that soutiltee. And eek I seyde I mette of hym al nyght...And al was fals; I dreamed of it right naught" (ll. 576-82). After they are wed, when Jankin beats her, the Wife pretends to be dead to scare him into changing his antifeminist beliefs and burning his book: "And with his fists he smoot me on the heed/ That in the floor I lay as I were deed./ And whan he saugh how stille that I lay,/ He was agast and wolde han fled his way,/ Til atte laste out of my swogh I breyde" (ll. 795-99). Ovid suggests that men and women keep two lovers, competition encouraging both to try harder to stay in favor. In *Remedies of Love* he instructs men, "I advise you, also, to have two mistresses at the same time. If a person can have still more, he is more secure" (478). "Judgement does not condemn you to one fair alone. The Gods forbid!" he explains in *Art of Love*, Book II. If the fair become jealous of each other, all the better; "rekindle deadened feelings; let (each) pale at the proof of your inconstancy" (424). Women must constantly be challenged in their relations, he asserts, "if there is no rival existing, their passion waxes faint" (423). He suggests to women in Book III that they also keep more than one lover: "While the lover that has been captured of late is falling into your toils, let him hope he alone has admittance to your chamber. But soon let him be aware of a rival, and a division of the privilege of your favors. Remove these contrivances and his passion will grow effete" (456). Although the Wife does not follow these suggestions literally, she achieves the desired result by merely threatening infidelity. However, hers is a reaction against her husband's inconstancy to her, his "paramours." She explains,

"I hadde in herte greet despit
That he of any oother had delit.
But he was quit, by God and by
Saint Joce,
I made hym of the same wode a
croce--
Nat of my body, in no foul manere,
But certainly, I made folk swich
cheere
That in his owene grece I made
hym frye
For angre and for verray jalousye"
(ll. 481-89)

Keeping two lovers is only one aspect of Ovid's larger theme of the disdainful lover. The Wife explains that her first four husbands "were ful glad when I spak to hem faire,/ For, God it woot, I chide hem spitously" (ll. 223-24). Later she remarks, "Namely abedde hadden they meschaunce. /Ther wolde I chide and do hem no pleasaunce" (ll. 407-8). She later agrees, however, that one reason she loves Jankin is because he is disdainful to her:

"I trowe I loved hym beste for that
 he
 Was of his love daungerous to me.
 We wommen han, if that I shall not
 lye,
 In this matere a quentye fantasye:
 Wayte what thyng we may nat
 lightly have,
 Therafter wol we crie al day and
 crave.
 Forbode a thyng and that desiren
 we" (ll. 513-19)

For this reason, in Remedies of Love, Ovid advises men to be distant from their mistresses. "Should she tell you to come ...and the gate be closed, do not lay down your sides upon the hard threshold. When the next morning comes, bear no signs of grief upon your features. She will lose her haughtiness when she shall see you growing cool" (480). He similarly advises women, "A repulse must now and then be mingled with your joyous dalliance...The sweet we cannot endure. This is that which does not permit wives to be loved; husbands have access to them whenever they please...Harshness rekindles the flame, even gone out. Myself to wit, I do not love unless I am ill-used" (456). Ovid advises the mistreatment of the fair many times in his tracts. The *Amores*, Elegy VII is entitled, "he has beaten his mistress and endeavors to regain her favor" (275). In Elegy III he compares the ideal courtly lovers to Leda and the Swan--a classical rape myth, and in Elegy V he describes what he considers an ideal courtly love scene: "I draw aside the tunic, in its thinness it is but a small impediment, still to be covered by the tunic she did strive, and as she struggled as though she was not desirous to conquer, without difficulty was she overcome" (271). Disregarding the possibility that the fair might actually not be desirous to conquer or, more accurately, to be conquered, Ovid suggests in The Art of Love that men force themselves upon the

unwilling fair: "tis pleasing to the fair to submit when the other takes the initiative" (405), he asserts. "he has who gained kisses, if he cannot gain the rest, will deserve to lose even that which was granted to him. Call it violence if you like; such violence is pleasing to the fair. Whatever fair one is despoiled by the sudden violence of passion, she is delighted at it" (404).

Chaucer assimilates this aspect of Ovid's antifeminism into the Wife's Tale in two ways: Jankin's abuse of the Wife in the Prologue and the rape that begins the Tale. In the Prologue, Chaucer gives the Wife an unfortunately un-feminist stance on physical abuse--her own in particular--one that affirms Ovid's misguided suggestions to men. She admits that Jankin "was to me the mooste shrewe,/ That feele I on my ribbes al by rewe, /And ever shal unto myn endyng day./ But in oure bed he was so fresshe and gay...Whan that he wolde han my bele chose, /That thogh he hadde me bet on every bon, /He koude wynne agayn my love anon" (ll. 505-12). Although the Wife responds to Jankin's violence with her own--"estoones I hitte hym on the cheke" (l. 808), she lets him get away with it: "Thus hastow mordred me?/ Er I be deed yet wol I kisse thee" (ll. 801-2).

The Wife confirms other courtly conventions mentioned by Ovid, although none as negative as his advocacy of rape and abuse. Both Ovid and the Wife make fun of cuckolds and blame them for their own folly. The Wife describes her first four husbands as "the thre men were goode, and riche, and olde. /Unnethe myghte they the statut holde/ In which that they were bounden unto me. Ye woot wel what I mene of this, pardee" (ll. 197-200). She adds that "the clerk whan he is oold and may nought do/ Of Venus werkes worth his olde sho,/ Thanne sit he down and writ in his dotage/ That wommen kan nat kepe hir marriage" (ll. 707-10). Clearly, this is another jab at authority and 'glosing.' Ovid includes a similar theme in his *Amores*; in Elegy IX he asserts, "The age which is suited for battle, is suited to love as well. It is unseemly for an old man to soldier, unseemly for an old man to love" (285), and in Elegy XIII advises his mistress, "While thou art avoiding him because he is chilled by length of years, rise early in the morning from the bed of the old man to thy odious chariot. Why should I be punished in my affections if thy husband does decay?" (295). The Wife confirms Ovid's assertion that wine may act as an aid in the pursuit of courtly love. Ovid writes that wine "incites the feelings to lust" (490), and

"composes the feelings and makes them ready to be inflamed; care flies and is drenched with plenteous wine" (389). He advises wives to use alcohol to drug their cuckold husbands--"Bid your husband drink incessantly, and while he is drinking, if you can, add wine by stealth" (269). Men, he suggests, should "feign inebriety" to seduce women (402), and the fair he assures, "it is more becoming to drink to excess" (462). He warns, however, that "a woman sprawling along drenched in wine is a disgusting object; she is worthy to endure the embraces of any kind of fellows" (462). Hoffman points out that Ovid's suggestions for the use of wine in lovemaking are "as useful for lustful women as for the lustful men to whom Ovid addressed them" (139). The Wife confirms this theory, admitting, "After wyn on Venus moste I thynke,/ For al so siker as cold engendereth hayl,/ A likerous mouth moste han a likerous tayl" (ll. 464-66).

Ovid and the Wife also agree that the funeral of a dead husband is a good place for his widow to look for a new lover. Ovid advises, "let the handsome woman present herself to be seen by the public. Chance is powerful everywhere; let you hook be always hanging ready. Many a time, in waters where you least think it, there will be fish. Many a time, at the funeral of a husband, is another husband found. To go with the tresses dishevelled, and not to withhold your lamentations, is becoming" (451). Rand writes that an important aspect of Ovid's tracts for women is the discussion of "the attractiveness of mourning apparel" (44). The Wife captures her fifth husband with this technique, taking Ovid's advice to men in *Remedies of Love* to "beforehand provide for (her)self a twofold solace" (478) by suggesting to Jankin prior to the death of her fourth husband "that he,/ If I were wydwe, sholde wedde me" (ll. 566-8). The Wife's motto is 'be prepared'; she asserts, "I holde a mouse herte nat worth a leek/ That hath but oon hole for to sterte to,/ And if that falle, thanne is all ydo" (ll. 572-4). At her husband's funeral she remarks, "Jankin, oure clerk...As help me God...he hadde a pair/ Of legges and of feet so clean and faire/ That al myn herte I yaf unto his hooold" (ll. 595-99). "A wys womman," she explains, "wol sette hire evere in oon/ To gete hire love, ye ther as she hath noon" (ll. 209-10).

Finally, Ovid and the Wife agree that women demand money in exchange for sex, withhold sex if their husbands do not give them money, and otherwise sell sex or use it to men's disadvantage. Ovid, from the male perspective, finds this practice

despicable; the Wife views it in much the same way she sees women's dishonesty to men: women wouldn't have to use sex for money if their husbands would grant them economic freedom. The Wife asserts, "By my fey, I tolde it of no stoor;/ They had me yeven hir lond and hir tresor...But sith I hadde hem hoolly in myn hond,/ And sith they had me yeven al his lond,/ What sholde I taken heede hem for to plesse/ But if it were for my profit and myn ese?" (ll. 203-14). If she did not force her husband's to share with her what, in marriage, should be equally hers, she would have nothing, the Wife implies. She is not greedy, however, and does not hesitate to give her possessions to Jankin when they marry, extending to him more marital privilege than her first husbands gave to her: "And to hym yaf I al the lond and fee/ That ever was me yeven therbifoore" (ll. 630-1). Later she admits of her relations with her first four husbands, "Til he had maad his raunsoun unto me;/ Thanne wolde I suffre hym to do his nycetee...Wynne whoso may, for al is for to selle;/ With empty hond men may none haukes lure./ For wynnyng wolde I al his lust endure/ And make me a feyned appetit" (ll. 411-17). Ovid condemns this behavior: "A woman finds contrivances be means of which to plunder the riches of the eager lover. She asks for a present; then, full of tears, she laments its pretended loss and the jewel is feigned to have fallen from her pierced ear. They ask for a sum to be lent to them; so lent, they have no inclination to return it" (396). In *Elegy X* he adds, "The mare asks no gift of the horse, nor the cow of the bull; the ram does not woo the ewe, induced by presents. Woman alone is on sale, to be hired at a price. She sells, too, joys that delight...and makes of them a matter of pay" (288).

This passage also illustrates Ovid's use of animal imagery to describe women and their animalistic tendencies, a habit Chaucer adapts for the Wife. Ovid writes, "in the balmy meads, the female lows after the bull; the female neighs after the horny-hoofed horse...Pasiphae delighted to become paramour of the bull; as the companion of the herds...no regard for her husband restrained her; and by a bull was Minos conquered" (391). The Wife mentions this myth in her list of "wikked wyves" included in Jankin's book: "Of Phasifpha, that was the queene of Crete...Fy! Speke namoore--it is a grisly thyng--/ Of hire horrible lust and hir lykyng" (ll. 733-36). Ovid makes other references to animals in the description of women, often referring to the pursuit of courtly love in terms of the hunt; he

describes the courtier as the hunter and the fair as "prey." He writes, "The hunter knows full well what vale dwells the boar gnashing its teeth... You too who seek a subject for love, first learn in what spot the fair are to be met with" (380). He suggests courtly lovers study "where to lay their nets" for the fair (390) and warns, "There are various dispositions in the fair, treat these thousand dispositions a thousand different ways... These fish are taken up with a dart, those with hooks; these the encircling nets draw up... Likewise, let no one method be adopted by you above others" (407). In *Elegy II* he asserts, "The horse which is unbroken bruises its mouth with the hard curb; Love goads more sharply those who struggle than those who agree to endure his servitude" (263), a statement which also refers to his rape theme. Chaucer describes women with animal imagery also, echoing Ovid, but reversing his meaning. The Wife asserts that men "seist that oxen, asses, hors and houndes, / They been assayed at divers stoundes... But folk of wyves maken noon assay / Til they be wedded--olde dotard shrewe! / Thanne, seistow, we wol oure vices shewe" (ll. 285-92). The Wife uses this animal reference to criticize the way men view their wives--as property akin to livestock--rather than to point to the animalistic qualities of women. She asserts that men think of their wives as singed cats, refusing to buy them pretty clothing because they fear it will make them inconstant:

"For whoso wolde senge a cattes
skyn
Thanne wolde the cat wel dwellen
in his in,
And if the cattes skyn be slyk and
gay
She wol not dwell in house half a
day,
But forth she wole...
To shewe hir skyn and goon
a-caterwawed;
This is to say, if I be gaye, sire
shrewe,
I wol renne out my borel for to
shewe" (ll. 349-56).

The Wife's animal imagery again indicates a criticism of mistrusting husbands, unlike Ovid, whose animal comparisons usually reflect negatively on women.

The most important references to Ovid in the Wife's Tale are the classical myths of Argus in the

Prologue and Midas in the Tale. In addition, Chaucer appropriates Ovid's hag Dipsas as a pattern for the knight's "loothly Lady" in the Tale (Robertson 12). Hoffman writes of Chaucer's reference to Argus that he is implying, through literal or figurative blindness, "even the most circumspect guardian can be cozened of his treasure" (133). Ovid uses Argus to explain how women's deceptive nature can be used against their husbands: "Even if as many eyes be watching you, as Argus had, if there is only determination, you will deceive them all" (458). The Wife turns this reference into a criticism of men's deceptions to spy on their mistresses, challenging: "Sire, olde fool, what helpeth thee to spyen? / Thogh thou prey Argus with his hundred eyen / To be my warde-cors, as he han best, / In feith, he shal not kepe but me lest" (ll. 357-60).

The Wife subverts Ovid's myth of Midas more than any other passage from Ovid's works. D.W. Robertson, Jr. writes, "It is frequently helpful to consult Chaucer's sources to see first how he has managed them for his purposes, and then to consider the alterations made in the original" (1); clearly, this is the case with Chaucer's reinterpretation of Ovid's Midas. The original myth, included in the *Metamorphoses*, explains that Midas tells the secret of his asses ears to his barber, who whispers it into a hole in the ground. The secret is spread when reeds grow from the whole and wind blows through them, dispersing the secret. Ovid's intention was to imply that nothing can be kept secret for long. Chaucer changes the events of the myth--Midas tells his secret to his wife, who whispers it to a river; the secret is never discovered--to change its meaning to imply that woman cannot be trusted to keep secrets. Robertson explains this by theorizing that the Wife has misread Ovid's myth (5), but Shannon's assertion that the misinterpretation is on the part of the writer of Jankin's antifeminist book, who would have altered the source to support his view, or by Jankin in the telling of the myth to his wife is more believable (319). Chaucer also appropriates Ovid's bull, cow and crow fable from *Elegy V*, subverting its intended meaning from antifeminism to a criticism of suspicious husbands. In the elegy, Ovid dreams of a white cow and her mate who attended by a crow that pecks the cow and "imposes black envy upon her breast" (351). Ovid interprets the dream to signify an ideal courtly couple harassed by a procuress and predict that his mistress will be tempted to infidelity by a procuress, which occurs when she encounters Dipsas in *Elegy VIII*. The Wife mentions this fable

in her Prologue when she asserts that "a wys wyf, if that she can hir good, / Shal beren hym on hond the cow is wood" (ll. 231-2), 'cow' meaning chough or crow.

The knight in the Wife's Tale encounters a hag not unlike Dipsas, although her character is made more positive by Chaucer. Dipsas is described as an "old hag" with a "double pupil" indicative of her power of prophecy. Similarly, Chaucer describes his hag, "a fouler wight ther may no man devyse" (l. 999), and writes that the knight initially encounters the hag in a magical realm of dancing and disappearing women whose intangibility may imply women's inconstancy. Ovid asserts that Dipsas "has made it her occupation to violate the chaste bed and is not wanting in guilty advocacy" (280). Chaucer's hag, on the other hand, saves the knight and enlightens him on the true nature of marital bliss, enabling him to see women's other than physical worth. Both Chaucer and Ovid discuss the relationship of beauty and chastity; much of Chaucer's opinion on this topic is voiced by the hag. Ovid advises men, "Why didst thou choose a beauty for thyself if she was not pleasing unless chaste? Those qualities cannot by any means be united" (350). Chaucer's hag argues this point with the knight, asserting,

"Now ther ye seye that I am foul
and olde,
Than drede ye nought to be a
cokewold...
'Chese now,' quod she, 'oon of
these thynges tweye.
To han me foul and old til that I
deye,
And be to you a trewe and humble
wyf,
And nevere yow displese in al my
lyf,
Or elles te wol han me yong and
fair,
And take youre aventure of the
repair
That shal be to youre hous by cause
of me,
Or in some oother place, may wel
be" (ll. 1213-26).

Again, Chaucer has turned Ovid's criticism of young, promiscuous women into a condemnation of men who select wives on the basis of their beauty.

The most important way the Wife subverts

the message of Ovid's love tracts is in support of her main thesis: sovereignty and equality in marriage. Although Ovid advises men to pretend to give their wives their way in order to manipulate them, the Wife and the hag advocate and achieve partnership with their husbands -reformed antifeminists--and teach them that the ideal married state is one of equality and mutual respect. Rand explains that Ovid's plan is to let women run things--rather let them think they do--and manipulate them through the use of this misconception. He asserts, "Tis that subdues the tigers and Numidian lions. By degrees only does the bull submit to the rustic plough...yield to her when opposing; by yielding will you come off victorious" (414). Both Jankin and the knight, however, willingly abdicate their positions of dominance and agree to share equally with their wives in "sovereignty," which the Wife views as mutual respect, responsibility and freedom. She relates in her Prologue that, after they had agreed to "honour" each other in marriage, "after that day we hadden never debaat" because she "was to hym kynde...And also trewe, and so was he to me" (ll. 823/5). In the tale she describes a similar scenario between the knight and the hag; the knight agrees to love and respect the hag, and "she obeyed hym in very thyng" (l. 1255). as a result, they "lyve unto hir lyves ende/ In parfit joye" (ll. 1257-8).

Henry Barrett Hinckley calls the Wife's Tale "the story of a man who had his wish simply by letting his wife have hers" (217). Although the hag agrees to obey her husband, she does so willingly because he has agreed to "obey" her as well. Cooper points out that the Wife "focuses the question of the nature of women, dealt with at large in the Tales, into a more restricted theme, the nature of women's role in marriage, her own in particular" (148). "The central point of the Wife's argument is her own will" Cooper adds, and her success lies in her refusal to accept the roles forced upon her simply because other women do so. The Wife refuses to respect authority simply because it is such, and insists that her husband's antifeminist beliefs either be defended and proven, or rejected. Cooper concludes that the Wife has her way because she refuses to submit to the demands of her husbands, society and the church, and is steadfast in the belief that she is right about the ideal state of marriage and they are wrong.

Rand writes that Chaucer "studied the nature of women with Ovid's help" (149); if so, it can be said that Chaucer has considerably improved Ovid's conception of women by subverting the very tracts

Ovid wrote in criticism of them. The overall message of the Wife of Bath's Prologue and Tale indicates that Chaucer and Ovid have different views of women and their roles in society, and if, as Rand says, Chaucer is "one of the most conspicuous reincarnations of Ovid in the Middle Ages" (149) it is clear that Chaucer is much enlightened as a result of their interaction.

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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES**

David H. LUCAS, Respondent

vs.

SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL, Appellant

**THIS CASE IS ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

TISHA L. MORRIS

COUNCIL FOR THE RESPONDENT

David H. LUCAS

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The question of when regulation from police power becomes a taking can not be easily answered, and has traditionally been an area of confusion among courts. In fact, Justice Stevens says in his dissent in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 265 (1987), that regulatory takings decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been "open-ended and standardless." *supra*, 482 U.S. at 340, 107 S.Ct. at 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d at 280 (footnote 17).

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution allows the federal government to take private property under two conditions: the taking must be for a public purpose and the owner must be justly compensated. This case must determine whether the application of the Beachfront Management Act, Code, sec. 48-39-10 et seq., to the respondent's property is a taking of property without just compensation. The following questions must be considered in order to decide:

1. If the regulation resulted in Lucas' property having no economic value, then was there a regulatory taking without compensation? If so, does this violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
2. How has the United States Supreme Court decided Takings cases in the past?
3. What is the purpose of the Beachfront Management Act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is before the Court as an appeal by David H. Lucas, the respondent. As an owner of beachfront property, he brought action alleging that the application of the Beachfront Management Act, S.C.Code Ann. sec. 48-39-10 et seq. (1989 Cum.Supp.), to his property constituted a taking without just compensation. The Common Pleas Court of Charleston County, Larry R. Patterson, Special J., awarded Lucas \$1,232,387.50 as just compensation for the "regulatory" taking. The South Carolina Coastal Council, the administrator of the Beachfront Management Act, appealed the case. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, Toal, J., reversed the lower court by ruling that governmental regulation of the property, in order to prevent serious public harm, did not amount to a "regulatory taking" of property; therefore, compensation was not

required. Basing his case on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Lucas now requests judgment by the Supreme Court of the United States.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

May it please the Court:

Imagine spending almost a million dollars for land and then being told you can't do anything with it. This situation became reality for David Lucas, who owns two ocean-front lots in the Beachwood East Subdivision of the Wild Dunes development on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina. After Lucas had bought the lots, the South Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act, which limits construction within the beach/dune system. Through statutorily mandated setback lines, the construction of any permanent structure is prohibited. As a result, Lucas' plans to build homes on the lots, one for himself and one to sell, have been put to a halt.

Because the property is no longer economically viable, Lucas is seeking compensation from the state of \$1.2 million. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation." Therefore, the application of the Beachfront Management Act violates the Takings Clause.

However, the federal and state governments also have the right of eminent domain and police power. Eminent domain involves the taking of property for public use for which compensation is required to be made. Police power involves the regulation of private property to prevent public harm.¹

Another type of taking is a "regulatory taking." This taking occurs when a regulatory action by the government lowers the value of the property so much that the landowner considers it to have been taken by the government and expects compensation in return. In this case, the government usually contends that the loss in the value of the private property is offset by the increase in the value of public safety, morals, or welfare.²

Does this type of action violate the Fifth Amendment? David Lucas believes so.

Even if prohibiting new construction in close proximity of the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent erosion, Lucas believes he is still entitled to compensation as a result of a regulatory taking, which has deprived him of all economically viable use of his property.

ARGUMENT OF LAW

I. Although the regulation depriving Lucas to build is intended to prevent public harm, a regulatory taking still exists; therefore, Lucas is entitled to compensation.

The Constitution of the United States provides a clause, known as the Takings Clause, that protects citizens from eminent domain through the means of compensation. Our founding fathers, however, did not intend for the clause to become as complex as it has. In fact, the purpose of the Takings Clause is to limit government intervention into private property. In other cases involving the Takings Clause, there has been much debate over what constitutes a taking, and/or what are, if any, the exceptions to compensation.

A. South Carolina's regulation of David Lucas' property does constitute a taking. The general rule for a regulatory taking was established in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), which states, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." supra, 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160, 67 L.Ed. 326. Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), upheld this rule and also stated that regulation can bring about a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of its land." supra, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648. Therefore, the next question is whether Lucas' property is economically viable. In determining economic viability of land, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) should be applied. The Keystone Court held that there should be a comparison between the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property. supra, 480 U.S. at 497, 107 S.Ct. at 1248, 94 L.Ed.2d at 496. When Lucas purchased the two lots, he planned to build two homes, one for his family and one for market sale. However, according to Lucas' appraiser, the Beachfront Management Act's prohibition against building caused the value of the lots to plummet to zero. As a result, the lots have no fair market value and no economic viability.

B. The South Carolina Coastal Council's contention that preventing a serious public harm follows no compensation is unconstitutional. According to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, private property shall not be taken for

public use without compensation. The constitution has not designated the prevention of a public harm to be an exception. However, PRIVATE PROPERTY TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE has been specifically designated as a condition to authorize compensation. Lucas' property has been taken for public use and, therefore, warrants compensation.

II. Since the subject matter in cases dealing with the Takings Clause is complex, the Supreme Court of the United States has appropriately decided these cases in the past by considering the various factors involved rather than using one precedent.

Some of the various factors that the Court now considers are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation's interference with investment backed expectations; (3) the character of the government action; and (4) the nature of the State's interest in the regulation. Keystone, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 1244, 1247. However, the Court has previously had difficulty in deciding takings cases.

A. Beginning with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887), the Court stated that a taking has not been found when the regulation exists to prevent serious public harm. The Supreme Court followed the Mugler rule by stating, "the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity." Keystone, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 1245 n. 20. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has used this part of Keystone as a precedent in deciding takings cases. However, they are not taking into account other factors involved. B. After the Mugler case, the Court decided Pennsylvania Coal, which adopted a new rule which states that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." supra, 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160, 67 L.Ed. at 326. As a result, the Mugler rule was only viewed as the minority opinion in the Pennsylvania Coal case. However, five years later, the Supreme Court used Mugler in deciding Miller V. Schoene, 276, U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928), and again in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). Then, in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, supra, the Supreme Court used the Pennsylvania Coal test and also stated that there was no "set formula" for determining compensation. supra, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648.

C. Finally, the Supreme Court addresses both

the Mugler rule and Pennsylvania Coal rule in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis, supra. Although Keystone does recognize the Mugler rule, it does not abolish the Pennsylvania Coal rule. As a result, there continues to be no established precedent; and, therefore, takings cases should be determined case-by-case depending on the individual factors involved.

III. The Beachfront Management Act is actually a result of the federal government's aversion in insuring risky, flood-prone areas.

In 1968 Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which provided flood insurance at a subsidized rate to existing homeowners in flood-prone areas. The program was established because private insurance companies were not willing to take the risk.³ However, this analysis is not complete because of the influence of previous governmental regulations. Property owners would not purchase private flood insurance because they could simply depend on disaster relief payments from the government.⁴ The South Carolina coast is a participant of the NFIP.⁵

A. Communities that receive coverage from the NFIP must establish land-use controls for flood-prone areas.

The mandatory regulations that a community is required in order to receive the NFIP include reviewing building permits for new construction, imposing floodproofing requirements and minimum elevation standards on structures in floodplains, and protecting against erosion.⁶ All of these requirements have been enacted through the Beachfront Management Act. These regulations by the federal government are imposed so that they will not have to foot such a large bill when a disaster, such as Hurricane Hugo, comes along. In fact, it was soon after Hurricane Hugo when the NFIP had to pay \$ 2 billion to cover only the Charleston area.⁷ Shortly afterwards, the Beachfront Management Act was enacted which restricted new construction and repairs to damaged structures along the 180-mile coastline. Conveniently, the NFIP would no longer have to pay for the damages because South Carolina was now going to protect the environment.

Supposedly, one of the main objectives of the Beachfront Management Act is to preserve the beaches for the tourist industry. Actually, destroyed, abandoned houses and empty lands have resulted. Is this what attracts tourists to South Carolina's beaches?

B. The root of the problem is actually the existence of a moral hazard.

The NFIP does not price discriminate on the basis of risk.⁸ Instead, a flat rate is charged to all recipients. As a result, those homeowners who are more liable to damage are not paying the full cost of their action; and, therefore, a moral hazard exists. Homeowners who are more risk neutral or adverse must pay the extra costs that the risk takers do not. After Hurricane Hugo, premiums increased for all recipients in order to finance those who lived in the most flooded areas.⁹ If the community were insured by private insurance companies, then the risk takers would pay more insurance. In turn, property owners would be paying for the full cost of their action, and no moral hazard would exist. Like private insurers, the NFIP should simply charge different rates instead of mandating regulations that deter having to pay for the risky, flood-prone areas.

CONCLUSION

Because the application of the Act constitutes a taking under the Constitution of the United States, it is not necessary to examine a taking under the South Carolina Constitution. Now that a taking does exist, an appropriate solution must be resolved. Recent amendments to the Beachfront Management Act, S.C.Code Ann. sections 48-39-290(A)(6) and 48-39-290(D)(1)(Supp.1990), state that an applicant may request a special permit to build a structure that has been disallowed in Sections 48-39-250 through 48-39-360. If Lucas is denied approval, I contend that he should be compensated for the loss of his land.

Respectfully submitted,
TISHA L. MORRIS
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Counsel for Respondent
David H. Lucas

¹Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen. Law and Economics (Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co.), 1988, pp. 191-192.

²Ibid.

³James Shilling, C.F. Sirmans and John Benjamin. "Flood Insurance, Wealth Distribution, and Urban Property Values," Journal of Urban Economics, July 1989, p. 43.

⁴Ibid. (footnote 1).

⁵South Carolina Coastal Council. telephone interview. 13 April 1992.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "To Build on the Beach, or Not," The Economist,
September 1989, p. 23.

⁸ "To Build on the Beach, or Not," The Economist,
September 1989, p. 23.

⁹ Ibid.

Cooperation and Conformity: Harmony in Japan

Christopher W. Oakes

Conflict is inevitable. One might say that as long as two people are present, conflict on some level is likely...but it does not even require two people. The psychological conflicts people experience every day result from different elements within one person competing. Not only must each individual work out a way to harmonize these competing elements, but each society has to work out ways to harmonize individuals to work together; else a society would not exist at all but rather a survival-of-the-fittest anarchy. The rise of civilization in all areas of the world involved the harmonization of individuals into some sort of whole. Thus just how that harmony is conceived of, defined, and enacted has an immediate impact on how people think, act, and interact.

To call Japan a "Harmony Society" then would seem to be redundant. But also possibly inaccurate...as in any society's history, conflict and attempts to solve it are a constant. The battles of various politically powerful families (such as the Soga and Fujiwara) and the feudal wars during the Kamakura Period and the Zengakuren student protests, for example, all seem to throw the concept of "wa" (harmony) out the window. This paradox is resolved when "wa" is seen not as a given, a factor that "naturally permeates" Japanese society but rather as a "behavioral ideology" as Harumi Befu calls it (Moeran, 65) activated in order to prevent or resolve specific conflicts (Eisenstadt 13). Thus, as Nakamura Hajime puts it, "The unanimous moral solidarity of a community has been sought as the social ideal, on an island scale, of Japan." (Nakamura, 145). "Wa" is an ideal invoked and applied within a certain context to get people to cooperate instead of being at odds, an action which always entails at least some suppression of the individual, whether it be the suppression of destructive instincts or the suppression of an individual's difference of outlook.

What exactly then is this ideal, this societal tool, harmony? What does a Japanese person mean when he/she says "wa" and in what manner does the tool operate? The Ministry of Education in Japan once defined "wa" indirectly in their "Grand Principles of National Polity" as follows:

In individualism there can exist cooperation, compromise, self-sacrifice, and so on, in order to adjust

and reduce contradictions and oppositions, but in the final analysis there exists no real harmony (wa)....The "wa" of our country is not mechanical cooperation, starting from reason, of equal individuals independent of each other, but the grand harmony (taiwa) which maintains its integrity by proper statuses of individuals within the collectivity and by acts in accordance with these statuses....After all, oppositions of opinions, as well as differences of interests deriving from [various] standpoints, are integrated into a unity of grand harmony proper to Japan and originating from a common source. Not conflicts, but harmony is final. (Kawashima, 264)

Thus, as Harumi Befu points out, conflict will be seen as "dysfunctional," something to be avoided (215). The central mechanism in avoiding such conflict is "nemawashi" (prior consultation), the practice of the leader of a group informally discussing the issue with various subordinates, identifying any possible conflicts, and working out compromises before the formal meeting (Befu, 216). As a senior executive of the SONY corporation relates,

To be truthful, probably 60 percent of the decisions I make are my decisions. But I keep my intentions secret. In discussions with subordinates, I ask questions, pursue facts, and try to nudge them in my direction without disclosing my position. Sometimes I end up changing my position as the result of the dialogue. But whatever the outcome, they feel a part of the decision. Their involvement in the decision also increases their experience as managers. (Smith, 55)

While this does offer a chance for dissent, one wonders if at times the opportunity is passed up to give an appearance of harmony even on this level.

Whatever the case may be, at times the unanimity is indeed forced beforehand through persuasion in the form of an appeal to harmony or even through veiled threats (Yanaga, 86).

Whatever the situation, the appearance of harmony is usually achieved by a dichotomization of the Self into atemae, "the formal and public position one takes", and honne, the "privately held view of the individual" (Befu, 216). In a situation wherein the individual opinion may cause conflict within the group, it is encouraged and prescribed to state the formal atemae position regardless of one's true feelings (Befu, 216). This value is taught to Japanese at an early stage of socialization: Betty Lanham observes,

Japanese Teachers are advised to discourage students from expressing impulsive thoughts and emotional opinions; thus the potential for eradicating negative feelings through this means is lost. The result may be the establishing of two identities, one functioning on the communicative level and the other known only to ego. A damper is placed on the potential for shared excitement. There are, of course, inhibitors in the United States. The difference is a matter of degree. (Lanham, 294)

Such a system certainly has operative problems as well. First of all, the harmony system only seems to work with small, personal groups (such as certain departments of a company or a university). Such small groups, as opposed to the overall structure, are expected to share a devotion to the group's goals and to respect their co-workers as partners in attaining this goal (Smith, 51). As Befu notes, such an emphasis tends to promote, as one may well expect, too much loyalty to one's own group and prejudice and hostility towards other groups, even other groups within the same overall structure (Befu, 214). The frequent transfer of people from one small group to another is an attempt to create personal networks between groups to counteract this tendency, and such an attempt works sometimes but certainly not all the time (Befu, 216). The example is cited of the (so-called) Liberal Democratic Party, wherein

sub-units of the Party become semi-autonomous in competing for resources within the party, although to be sure, vis-a-vis other political parties, they act in unison, as seen in their practice of bloc voting in the Diet. (Befu, 216)

The situation for the Zengakuren student protestors was more disastrous, wherein they fractured into cliques all fighting (even violently) among themselves instead of against their common opponent. They lost public support, focus, effectiveness, and lives as a result.

Second of all, a major weakness of the harmony system is that, in order for it to be effective, it must assume in the first place a common worldview (Befu, 217). When the two parties differ in basic worldview, as can be seen in the Tokugawa peasant uprisings or the student protests of the 1960s, the ideal breaks down and isn't applicable—in exactly the very situation in which the need for some sort of cooperation is most pressing.

Last, the principle is easily abused by power groups to control the masses, although the masses may also utilize it to make demands upon the power groups. For instance, after World War I certain groups formed to oppose government oppression, using the idea of individual rights as their basis. The government in turn tried to deal with this challenge by emphasizing mediation and harmony (Kawashima, 272). As time progressed after the Manchurian incident,

the government moved further in intensifying the inculcation of the ideology of familial "piety" and denounced self-assertion and individualism by issuing official textbooks on authorized totalitarian ideology, such as Kokutai no Hongi (Grand Principles of National Policy), Shinmin no Michi (The Way of Subjects), and Senji Katei Kyoiku Shido Yoryo (Basic Principles of Wartime Home Education). The spirit of "wa" was proclaimed as a supreme value, and the argument (kotoage) for private interest was condemned as a vice. (Kawashima, 272)

The Japanese sociologist Fukutake Tadashi felt acutely the misuse of the "wa" concept by authority.

He especially denounced the use of "harmony" to instill the cultural expectation that a person act in total conformity, restraining his/her individual feelings and opinions for the benefit of maintaining a harmonious community atmosphere, thus depriving individuals of autonomy and independent responsibility. Even when the government is not particularly repressive, the "wa" ideal sometimes encourages people to vote "depending on others" or "going along" (Richardson, 99), which somewhat defeats the purposes of voting, it would seem. When the government actually is repressive, as Fukutake says,

For a Japanese, the safest course was to tread the path of convention with everyone else. Consequently, whatever his reason or his conscience might tell him he should do, if doing it would invite isolation he would be unwilling to take the risk. Indeed, his very ability to react critically to conventional behavior was likely to be highly undeveloped in the first place. And as the habit of conforming with the crowd and suppressing individuality grew, so the fear of isolation increased and led to a deeply rooted conservatism which disliked any change. (Fukutake, 43-44)

Despite such potential disadvantages as these three, the principle of "wa" also works well in bringing people together in common causes. In business contracts, for instance, little to no provision for possible dispute is included since to suggest that such an event might actually happen would constitute mistrust and thus damage "wa." If a dispute does occur, it will preferably be handled through mediation, where both parties benefit to some degree and are reconciled, rather than resorting to a lawsuit causing bad feelings on both sides (Kawashima, 266-67). Such a unifying principle probably had a hand in what success the before-mentioned individual rights groups had in forming a coherent aim and achieving it despite opposition. The value of "wa" has also resulted in a tendency to de-emphasize the differences or incompatibilities in philosophies and religions (Moore, 295), thus creating an atmosphere of tolerance in which persecution is a rare phenomenon, and usually a politically not ideologically motivated one. The ability to work together and put the group's

interests first is one of the main factors in Japan's industrializing and modernizing successfully, relatively smoothly, and in a comparatively minuscule amount of time. Of course, such a change makes the very concept that sped it on somewhat problematic. As Kosaka Masaaki comments:

the problems to be solved [in contemporary Japan] are the relation between the individual and the state and that between the individual and the various social groups. As the Japanese has deemed strong self-assertion ugly, he seldom expresses his opinion in the presence of others. To eliminate what is bad is relatively easy, but to eliminate or alter what was good but is no longer deemed highly appropriate is very difficult. Here lies one of the fundamental problems for the Japanese. For the virtue of non-self-assertiveness that was once respected is now either inappropriate or insufficient for modern society. (Kosaka, 256)

Thus, as with any other aspect of society, one cannot say of "harmony" that it is either "good" or "bad," but rather that it is useful and beneficial in some circumstances, while useless and harmful in others. Such a pervasive element seems to have little chance of being completely extinguished from the fabric of society, and such a move could well prove quite harmful. However, it does seem that to face the challenges of the quickly-approaching next century the Japanese people will probably need to modify the concept so that it will be relevant and helpful rather than something holding them back and cutting them off from other people in the world and from themselves. Especially the younger generation today seem to be trying more and more to assert themselves and consider their own interests and opinions as of equal importance to that of their group. Such may be the necessary adjustment. After all, every society needs something to hold it together, but if you hold something together too tightly. . . it breaks.

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A Review and Examination of the Causes of the Mexican War, 1846-1848 *Arthur William Penn*

The Mexican War of 1846 to 1848, forgotten by most Americans, arose out of a complex situation that many different authors have attempted to explain. The results were plain: the United States so successfully carried out the war against Mexico that over ten degrees of latitude were added to the former country at the expense of the latter.¹ Mexico lost one-half of her territory. Many reasons have been given for the conflict. Some historians blame the Southern slaveholding interests for seeking to add more slave land to the United States. Others simply cite provocations by Mexico: her violations of treaties, abuses of U.S. citizens in her territory, mistreatment of the Texans after they gained their independence from Mexico, and finally, her declaration of war (albeit a defensive one) against the United States. President Polk's expansionist actions, some blame; the Eastern United States commercial interests, others impute. The ubiquitous concept of "Manifest Destiny" pervades the historiography of the Mexican War as a source of conflict. And infrequently mentioned is the significance of political instability in Mexico in the period from Mexico's independence in 1821 until the war. Because these varying theories do not fall neatly into groups, they will be examined chronologically.

Nineteenth Century American and Other Non-Mexican Historians

Nathan Covington Brooks

In A Complete History of the Mexican War: its causes, conduct, and consequences: comprising an account of the various military and naval operations, from its commencement to the treaty of peace, Nathan Covington Brooks claims that the war was an act of aggression that the President of the United States conducted without regard to the wishes of the Congress. Mexico did violate the April 5, 1831, commercial treaty with the United States when she impounded a vessel from Maine and incorporated it into the Mexican navy, and she did declare war first; but since the declaration of war was of a defensive nature, Mexico did not act upon it. The independence of Texas and later its annexation into the United States brought on the hostilities only in

that Polk ordered troops into the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers that Texas claimed upon her independence. The boundary of Texas was the Nueces, and even though Texas made a claim to the land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, the claim was not supported by occupation or the law; it was only made in writing. Polk, ". . . by an assumption of power not warranted in the Constitution, and without the knowledge and consent of Congress, order[ed] the American army into the territory of Mexico and precipitat[ed] the country into war."² Mexicans considered this act to be the commencement of war. The short period between the annexation of Texas and the outbreak of war allowed no time to pass for Mexican tempers to cool, further fueling the crisis and possibly causing the fighting. Brooks asks, ". . . who can imagine what the end would have been if, in the dispute about Oregon, the President, without consulting Congress, had ordered the American army to the boundary as claimed in 54 degrees 40 minutes?"³

William Jay

Perhaps the most unorthodox source considered here is A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War by William Jay, first published in 1849. Jay cites the extension of slavery as the primary and, perhaps, only motivation for the initiation of the conflict. Slavery was geographically confined to the southeastern United States before the acquisition of any Mexican territory because it was not allowed by the free Northern states or the Mexican lands to the west. The grievances began for the Americans when the Mexican government completely abolished slavery in her territories in 1829. Because the Mexican government was too weak to expel the numerous slaveholding Americans in Texas, the Texans sought annexation to the United States as a slaveholding state. A wave of attempts to purchase Texas ensued. Some newspapers estimated that up to nine new slaveholding states could be added to the union if this were accomplished. Slavery needed land to survive: dense populations created rebellions.

The purchasing of Texas a failure, slaveholders encouraged the Texans to end their

union with the Mexican government so that annexation could be pursued. Independence was gained with the aid of many U.S. citizens enlisted into the Texan armies. Unfortunately for slaveholders, annexation was opposed by many in Congress; this barrier would be removed if Mexico began the hostilities. The U.S. could then take the land through the right of conquest. "From this time, the policy of the administration was to force Mexico into war."⁴

Many claims were made by American citizens against the Mexican government, but upon examination of the abuses supposedly committed by Mexico, Jay writes that no claims were justly made. Even the ones that were legitimate abuses were not national issues, being committed by lower officials who occasionally took too much power into their own hands; no national tension should have begun over these claims. The threats that Mexico made about recapturing Texas were idle threats, and the political instability in that nation left them completely incapable of carrying any of them out. Also, the boundary dispute that allowed President Polk to declare that American blood had been spilled on American soil was a result of the Texan legislature's extreme claims: Texas at one point claimed land as far as Oregon. No Texan settlements were in the disputed area between the Rio Grande and the Nueces River. Even the clash of arms over the above boundary dispute was not enough to begin a war, as the British had previously seized two American ships, killing members of their crews and damaging the ships, with no talk of war over it.

Interestingly, Polk claimed Mexican territory with the same insistence with which he claimed British Oregon, but the "clear and unquestionable" title to Oregon ended in a peaceful relinquishment of five degrees and forty minutes of territory; in contrast, the claims to Mexican lands led to a war. Jay asserts that slavery would never have occurred in Oregon, but the new southern lands had ripe conditions for the introduction of slaves. From start to finish slavery determined the prosecution of the Mexican War and the provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.⁵

Twentieth Century American and other Non-Mexican Historians

Karl Jack Bauer

In Bauer's book The Mexican War, 1846-

1848, he finds Manifest Destiny and the accompanying notion of the superiority of American democratic egalitarianism to be the underlying principles behind the events that caused the Mexican War. These concepts entailed the vision of a United States expanded to the west coast of the continent in spite of the intervening Mexican territory. ". . . It was clearly America's obligation to overspread the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Only under the American Way could the trackless wilderness be brought into blossom."⁶

The key events that brought about the hostilities were the Texan Revolution and the claims held against the Mexican government by American citizens. The Texans won their independence on April 21, 1836, and there was some desire on the part of the United States government to annex Texas, but the opposition in Congress was too great to make an attempt until 1844. Then, President Tyler and his Secretaries of State, Abel P. Upshur and John C. Calhoun, were able to achieve the annexation of Texas. To the Mexicans, who never accepted the independence of Texas, this was in effect the annexation of their territory. They considered the loss of Texas a blow to their national honor. The dispute surrounding the border of Texas only served to inflame the tension between Mexico and the United States.

The adjustment of claims was the other major area of friction between the two nations. Mexico did not pay the \$2,026,149 in claims she had agreed to pay in 1843, and to many Americans, Mexico should have given parts of her territory to repay the debt she could not pay monetarily.⁷ Repayment with territory was totally unacceptable to the Mexicans, who increasingly came to oppose any settlement with the United States, much less one involving the loss of land.

The United States and Mexico went to war in 1846 because Mexico could not give up her territory without a military defeat that eliminated her ability to resist. The United States, influenced by the necessity of expansion to the Pacific under the concept of Manifest Destiny, was unable to negotiate the peaceful transfer of the Mexican lands. In Bauer's opinion, "if America ever fought an unavoidable war, it was the conflict with Mexico over the delineation of the common boundary."⁸

Samuel Flagg Bemis

In A Diplomatic History of the United States

the author defends Polk's actions by saying that "the United States was not responsible, nation to nation, for the settlement of Texas, nor for the outbreak of the Texan revolution."⁹ Both of the above events were popular, justifiable movements, as was the independence of Texas; Mexico itself recognized it in 1845 when she offered to agree to a treaty with the Republic of Texas as long as the latter would never become a member of the United States. When Mexico informed the U.S. that annexation would be taken as a declaration of war, Polk sent troops to Texas to defend it and positioned the navy off the Mexican coasts. He avoided the policy of inciting the Texans to make war on Mexico, his primary goal being a peaceful settlement of both the boundary dispute and of the claims made against Mexico.

The conflict came when Polk misread the signals from the Mexican government about resolving the differences. The Mexicans under the Herrera government said they would accept a commissioner from the United States to negotiate a settlement; however, Polk appointed John Slidell as minister plenipotentiary to the Mexican government. Herrera could not accept a full minister from the U.S., as this would have been a sign of capitulation to the Americans and would have brought about the loss of his political power. When indeed he was later deposed by General Paredes, the new government continued to reject Slidell, fearing that to acknowledge Slidell as a minister would lead to the government's overthrow. In addition, since neither government was afraid of the United States, there was not much necessity for recognizing Slidell. This was an imprudent policy on the part of the Mexicans, for when it became apparent to Polk that the Mexican government would not negotiate with Slidell, "...he disposed the military forces of the United States in a challenging way. Only the fact that the Oregon question was still pending seems to have prevented Polk from sending a war message to Congress immediately upon learning of the failure of Slidell's mission."¹⁰

Polk could have kept the peace even then by not sending the army across the Nueces, but as his efforts to resolve the problems diplomatically had failed, he ordered the army to occupy the eastern bank of the Rio Grande, thereby preventing the Mexican military from gaining an advantageous position in the area. Once the Mexicans had declared a defensive war and a brief fight between Taylor's and Arista's army had occurred, Polk declared war as a reaction to Mexico's provocation. He could have

avoided the war, but as Bemis indicates "... [he] allowed Mexico to begin [it], and this, too, without any dishonorable action on his part to precipitate it."¹¹

Much territory was added to the United States as a result of the Mexican War. But the new territories inflamed the slavery controversy once again, and their acquisition became the first in a ten-year series of events that led to Southern secession and Civil War. In spite of the immense cost of the latter war, Bemis supports the actions taken by Polk, saying that "... it would be well-nigh impossible today to find a citizen of the United States who would desire to undo President Polk's diplomacy, President Polk's war, and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. . . ."¹²

Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk

Connor and Faulk find the reaction of Mexico against the annexation of Texas by the United States as the cause of war in North America Divided: the Mexican War, 1846-1848. Basically, the war had its roots in the actions of Stephen F. Austin, who petitioned the Mexican Congress to allow him to settle American colonists in Texas. He was allowed to do so under the auspices of the Mexican Federal Colonization Law. The liberal Constitution of 1824 being in effect, the authorities thought it best to encourage colonization to the frontier areas of Mexico. For this reason, Mexico granted land quite freely to colonists; this liberality "... quite definitely provided the impetus for an American migration to Mexico. . . ."¹³ As Connor and Faulk indicate, the Americans settled Mexican northern provinces to get free land and live in a democracy.

However, Mexico did not continue the federal government that was in power when the colonists came into Texas. A shift in regimes ushered in a Centralist government which denied Texans their local autonomy and prompted the start of the Texan Revolution on October 2, 1835. This Revolution was not a rebellion against Mexico but against the Centralist, Santa Anna-led dictatorship that revoked federalism and abrogated the Constitution.¹⁴ When the United States annexed Texas, a surge of nationalism sprung up in Mexico. Although some other factors contributed to the outbreak of war (such as the Centralist government's unwillingness to pay on any U.S. claims made against the previous Federalist government, and two military intrusions made by Santa Anna into independent

Texas by 1842), it was the annexation of Texas that brought about the war. "There can be no question but that the annexation of Texas precipitated a reaction among patriotic zealots in Mexico which produced war-- California, Polk, Manifest Destiny, claims, Nueces boundary notwithstanding."¹⁵ General Paredes, taking advantage of this patriotic fervor, used it as a tool to gain power by overthrowing the Herrera government and then ordering Mexican troops into combat (and thus beginning the war).¹⁶

William E. Dodd

William E. Dodd in an article that appeared in the Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, "The West and the War with Mexico," cites Western and Southern aggression as the primary forces that led to the Mexican War. James K. Polk, a sectional President from the West, defeated Henry Clay on a platform to annex Texas and Oregon for the United States. His candidacy was engineered by the capable Robert James Walker of Mississippi, who had widely publicized the Texas and Oregon plan. Polk remained loyal to his platform once in office, and immediately began hostilities with Mexico to annex territory. Slavery was not a part of this issue, as the goal of the West was to add more states to the union, thereby increasing its stability (a principle postulated by Thomas Jefferson) and extending its dominion over all of North America. The Western interests ruled the White House for four years and were responsible for the Mexican War.¹⁷

John S. D. Eisenhower

John S. D. Eisenhower in So Far From God proposes that the war was provoked primarily by American policies, although both nations were responsible. Mexico was responsible for several aggravations. Santa Anna, the Mexican dictator in and out of power in the period preceding the war, removed the liberal Mexican constitution and in doing so angered the Texans by taking away their sovereignty. The most offensive measures were the taking away of Texan self-government, establishing voting requirements that let only a few vote, and enforcing the abolition of slavery. Also, Santa Anna fought against the Texan rebels during their struggle for independence and was determined to handle them through terrorization. Until he was deposed in 1844, he continued border fighting with the independent Texans, inflaming American hostility toward the

Mexican government and creating a great deal of sympathy for the new Texan republic. And because no Mexican politician could recognize Texan independence and remain in office, diplomatic relations were broken with the United States.

The United States, sympathetic to the Texans in their struggle with the Mexicans, sought to annex the territory and gain it as a state. It was not necessary to engineer public opinion against the Mexicans-- the border terrorization carried on by Santa Anna's regime had polarized the American people against Mexico. The American government remained neutral until Texan statehood, but the people did not, liberally supplying the Texans with manpower and munitions. After Texas was accepted as a state in June of 1845, an army under Zachary Taylor was sent to the area for "defense," a reaction (on the surface) to the many Mexican wrongs against Americans. After taking the Mexican town of Corpus Christi, and after the American minister to Mexico, John Slidell, was rejected by their government, Polk issued his declaration of war. This declaration not only served to determine relations with Mexico, but it possibly settled the dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon Territory: the British were eager to settle once they saw that the United States was serious in its dealings with Mexico. Whether this was an intended effect or not is a question in itself: Mexico could have been the scapegoat for solving the Oregon question as well as a ready outlet to feed the desire for more land in the United States. Mexico was a victim of Manifest Destiny: her northern territories were in the way of the westward expansion, and she was unable, both as a result of corruption and of her devastating war for independence, to control them adequately.

The American people wholeheartedly supported the war, at least for the first year, until the casualty reports began to make themselves known. The American people gave much support to the Texans both before and after Texan independence, and this continued into the war itself, when many volunteers signed up to fight alongside the regular army. The Mexican mistreatment of Americans angered them: Mexico deserved to be defeated. The Mexican people, on the other hand, had a very low morale throughout the conflict; their leaders, especially Santa Anna, had primarily their own interests at heart, not those of the Mexican people, and all knew it. Mexican psychology worked to create the feeling that the people "...were being punished for the ambition and stupidity of their

leaders. The Yankees were merely the agents of evil, sent to Mexico to chastise her."¹⁸ Although many hated the Americans, most swallowed their pride and dejectedly accepted the events as they came.

After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the American public was elated, and the primary debate was not related to guilt over the wartime annexation of so much territory but to the leniency of the Nicholas Trist treaty. Some even recommended the annexation of the entire country of Mexico. The Mexicans, satisfied that they had tried to fight to save their territory, were not a defeated nation. They had lost many lives and much land, but at least their honor was defended and they had been compensated monetarily with \$15 million for the lost territory. The treaty was an acceptable way to rid their country of the Yankees.¹⁹

John D. P. Fuller

John D. P. Fuller refutes Jay's slave-conspiracy thesis in his essay entitled "The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848." He proposes that at the beginning of the Mexican War, the prevalent belief was that territory acquired from Mexico would enter the union with slavery, but after sectional controversies flared up, most Southerners came out in opposition to the acquisition of new territory. Many of those who favored annexation of Mexican lands were slaveholders, but these were primarily in the Southwest and were motivated by Manifest Destiny more than the extension of slavery. The movement against annexation really was not based on the slavery question but on "...the partisan opposition of Whigs to Democratic measures" and New England's diminishing power as the nation grew.²⁰

The question of slavery in any lands taken from Mexico was a contrary force to expansion until it became apparent that slavery would not be taken into Mexican territory and therefore was not a great concern. Almost everyone was opposed to expansion at the expense of the Union, and the sectionalism inflamed by the controversy put a damper on all proposals to acquire new land. But it was gradually realized that the Mexican people were opposed to slavery and that the land was unsuitable for its propagation, and therefore territory taken from it would be free territory upon entry into the Union. Such an expanse of free land would not only block the spread of slavery but would greatly increase the

power of the free states over the slave states. It is here that the South, particularly the Southeast, came out in solid opposition to the acquisition of northern Mexico. Led by Senator John C. Calhoun, the position of the anti-annexation forces was rooted in two main beliefs: that annexation would greatly inflame sectionalism at the expense of the Union, and that the power of the South would be greatly diminished by the annexation of Mexican territory. By the end of the war, two "conspiracies" were seen developing: an anti-slavery drive to annex the entire nation of Mexico, supported by slaveholding Westerners, and a pro-slavery movement not to annex. Calhoun and the latter movement deserve "...not a little credit..." for the fact that Mexico is today an independent nation,"²¹ for without their solid opposition to annexation the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo might not have been accepted.²²

Norman A. Graebner

Norman A. Graebner offers a challenge to the Manifest Destiny thesis in his work Empire on the Pacific. Manifest Destiny is an expanding, undirected concept that does not imply definite geographical goals; it cannot explain why certain areas, especially California and Oregon, were singled out as goals for American annexation. Graebner argues that the expansionist policies that led to the Mexican War were carried out in a very defined manner amidst popular opposition, not in an amorphous, undirected popular expansion. These policies were bent on securing the wealth and commerce of the Pacific Coast for the United States. Popular expansionism ended with Texas; only there was there sufficient American population to claim the territory in the name of westward expansion.

Americans had long known of the great commercial potential of the Pacific Coast, especially of the excellent natural harbors of Puget Sound, San Francisco, San Diego, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. "It was the Pacific Ocean that determined the territorial goals of all American Presidents from John Quincy Adams to Polk."²³ After the annexation of Texas, these ports became the main objectives of Polk's policies. The commercial interests looked beyond the western edge of the continent to the commerce of the Far East. The Mexican War provided the means of obtaining these ports, and many volunteers from the western states fought knowing that their agricultural produce could be sold on the Pacific Coast through overland routes.

Manifest Destiny was not responsible for the War; the conflict occurred when peaceful policies failed to annex the Pacific Coast. Polk's expansionism was geared toward the single goal of a Pacific Coast commercial empire.²⁴

D. E. Livingston-Little

As the editor of Thomas Tenny's war diary, Livingston-Little sees the admission of Texas into the Union as the event touching off the Mexican War. Many other factors contributed to the commencement of hostilities, however. The war had its roots in the policy of Mexico to offer generous tracts of land to settlers, mostly American, because of the unpopulated nature of her frontier. These settlers were given some local autonomy under the federal Constitution of 1824, and they participated in the government in spite of having to become Roman Catholic citizens of Mexico and accept the prohibition of slavery. But in 1833 when Mexico adopted a Centralist Constitution that ended local autonomy, the Texans began a revolution to get free. They won this revolution and their independence, and although Santa Anna recognized it in a treaty, later Presidents of Mexico denied its legitimacy.

Other factors for Livingston-Little that led to war were the difficulty the U.S. had in settling claims made against the Mexican government by Americans; numerous Mexican violations of the 1831 commercial treaty between Mexico and the U.S. (including barring aliens from settling in Mexico's frontier areas, detaining Americans in California in 1840, and ending all trade between the two nations in 1843); and the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Juan Almonte, the Mexican minister to the U.S., when Texas was admitted into the Union. In short, Mexico was almost totally responsible for the War. The Paredes government that came into power in December 1845 "... vowed to defend Texas to the Sabine River. At this point it is sufficient to add only that for the next two years Polk never gave up trying to settle the conflict through diplomatic means."²⁵

Glenn W. Price

Glenn W. Price in the *Origins of the War with Mexico* states that the war was a result of American expansionist policy when policy itself failed in achieving the annexation of Texas. When war did come, Americans had to justify it as a defensive war

because Western Christendom has no provision to justify aggressive violence. Mexico's atrocities were used to justify the conflict; these included her failure to pay on claims made against the Mexican government; the insulting attitude taken by her in dealings with the U.S. government; and her proposals to reoccupy Texas.

From 1825 to 1845, when Americans held out the hope that parts of Mexico, most notably Texas, could be purchased from the Mexican government, the policy towards Mexico was geared toward that end. Numerous representatives were sent to the Mexican government with money to purchase lands, bribe governmental officials, or somehow to compensate the Mexicans in exchange for different territories. By 1840 it became evident that this sort of diplomacy would not be successful. But it represented the attitude held toward Mexicans by Americans: since the Mexicans were seen as being incapable of self-government, Americans carried the notion that liberty could be imposed upon them by the United States if they did not cooperate. Therefore, in dealings with the independent Texan republic the possibility of war to aid them was never very far from the minds of the people of the United States.

Once diplomacy had failed, two conspiracies were organized to gain Mexican territory: one, engineered by the U.S. Consul to Texas Duff Green, aimed not only to add Texas and California to the United States but also other northern provinces of Mexico through the Texan government's establishment of the Del Norte Company. Private corporations would carry out the conquest of two-thirds of Mexican lands, which would then be annexed along with Texas. Although this scheme was disavowed and Green apparently had acted on his own, he was not at odds with the thinking of the day. The other conspiracy, sending Commodore Robert Stockton to the Republic of Texas not only to read but also to manipulate public opinion there into hostility against Mexico, had governmental sponsorship from President James K. Polk. The latter policy was at least effective to a degree, for Texan support was quickly won. This final conspiracy would not gain the territory for the U.S., but it paved the way for war with Mexico. Soon afterwards the army under Taylor was sent to defend Texas against Mexican and Indian invasion, and the clash of arms in the vague boundary area between Texas and Mexico on April 25, 1846, allowed Polk to cry that American blood had been shed on

American soil. Polk had deliberately ordered the army to move on Mexican settlements north of the Rio Grande in primarily Mexican-settled territory to provoke war, which was then formally declared. The first act of war, however, was committed by the United States two weeks earlier on April 12, 1846, when it blockaded the Rio Grande.

The legacy of the Mexican War for Price was the swelling of American pride and self-justification joined by a failing to recognize the Mexicans as a nation. With the acceptance of Manifest Destiny, the Turnerian frontier thesis, and the Monroe Doctrine, the war was not viewed as an international conflict but as a domestic dispute. When political intrigues failed, war was the solution, and this method carried into future policies. To Polk and many other Americans, the Mexicans brought the war upon themselves through their atrocities.²⁶

Otis A. Singletary

Otis A. Singletary in *The Mexican War* writes that although the annexation of Texas was the event that touched off the Mexican War, it was only the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back; both sides had ample reasons for dispute, and talk of war had circulated even prior to annexation. The Mexicans were the resentful victims of Manifest Destiny who inevitably came into conflict with the United States because of the latter's desire for westward expansion. The Mexicans had goaded the Americans into hostility, however. Santa Anna shot prisoners of war during the Texan Revolution, revoking the assurances of an inferior officer that the captured Texans would be treated as prisoners. The above incident, disrespect for the bodies left at the Alamo, and the Mexican war cry of "Exterminate to the Sabine"²⁷ during the Texan campaign had outraged many Americans. Mexican border raids on Texas kept these memories fresh. And finally, Singletary makes one of the few references to the extreme instability of the Mexican government, claiming that it prevented any diplomatic intercourse over the Texan issue; this lack of diplomacy was the key factor that led to war.

Socially, Americans saw the Mexicans as their inferiors and held a deep resentment for them. This was especially strong among the Texans, but was spread to a lesser degree throughout the population. Singletary says that "the intensity of [this feeling of resentment] would be difficult to describe."²⁸ Mexican resentment grew out of the

expansionism to which they fell victim.²⁹

Justin H. Smith

Justin H. Smith in *The War With Mexico* sees the Mexican desire for war with the United States as being the force that brought about the Mexican War. The Mexicans as a people hated the Americans; they feared the gradual annexation of the entirety of Mexico, the U.S. democratic influence, and Protestantism. All of these feelings were based on racism. This racism, fueled by the almost complete cultural dissimilarity between the two peoples, fostered the assumption that Americans were less than men.

Aside from the racial prejudice against Americans, many other factors led to the desire for war. Mexicans perceived that the Americans feared war with them to the point of preventing decisive action. Many Americans saw the war as unjust, and they gave support to this idea; the dissenters would provide internal political opposition. And the U.S. military was not seen as capable of carrying out the conflict. It lacked supplies, men, generals, and ships that would be necessary to defeat Mexico at such great distances from supply bases. The U.S. Navy would be subject to damaging Mexican privateer raids, and it needed many ships to effect a blockade, which would in fact benefit Mexico by protecting its industries.

In contrast, the Mexican army was held in high acclaim. The troops were seasoned from constant revolutions, and their leadership was capable. They could fight a defensive war, putting the burden of supplying a sizable army over vast deserts, high mountains, and other inhospitable terrain upon Washington, while the Mexicans could strike at any time. The United States would have to bear the cost of the war, which it could not do because of a lack of credit and resistance to high war taxes.

The Mexicans counted on significant foreign assistance once at war with the U.S. The anti-Anglo sentiment was not limited to Mexico; numerous Central and South American countries pledged their assistance to Mexico. Theirs was the moral cause, and the animosity of Europe towards the U.S. (particularly of Great Britain and France) would give them superiority. Slavery complicated the foreign aid issue; it was widely held that lands taken by the United States would spread the slaveholding system, further guaranteeing foreign intervention. But it was

the U.S. dispute with Britain over Oregon that seemed to clinch the issue for the Mexicans. Certainly Britain would lend assistance to Mexico for a war with a nation that was attempting to take her territory.

Given the Mexicans' ideas, it is not surprising that they were not interested in continuing diplomatic relations with the U.S. They wanted war, and reinforced by their pride, they provoked the Americans into it. If they had won, Mexico would become a great nation; this was a gamble they were willing to make.³⁰

Richard R. Steinberg

Richard R. Steinberg accuses President Polk of deliberately bringing about the Mexican War in "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845," which appeared in the Pacific Historical Review. Polk had a policy of covert aggression to bring about the War, a policy which was engineered to shift all blame from himself. His first attempt to gain Mexican territory through aggression was to incite Texas to conquer Mexico, and when this failed, Polk sent Slidell on a diplomatic mission to gain redress for American claims against Mexico, a mission which he had intended to fail.

Polk encouraged Texas to begin the conflict by pledging to uphold her territorial claims to the Rio Grande upon annexation. The "disputed" territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande was undoubtedly Mexican; Polk knew the Mexicans would defend it, as they could not passively allow their territory to be taken away. In this manner he could incite a war without taking the blame for it: the Mexicans would have been occupying Texan territory. To accomplish these ends, Commodore Stockton and a number of other unofficial diplomats were sent to Texas to encourage the war and annexation. Texas President Anson Jones among others was not eager to begin a war to further U.S. territorial acquisition; he was satisfied when Mexico recognized Texan independence and declared an end to the hostilities.

After failing to incite the Texans to begin the war, Polk sent Slidell on a diplomatic mission to Mexico to gain compensation due for private American claims against Mexico. This mission was intentionally doomed. Immediately after the annexation of Texas, Polk sent an army under Zachary Taylor encouraged to defend the Rio Grande border. Taylor's orders were made deliberately

vague so that the blame for any hostilities could be pinned on him. However, Taylor refused to occupy the Mexican territory west of the Nueces until explicitly ordered to do so on January 13, 1846. The ensuing clash of arms allowed Polk to cry that "American blood had been shed on American soil," and counting on the widespread popular support for the hostilities, he set out to seize northern Mexico. Having failed in his covert operations to begin the war, Polk aggressively turned to handling the boundary dispute as a means of furthering his expansionist policies.³¹

Nineteenth Century Mexican Historians

Ramón Alcaraz

In The Other Side: or notes for the history of the war between Mexico and the United States, Ramón Alcaraz presents the Mexican side of the problems of the war soon after its conclusion. In a primarily legalistic approach, Alcaraz sees "...the insatiable ambition of the United States, coupled by our weakness [from inexperience in government and a constant state of revolution after independence]. . ." as the origin of the war.³² The United States from its foundation onward sought to expand its territory by any means, through purchase, covert operations, or outright aggression. This national attitude was directly taken from the British, who preferred violence to subdue the natives in their dominion. Mexico stood in the way, and the key event to the loss of its northern territories occurred when Louisiana passed into U.S. control. From that point on, Americans flooded into the Southwest, and with each plot of land they occupied they coveted the next.

Texas was an example of the above. A treaty of limits was passed on April 5, 1831, reiterating the territorial limits of the 1819 Adams-Onís treaty, which nullified all U.S. claims to Texas. [Nathan Covington Brooks calls this treaty one of amity, commerce, and navigation, and does not mention territorial limits.] The U.S. immediately sought to subvert this treaty while the Mexicans held it in good faith. Immediately following the ratification of the treaty, many failed attempts were made to purchase Texas. Then the Mexican government in an internal revolution revoked the federal system of government in its territories, and the U.S. seized the moment to provoke a revolution by the emigrant population in Texas. Not Mexican people in any way, either culturally or even

politically, the Texans used the abolition of slavery and the internal revolution in the Mexican government to justify the revolt. Probably the uprising would have occurred even if Mexico had not revoked the federal government, because the population in Texas was almost completely American in character.

Texan independence had to be fought, as the Mexicans could not passively allow a rebellion. They faced Texans supplied covertly by the United States, which the entire time proclaimed its neutrality in the affair. The diplomatic breaking point came when an army under General Gaines was sent to occupy Mexican soil, under the pretense of protecting against Indian incursions. The Mexican minister to the U.S. packed up and left Washington.

The Mexicans tried to let the matter blow over after Texan independence, and even when its annexation was being argued in Congress, the most that was done was the issuing of a protest saying that annexation would be considered as a declaration of war. It would have been just to wage war immediately on the U.S. when it annexed what rightfully belonged to Mexico, but even this was not done. The Mexicans kept their agreements in good faith. But the U.S. demonstrated its lack of neutrality and its war-making desires by blockading Mexican ports and stationing troops in Mexican territory. Mexico was within its indisputable rights in the whole affair; the United States conducted itself unjustly through a policy of aggression.³³

Carlos María de Bustamante

Bustamante, a deputy to the Mexican Congress from Oaxaca as well as a former soldier and historian, views the Texans who rebelled against the Mexican government as ungrateful; they had been given free land, a suspension of taxes, and the ability to conduct commerce in Mexico. With this they happily established themselves, and Mexico did not gain anything from the colonization process. But they rebelled and set up an independent nation of American citizens; there was not enough time in the ten years or so from the independence of Mexico to the independence of Texas for a generation of Texans to emerge, so those who set up independent Texas had to be United States citizens. Texas could not stand on its own as an independent nation, however; it needed volunteers from the United States to win and maintain its independence, so it cannot be compared to any other newly-independent nation that

liberated itself and then stood under its own power.

Mexico had other complaints about the conduct of the U.S. government. Bustamante cites an example of United States troops aiding in the Texan Revolution (General Gaines' cavalry) as a violation of the neutrality claimed by the U.S. as well as the public organization of armies to send to Texas in United States cities such as New Orleans. "Who, then, provoked the war-- Mexico which only defended itself and protested [the annexation of Texas], or the United States which became aggressors and scorned Mexico, taking advantage of its weakness and of its internecine agitations."³⁴

Twentieth Century Mexican Historians

José María Roa Bárcena

José María Roa Bárcena, in his 1902 Recuerdos de la Invasión Norteamericana, 1846-1848, Por un Joven de Entonces, claims that "our war with the United States was the double result of inexperience and vanity about our own capacities, on the one hand; and of an ambition unconstrained by concepts of justice and of the abuse of force, on the other."³⁵ Mexico's attempts to recover Texas, both during and after its Revolution, with a poorly-equipped army from a great distance away exhibited the inexperience of the nation. The sending of U.S. citizens to colonize Spanish and later Mexican lands was a "... plan by the United States, calculated and executed calmly and cold-bloodedly in a manner truly Saxon" to gain new territory to be added to the United States.³⁶ If Mexico had been prudent, she would have ceased to bother with Texas after 1835 and strengthened her frontiers instead; however, this would not have prevented the annexation of the frontier by the United States in 1848. American aggression was the root cause of the hostilities.³⁷

Carlos Bosch García

For García, the concept of transcontinentalism was the cause of the Mexican War of 1846-1848; the people of the United States, ever interested in expansion, went about it in various ways which opened one door after another until the U.S. occupied the territories once held by Mexico. By 1819, the Adams-Onís Treaty and the Louisiana Purchase had gained Florida and Louisiana; this led to the acquisition of Texas on the Louisiana border, and the acquisition of Texas brought about the

Mexican war in 1846. Transcontinentalism was encompassed in Manifest Destiny, and this later took on a maritime aspect as the United States occupied Cuba and the Panama Canal. It had become a driving force in U.S. foreign policy. What is important is that the territories gained were not gained as a result of overpopulation: the settlers had to pass through much empty land to get to Texas (and later New Mexico and California). The expansion was the result of "the desire to increase the power of the United States and with goals that were speculative and financial."³⁸

Justo Sierra

Justo Sierra cites American aggression as the source of the war in Evolución Política del Pueblo Mexicano. However, the Mexican leaders mismanaged the war for personal gain and prevented successful resistance. Santa Anna was the main criminal in the national betrayal.

The vehicle for the conflict was the Spanish borderlands, the sparsely-populated north of Mexico, which the Mexicans could not hope to control once they were populated by the migrating Americans. Mexico should have simply given Texas away, because it became almost wholly American in composition. This was an impossibility at the time due to racism and ignorance of the effects of holding onto the province. The desire for independence on the part of the Texans was completely understandable, as they had no ties to Mexico and every tie with the United States from whence they came.

The U.S. policy toward Mexico was a product of the South's continual attempts to acquire Mexican lands, seeking to spread slavery. These were done with complete disregard of Mexican rights over her territory. The U.S. claimed part of Texas across the Nueces that had never been a part of it, and marched troops onto Mexican lands before declaring war. Justice was with Mexico, and every nation knew it.

But the Mexican leaders continually undermined the national cause. Santa Anna kept agitating Texas to keep his army in the field (and therefore himself in power), a policy which led to the Texan revolution. General Paredes was sent with the finest troops to defend the northern border and take the offensive in Texas, but he used them to overthrow the Herrera government instead. Santa Anna, upon his return to power, sought to regain his

own glory by leading the army against the United States. "...if the contending factions in Mexico had not converted the question of Texas into a political weapon to disparage each other by mutual accusations of treason, the great calamities could have been avoided."³⁹ If the incontrovertible Texan independence had been recognized, the Mexicans could have retained much of the territory that they lost.

The legacy of invading Mexico has had a disastrous effect on those who attempted it. The Franco-Prussian War came from French intervention in Mexico, and the American Civil War arose out of the acquisition of a vast expanse of southern land. "The war with Mexico was the school for the future generals of the Civil War."⁴⁰

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez

Josefina Vázquez considers several factors as contributors to the Mexican War. Perhaps most important was the expansionist movement in the nation (reflected in the elections of Andrew Jackson and James K. Polk) and the concept of Manifest Destiny. Oregon, Texas, and California were the main objectives of this expansionism, which was justified in many ways: it was called biblical, and was seen as a commitment to spread the freedom and democratic government of the United States across the land.

What also led to the breakdown of the diplomatic process was the difference in attitude that the U.S. government held in relation to the purchase of lands in comparison to that of Mexico. The United States had historically purchased land; Florida and Louisiana were acquired in that manner without great hostility on the part of foreign governments. But to Mexico, the sale of land to the United States was an unpatriotic act that would be a betrayal of the nation; therefore, the negotiations broke down amidst a flurry of insults on both sides. Both the U.S. and Mexico then resorted to force to settle the question.⁴¹

Some Conclusions About the Mexican War, 1846-1848

Clearly, there is no consensus on what caused the Mexican War. Manifest Destiny draws some support as a cause, as do the expansionism of Westerners and the commercialism of Easterners in the United States; Polk's naked aggression, general American expansionism, and the political

inexperience of Mexico are factors often referred to by the Mexican historians. The slave-power thesis provides an alternate but refutable explanation. Only Otis Singletary and Justo Sierra give much importance to the chronic political instability in Mexico in the period from her independence from Spain in 1821 to the outbreak of war with the United States in 1846. This political instability that Mexico suffered from after independence was not unique; other newly-independent Latin-American nations shared a similar fate.

Simón Bolívar in his famous "Jamaica Letter" gives an explanation for the occurrence of political instability that plagued Latin American nations after they attained their independence. Spain's monarchy held absolute sway over the colonies in the New World; her American subjects were not allowed participatory government, even if that participation was under the thumb of the King as subordinate administrators.⁴² Instead, Spaniards were sent to the colonies to govern them, precluding any legitimacy for American rulers-- even autocratic ones-- and setting up fertile ground for the success of revolutions.⁴³ Liberal, constitutional republics like the one maintained in the United States were unsuited to Latin America because, unlike the people of the United States, Latin Americans lacked the experience and political virtues to sustain them in proper equilibrium.⁴⁴ Such a liberal government, based on the equality of man and liberty for all, was installed in Mexico through the Constitution of 1824.

In addition to the adoption of the Constitution of 1824 and the lack of legitimacy for any native Mexican ruler, other factors led to post-independence political instability for Mexico. The army that won her independence remained involved in politics and became a tool for political leaders to enter office.⁴⁵ And while the more conservative elements in Mexican society wanted no social change, liberal elements sought socioeconomic reorganization.⁴⁶ The alternation of power between the two groups with the army always in the middle was a hallmark of the period before the Mexican War.

It was this Mexican political instability in the period from independence until 1846 that was a significant factor in provoking the Mexican War. In fact, of all of the Presidents of Mexico between her independence in 1821 and 1844, only the first one, Guadalupe Victoria, was able to serve out a full four-year term in office.⁴⁷ Some of the often-cited causes of the Mexican War have their origin in the endemic

political instability that Mexico suffered from after she achieved her independence from Spain. Perhaps the most important of these is the Texan Revolution and later the annexation of Texas into the United States. President Johnson wrote that the admission of Texas into the Union was the cause for Mexico's initiating war.⁴⁸

Under the liberal Constitution of 1824, the Mexican Congress passed the Federal Colonization Law, which allowed foreigners to colonize Mexico. The settlers were given large tracts of land: colonists received up to a league in Texas, and up to eleven leagues in California.⁴⁹ These tracts were offered to settlers, mostly American, because of the unpopulated nature of Mexico's frontier. The colonists accepted them in spite of having to become Roman Catholic citizens of Mexico, and they began participating in the federalist democracy.⁵⁰ But the situation at home in Mexico was not stable; the elections of 1833 would spell the death of the participatory democracy enjoyed by the Americans in Texas.

Antonio López de Santa Anna won the elections of 1833 under liberal auspices, and after discovering that being the President was dull, he turned power over to his Vice-President, Gómez Farfás, and returned to his estate in Veracruz.⁵¹ The liberal Farfás, not surprisingly, enacted antimilitary and anticlerical reforms in keeping with his ideology. He shrank the army and abolished the *fueros*, which had kept military men from being subject to civil law. And in debasing the clergy, he attempted to secularize education (including closing the completely clerical University of Mexico); he declared the government's right to assign all clerical positions; he assumed control of the Californian Franciscan missions and put them under secular auspices; and most importantly, he abolished the mandatory tithe.⁵² The conservatives (traditionally the hacendados, the clergy, and the military) reacted vehemently and sought to topple the government. And who would be their champion but the same Antonio López de Santa Anna who had been elected as a liberal? Santa Anna led a coup and repudiated all of the measures taken by Farfás, setting up a regime that "was openly conservative, Catholic, and centralist."⁵³

Santa Anna then revoked the Constitution of 1824 and supplanted it with the *Siete Leyes*, a centralist document that allowed the central government to assign regional leaders and put income requirements on voting and election into political office.⁵⁴ Because of this shift in constitutions, the Texans were deprived of the local autonomy that they

had enjoyed (which was similar to the self-government allowed to a state in the United States), and they began a revolution to get free.⁵⁵ The Texan Revolution began on October 2, 1835, as a rebellion not against Mexico but against the Centralist, Santa Anna-led dictatorship and the "abrogation of the Constitution."⁵⁶ Though the Texans won their independence and Santa Anna recognized it, later Presidents of Mexico denied the treaty of recognition.⁵⁷ This would prove to be a mistake; Roa Bárcena wrote that "Mexico, if it were to have acted with prevision and wisdom, should have written off Texas in 1835 while fastening onto itself and fortifying its new frontiers. It should have recognized as an accepted fact the independence of that colony and, by way of negotiations, should have resolved any differences and settled boundary questions with the United States."⁵⁸ Instead, by 1842 Santa Anna had made two small military intrusions into Texas, inflaming the possibility of the outbreak of war.⁵⁹

When Texas was annexed by the United States, Juan Almonte, the Mexican minister to the U.S., left the country proclaiming that the "joint resolution [to annex Texas] was tantamount to a declaration of war;" however, he had expected to lose his position soon, as he was a centralist appointed by Santa Anna, who had since fallen from power.⁶⁰ In ending negotiations between the two governments, he hoped to discredit the new Herrera government by confronting the United States.⁶¹ Unfortunately, the ending of negotiations also complicated a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

Herrera wanted to settle the question over Texas without going to war, but Texas did not accept his offer of peace with Mexico because they had already decided on annexation into the United States by July 1845 (the Mexican proposal included a proviso that Texas would not seek to be annexed by the U.S.). Amidst opposition from many who wanted war, Herrera then sent word to the U.S. that his government would accept someone to resolve the problems between the two nations; this someone was John Slidell.⁶² However, Herrera could not recognize Slidell as an "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary" without fear of falling from power upon Slidell's arrival in Mexico.⁶³ Both Herrera and his successor, Paredes, told the United States government that "... it had been agreed to receive only a 'commissioner' empowered to adjust outstanding disputes, not a regular minister plenipotentiary to resume diplomatic relations before

everything was settled."⁶⁴ In December of 1845, however, General Mariano Paredes took over the government, gaining support by insisting that Texas be reclaimed, violently if necessary.⁶⁵ "Centralists [Paredes]... used annexation to overthrow the Herrera government and to work large segments of the Mexican population into a war fever."⁶⁶ Paredes then immediately began preparing for war.⁶⁷

Paredes believed that Mexico could win the war. Granted, many things were in Mexico's apparent favor: her troops were seasoned and well-equipped; the army of the United States was only one-quarter the size of Mexico's; and aid was expected from Great Britain due to the conflict between the United States and Britain over Oregon.⁶⁸ In contrast, the American army was filled with volunteers whose combat worthiness was in question, and since Texas was so far from centers of population and supply, logistical support would be difficult (especially for an American army inside Mexico). In addition, Paredes expected the Northern abolitionists in the U.S. to oppose the war and thereby ruin morale. He even went so far as to expect Indians to fight on the side of Mexico and slaves to rebel in the South.⁶⁹ However, the Mexican generals making these assumptions were not chosen on the basis of their generalship. Francisco Bulnes, describing the situation of the Mexican army in 1830, said that because of a fear of falling out of power, presidents would not appoint any general with a good military reputation; such a man would be humiliated if he allowed the president to direct his activities.⁷⁰ As a result, presidents did whatever they could to prevent the development of good military leadership and instead focused on having the generals be their own minions: "... the Presidents Bustamante and Santa Anna demanded of their army chiefs that they be first of all followers of Bustamante or Santa Anna, although they might at the same time have been cowardly or inept."⁷¹ The outcome was that only unfit men were given the top military positions.⁷²

Political instability not only worked against a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Texas; it caused and then made difficult the diplomatic resolution of the issue of claims made against the Mexican government by American citizens. After Mexico gained her independence, she experienced political chaos resulting in an almost constant array of pronunciamientos against the government; these uprisings and conflicts many times destroyed the property of aliens living in Mexico.⁷³ Foreign governments, seeking collection on the claims their

people made against the Mexican government, sometimes skirted diplomatic means to do so. During the time between the closing of the American embassy in Mexico at the end of 1836 and its reopening in 1839, both Britain and France had sent military missions to pressure the Mexicans into settling claims their citizens had made against the Mexican government.⁷⁴

Many other claims arose from Mexican violations of the April 5, 1831, "treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation" (which was ratified later) between Mexico and the United States.⁷⁵ For example, in 1836 Mexico barred aliens from settling in her frontier areas, thus violating the treaty; in an 1840 enforcement of this law some Americans were detained in California.⁷⁶ And in 1843, Santa Anna ended almost all trade with the U.S. and barred aliens from conducting any retail trade in Mexico, again abrogating the earlier treaty.⁷⁷

In 1836, the centralist Mexican minister to the U.S., Manuel Gorostiza, left the country accusing the U.S. of aiding the Texans during their revolution; however, for the previous eight years President Jackson had been trying unsuccessfully to get the Mexican governments to pay the money they owed to American citizens.⁷⁸ Connor and Faulk write that "one may suspect that Gorostiza's diatribe against the United States was motivated in part by the impasse over the claims."⁷⁹ The previous federalist government in Mexico had been responsible for many of the claims, and the centralist government that Gorostiza served under was in power.⁸⁰

The United States attempted arbitration rather than force to settle the claims its citizens made against the Mexican government, and arranged for Baron Roenne, a Prussian, to arbitrate a convention with the centralist government of Mexico.⁸¹ After the eighteen months had run out for deliberation in 1842, \$2,026,139.68 was granted to the claimants (\$4,265,464.90 was not even addressed for lack of time).⁸² The collection of this amount was difficult. A second convention was held on January 30, 1843, to assure Mexico's payment of the money owed, but "Mexico paid only the interest due on the 30th of April, 1843, and three of the twenty installments [sic] of the principal;" a third convention to discuss the remainder of the claims began on November 20, 1843, but bogged down because the Mexican government did not respond to whether it would accept the amendments to the convention that the United States Senate ratified.⁸³ Santa Anna, back in the presidential chair after overthrowing the

government that agreed to have the convention originally, refused to complete his obligation to pay.⁸⁴ By July 1844, because of the furor over Texas, the Mexican press began to criticize the Mexican government for agreeing to the remittance of claims, and applied pressure to stop payment altogether.⁸⁵

Mexican political instability contributed heavily in causing the problems between Mexico and Texas, and it exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the United States by preventing a satisfactory diplomatic solution to the claims that the Mexican government owed the United States. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo included not only the settlement once and for all about Texas, but it also provided a resolution of the claims owed by Mexico to citizens of the United States.⁸⁶ Given the absence of political instability in Mexico and the accompanying problems, the Mexican War of 1846-1848 might not have happened.

Works Cited

Alcaraz, Ramón. The Other Side: or notes for the history of the war between Mexico and the United States. Translated and edited by Albert C. Ramsey. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970.

This source was invaluable, as it was one of the translated Mexican sources that I was able to use. Alcaraz presents a credible point of view and casts a different light on the history of the United States and its relation to the war. He portrays well the Mexican need to defend her honor and, in a somewhat biased manner, legally defends Mexico to the point of being blameless.

Bauer, Karl Jack. The Mexican War, 1846-1848. New York: the MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974.

Bauer takes a rather philosophical approach in explaining what brought about the Mexican War, seeing Manifest Destiny as the force that brought America into contact (and soon conflict) with Mexican territory. The inability of Mexico to back down politically made conflict inevitable. This view is explained well.

Bolívar, Simón. "The Jamaica Letter." Reprinted in Selected Writings of Bolívar volume 1, 1810-1822. New York: Colonial Press, Inc., 1951.

Bolívar's letter gives a good basis for my thesis by explaining why political instability was going to occur in Latin America after the various nations achieved their independence from Spain. This same political instability occurred in Mexico and was a factor in causing the Mexican War.

Bemis, Samuel F. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1955.

Although Bemis presents a defense of Polk's actions, it is not a very logical or credible defense. He says that Polk was primarily concerned with peace, even though he explains that while Polk could have kept peace he took the initiative in battle-- not a peaceful position. He justifies Polk's actions through "the end justifies the means."

Brooks, Nathan Covington. A Complete History of the Mexican War: Its causes, conduct, and consequences: comprising an account of the various military and naval operations, from its commencement to the treaty of peace. Chicago: the Rio Grande Press, Inc., 1965.

Brooks's work is an example of a well-researched, fairly unbiased, nineteenth-century source. It is a credit to the author that soon after the war was concluded, amidst the celebrations, he was still able to maintain a critical view. Brooks blames Polk for the war, writing that he manipulated the tensions between Mexico and the United States to begin war without consulting Congress.

Bulnes, Francisco. Las Grandes Mentiras de Nuestra Historia. Mexico, D.F.: Librería de la Vda de C.H. Bouret, 1904. Reprinted in Robinson, View From Chapultepec, 119-26. Bulnes provides a good assessment of the Mexican military for my thesis on political instability. He was a keen observer of the situation in which only inept generals were given positions in the Mexican army.

Bustamante, Carlos María de. El Nuevo Bernal Díaz del Castillo o Sea Historia de la Invasión de Los Anglo-Americanos en Mexico. Mexico, D.F.: Testimonios Mexicanos, Secretaria de Educación, 1949. Reprinted in Robinson, The View from Chapultepec, 58-74.

Bustamante makes no attempt to be unbiased as he blames the United States for its aggression. To him, the United States took advantage of the weakness of Mexico in beginning the war.

Connor, Seymour V. and Odie B. Faulk. North America Divided: The Mexican War, 1846-1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Connor and Faulk hold Mexico responsible for the war. The key factor was the Mexican reaction to the annexation of Texas by the United States, and this, above all other philosophical concerns such as Manifest Destiny, began the war. This source provides good information in support of my thesis.

Dodd, William E. "The West and the War with Mexico." Reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 39-46.

Dodd presents a good response to the slavery-conspiracy thesis by explaining the war as a result of western policies. He explains how the west took over the White House for four years and added a great amount of western land to the Union without regard to slavery. Pure expansionism was the driving force behind the war. This position seems incomplete; it fails to explain why Mexico, and not Oregon, was singled out as a goal for expansion.

Eisenhower, John S. D. So Far From God: the U.S. war with Mexico, 1846-1848. New York: Random House, 1989.

I used this source to gain the basis of my understanding of the events of the Mexican War. This book is excellently written, and although I disagree that the Mexican War was a result of Manifest Destiny, it is very valuable in that it gives a comprehensive view of the war from its origins to its conclusion and legacy.

Fuller, John D. P. "The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848." Reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 29-38.

In a clear and logical manner Fuller completely refutes the slave-conspiracy thesis, convincingly proving that slave interests were not only free of blame for the Mexican War but that they provided the only real opposition to the movement to annex all of Mexico. This is a very good source that added a critical appreciation to my reading.

García, Carlos Bosch. La Historia de Las Relaciones Entre Mexico y Los Estados Unidos, 1819-1848. Mexico, D.F.: Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas, 1961. Reprinted in Robinson, View From Chapultepec, 185-192.

García sees the concept of trans-continentalism in the United States as the cause for the war. This resulted in the occupation of the territory once held by Mexico after the conclusion of the Mexican War. This is a good Mexican source, less biased than others.

Graebner, Norman A. Empire on the Pacific: a study in American continental expansion. New York: the Ronald Press Company, 1955.

This is one of the better explanations of the forces behind the Mexican War that I have encountered. Graebner refutes Manifest Destiny and explains the Mexican War in terms of the goals of commerce in the United States.

Jay, William. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.

Originally published in 1849, Jay is avid in his anti-slavery stance, and blames the entire conflict on the desire of the South to attain more land in which to spread slavery. There are many problems with this proposal, and when viewed in the light of Fuller's essay, it falls apart.

Johnson, Andrew. The Papers of Andrew Johnson. Edited by Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins. Knoxville, Tennessee: the University of Tennessee Press, 1967.

Johnson agrees with many later writers by proposing that it was the annexation of Texas by the United States that brought about war.

Meyer, Michael C. and William L. Sherman. The Course of Mexican History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

This book provides good information for my thesis and has been quite useful in clarifying this tumultuous period of Mexican history for me.

Price, Glenn W. Origins of the War with Mexico: the Polk-Stockton intrigue. Austin, Texas: the University of Texas Press, 1967.

Price presents a credible explanation of what led to the Mexican War, the failure of policy to attain the desired Mexican lands, without explaining what brought about the expansionism that made the policy. He details two major pre-war conspiracies that attempted to covertly carry out the expansion, and describes some of the racism prevalent in the U.S. This is a moderately useful source, although I consider it somewhat incomplete for reasons described above.

Roa Bárcena, José María. Recuerdos de la Invasión Norteamericana, 1846-1848, Por un Joven de Entonces. Volume II. Mexico, D.F.: Imprenta de V. Agüeros, 1902. Reprinted in Robinson, View from Chapultepec, 44-49.

Roa Bárcena holds Mexico's inexperience as a nation coupled with the United States' blatant aggression as the cause of the war. This is a good Mexican source, albeit a biased one.

Robinson, Cecil. The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War. Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989.

This has been an invaluable book for the research of my thesis. It provides translated sections of Mexican writers' works on the Mexican War, and a number of these sections were used in this paper. It would be a good starting point for research like Ruiz's sourcebook.

Ruiz, Ramón Eduardo. The Mexican War: was it Manifest Destiny? New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1963.

This has been an invaluable source to the compilation of this paper, for it presents a number of different theses on the war in an organized fashion. This should be considered by anyone doing research on the origins of the Mexican War because it not only details the different American schools of thought on the subject, but it also incorporates a German and a Mexican view. It proved to be critical for my research.

Schroeder, John H. Mr. Polk's War: American opposition and dissent, 1846-1848. Madison, Wisconsin: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.

Schroeder's book focuses on the opposition to the war in the United States, but it contains some useful information on the origins of the war.

Sierra, Justo. Evolución Política del Pueblo Mexicano. Translated by Ramón Eduardo Ruiz. Reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 110-116.

Sierra blames the American aggression for the Mexican War, aided by Mexican incompetence. The Mexicans' big mistake was to take so long to recognize independent Texas. He includes an interesting section on the legacy of the Mexican War: anyone who invades Mexico will suffer disastrous effects even if they win. Sierra was one of the few sources to make note of the political instability in Mexico as a cause of the Mexican War.

Singletary, Otis A. The Mexican War. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1960.

Singletary views Manifest Destiny as the driving force behind the conflict; on the surface, both sides had many reasons to dispute, and the annexation of Texas was the critical event that lit the fuse. He also discusses the racism that the Americans held against Mexicans. Singletary was another of the few sources that touched on the political instability in Mexico.

Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico. Volume 1. New York: the MacMillan Company, 1919.

Smith blames the Mexicans for the war, and explains why they made no preparations to fight. He makes a good case for the lack of foreign intervention in the conflict. Smith also discusses the anti-American prejudice that was widely held in Mexico. This provided a counterweight to the theses blaming the U.S., but it seems rather blown out of proportion.

Steinberg, Richard R. "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845." Reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 65-76.

This source accuses Polk of causing the Mexican War after his policies of covert aggression failed. Although it makes sense, Polk could not carry out his policies without support, and it fails to explain why Polk wanted to expand.

Tennery, Thomas D. The Mexican War Diary of Thomas D. Tennery. Edited by D. E. Livingston-Little. Norman, Oklahoma: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1970. The introduction to Tennery's war diary by Livingston-Little contains much good information about what caused the Mexican War. The author proposes that the annexation of Texas coupled with the claims made against the Mexican government by Americans were the causes of the war. This is a credible assessment.

Vázquez, Josefina Zoraida. Mexicanos y Norteamericanos ante la Guerra del 47. Mexico, D.F.: Secretaria de Educación Pública, 1972. Reprinted in Robinson, View From Chapultepec, 196-209.

Vázquez sees the concept of Manifest Destiny and the accompanying expansionism of the United States as the force behind the conflict. When Mexico would not sell land to the U.S. because it was considered unpatriotic, war resulted. This is a good Mexican source and is unbiased.

Notes

¹Nathan Covington Brooks, A Complete History of the Mexican War: its causes, conduct, and consequences: comprising an account of the various military and naval operations, from its commencement to the treaty of peace (Chicago: the Rio Grande Press Inc., 1965), 523.

²*Ibid.*, 102-3.

³*Ibid.*, 104; 13-36, 50-104 passim.

⁴William Jay, A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 32.

⁵*Ibid.*, 1-19, 31-2, 69-73, 121-9, 158-76, 181-95 passim.

⁶Karl Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: the MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), 2.

⁷*Ibid.*, 10.

⁸*Ibid.*, xix; xix-xxi, 1-31 passim.

⁹Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1955), 232.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 237.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 244.

¹²*Ibid.*, 244; 232-244, passim.

¹³Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, North America Divided: the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 3-31 passim.

¹⁷William E. Dodd, "The West and the War with Mexico," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 5 (July 1912), reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 39-46 passim.

¹⁸John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: the U.S. war with Mexico, 1846-1848 (New York: Random House, 1989), 80.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, xvii-xxvi, 8-28, 40-70, 80, 284-291, 369-374 passim.

²⁰John D. P. Fuller, "The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 21 (June 1934) reprinted in Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, The Mexican War: was it Manifest Destiny? (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 30.

²¹*Ibid.*, 38.

²²*Ibid.*, 29-38 passim.

²³Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: a study in American Continental Expansion (New York: the Ronald Press Company, 1955), vi.

²⁴Graebner, Empire, v-vii, 217-228 passim.

²⁵Thomas D. Tennery, The Mexican War Diary of Thomas D. Tennery ed. by D. E. Livingston-Little (Norman, Oklahoma: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), ix-xv passim.

²⁶Glenn W. Price, Origins of the War with Mexico: the Polk-Stockton intrigue (Austin, Texas: the University of Texas Press, 1967), 3-48, 105-130, 139-172 passim.

²⁷Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1960), 16.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 15.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 8-27, 148-162 passim.

³⁰Justin H. Smith, The War With Mexico, vol. 1 (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1919), 58-137 passim.

³¹Richard R. Steinberg, "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845," The Pacific Historical Review 4 (1935) as reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 65-76 passim.

³²Ramon Alcaraz, The Other Side: or notes for the history of the war between Mexico and the United States, trans. and ed. by Albert C. Ramsey (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970), 2.

³³*Ibid.*, 1-32 passim.

³⁴Carlos Maria de Bustamante, El Neuvo Bernal Diaz del Castillo o Sea Historia de la Invasion de Los Anglo-Americanos en Mexico (Mexico, D.F.: Testimonios Mexicanos, Secretaria de Educacion, 1949) reprinted in Cecil Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War (Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989), 66.

- ³⁵Jose Maria Roa Barcena, Recuerdos de la Invasión Norteamericana, 1846-1848, Por un Joven de Entonces vol. II (Mexico, D.F.: Imprenta de V. Agueros, 1902) reprinted in Cecil Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War (Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989), 44.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*
- ³⁷*Ibid.*, 44-45 passim.
- ³⁸Carlos Bosch Garcia, La Historia de Las Relaciones Entre Mexico y Los Estados Unidos, 1819-1848 (Mexico, D.F.: Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Politicas, 1961) reprinted in Cecil Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War (Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989), 187; 185-192, passim.
- ³⁹Justo Sierra, Evolucion Politica del Pueblo Mexicano (Mexico, 1940) reprinted and trans. by Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, Mexican War, 113.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 116; 110-116, passim.
- ⁴¹Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, Mexicanos y Norteamericanos ante la Guerra del 47 (Mexico, D.F.: Secretaria de Educacion Publica, 1972) reprinted in Cecil Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War (Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989), 196-209 passim.
- ⁴²Simon Bolivar, "The Jamaica Letter" reprinted in Selected Writings of Bolivar vol. 1, 1810-1822 (New York: Colonial Press, Inc., 1951), 110.
- ⁴³*Ibid.*, 111.
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 115.
- ⁴⁵Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 297.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷Eisenhower, So Far From God, 377.
- ⁴⁸Andrew Johnson, The Papers of Andrew Johnson ed. by Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins (Knoxville, Tennessee: the University of Tennessee Press, 1967), 362-3.
- ⁴⁹Connor, Divided, 9.
- ⁵⁰Tennery, Diary, x.
- ⁵¹Meyer and Sherman, Mexican History, 325-6.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, 326.
- ⁵³*Ibid.*, 327.
- ⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 328.
- ⁵⁵Tennery, Diary, x.
- ⁵⁶Connor, Divided, 11.
- ⁵⁷Tennery, Diary, xi.
- ⁵⁸Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, reprinted in Robinson, View from Chapultepec, 45.
- ⁵⁹Connor, Divided, 19.
- ⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 20.
- ⁶¹*Ibid.*
- ⁶²*Ibid.*, 21.
- ⁶³John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War: American opposition and dissent, 1846-1848 (Madison, Wisconsin: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 8.
- ⁶⁴Bemis, Diplomatic History, 237.
- ⁶⁵Connor, Divided, 27-8.
- ⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 31.
- ⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 28.
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 29.
- ⁷⁰Francisco Bulnes, Las Grandes Mentiras de Nuestra Historia (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria de la Vda DE C.H. BOURET, 1904) reprinted in Robinson, View from Chapultepec, 122.
- ⁷¹*Ibid.*
- ⁷²*Ibid.*, 123.
- ⁷³Meyer and Sherman, Mexican History, 328.
- ⁷⁴Connor, Divided, 18.
- ⁷⁵Brooks, Complete History, 8.
- ⁷⁶Tennery, Diary, xiii.
- ⁷⁷*Ibid.*, xiv.
- ⁷⁸Connor, Divided, 17.
- ⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 18.
- ⁸⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁸¹*Ibid.*
- ⁸²Brooks, Complete History, 21-2.
- ⁸³*Ibid.*, 22.
- ⁸⁴Connor, Divided, 19.
- ⁸⁵Brooks, Complete History, 23.
- ⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 522.

**"The Ballad of Billie Potts": Robert Penn Warren's
Kentucky Adaptation of Macbeth
Lisa Day Robertson**

Robert Penn Warren often acknowledged the influence of Shakespeare on his life and writing. In conversations with David Farrell during 1980 and 1981, Warren stated that he was "soaked in Shakespeare" from the time he taught graduate courses in Elizabethan and Shakespearean literature (325). In an interview by Floyd C. Watkins, Warren called his teaching of Renaissance, Elizabethan, and Shakespearean courses "the most satisfying courses" to give (267). The influence of Shakespeare on Warren is apparent especially in theme, such as Warren's extensive use of the theme of self-knowledge (Winchell 144), but Warren also uses Shakespearean characterization, imagery, and diction in his work.

Warren's early poetry strongly reflects a Shakespearean influence in form as well as theme, subject, and characterization (Winchell 146). Particular influences from Macbeth are seen in these poems originally included in Eleven Poems on the Same Theme. For example, the early poem "Terror" refers to the "criminal king, who paints the air/With discoursed madness and protruding eye" (286). Obviously, the "criminal king" is Macbeth. The poet persona in "Revelation" has "spoken harshly to his mother," who is "dearer than Duncan" to him (300-301). Mark Royden Winchell asserts that Warren wrote "perverse parodies of Shakespeare" in his fiction (145), and his remark can carry over to Warren's early poetry, particularly Warren's long narrative poem "The Ballad of Billie Potts," published in 1943, one year after Warren's Eleven Poems on the Same Theme. This poem has created a great deal of critical controversy due to Warren's combination of narrative with commentary, but Warren's Brother to Dragons, which uses the same technique, received widespread acclaim as a masterpiece (Strandberg, Poetic Vision 2-6). "The Ballad of Billie Potts" mimics Macbeth to flesh out the characters of a Kentucky folk legend which he heard during his childhood.

Big Billie Potts' wife is a Kentucky frontier version of Lady Macbeth, dominating the action of the narrative from a deceptively passive role. Big Billie Potts seems a king in his region, a man who runs a prosperous inn where the guests are his

subjects. Little Billie Potts seems at first the heir apparent, but he is doomed not to succeed his father. Upon Little Billie's return from the West, his masked identity as an affluent stranger makes him a combination of Duncan, whose death will bring good fortune, and Banquo, whose death is certain because of his unintentional threat to the throne.

Warren also uses setting to add pathos to the characterization and plot. Victor H. Strandberg indicates that the setting of the "land between the rivers" area immediately connotes Mesopotamia, the place of origin for all humankind (Colder 115). Warren emphasizes the importance of the setting through an irregular refrain. The Potts inn is situated in the section between the rivers as an Edenic paradise of safe haven for weary travellers. Its peaceful appearance, however, masks the evil reality inside, much like Dunsinane Castle in Macbeth.

As innkeepers, Big Billie and his wife "beguile the time" (Macbeth 1.5.63) to attract guests just as Macbeth and Lady Macbeth try to trick their subjects. Big Billie and his wife follow Lady Macbeth's advice to create the facade of their inn:

To beguile the time,
Look like the time, bear welcome in your eye,
Your hand, your tongue. Look like th'
innocent flower,
But be the serpent under 't.
(Macbeth 1.5.63-66)

Warren rephrases this speech aptly by calling the Potts' facade an "innocent savagery of Time" ("Ballad" 288), and he describes Big Billie's hidden brutality well:

Big Billie was the kind who laughed but could
spy
The place for a ferry where folks could come
by.
He built an inn and folks bound West
Hitched their horses there to take their rest
And grease the gall and grease the belly
And jaw and spit under the trees
In the section between the rivers.
Big Billie said: "Git down, friend, and take
your ease!"

He would slap you on your back and set you
at his table. ("Ballad" 288)

After bearing welcome in his eye, hand, and tongue,
Big Billie customarily gave his guests a dark
farewell:

"Thank you kindly, sir," Big Billie would say
When the man in the black coat paid him at
streak of day
And swung to saddle, was ready to go,
And rode away and didn't know
That he was already as good as dead....
("Ballad" 273)

Big Billie Potts' wife, however, is the darker,
more dominant figure in the ballad. She fits the
archetype of Eve in this Kentucky Eden. From the
beginning of the poem the reader knows that this
woman is a mystery:

Big Billie had a wife, she was dark and little
In the land between the rivers,
And clever with her wheel and clever with her
kettle,
But she never said a word and when she sat
By the fire her eyes worked slow and narrow
like a cat.
Nobody knew what was in her head.
("Ballad" 271)

This brief, yet tantalizing, character sketch of Billie's
wife foreshadows her part in the tragic conclusion of
the poem and the Potts family. She is the nameless
wife, mother, and instigator in the action of the
poem. Like Eve, she is "clever with her [spinning]
wheel," and her cleverness with her kettle and her
cat-like eyes connote an affiliation with the witches of
Macbeth. John Crowe Ransom calls the Potts family
"a nest of Kentucky rattlesnakes" (211); thus, Billie's
wife becomes both Eve and the serpent because she
provides Billie with the motivation for murder.

After Little Billie flees the area for the West,
having botched a murder attempt of a guest in hopes
that "Pap would be proud and Mammy glad"
("Ballad" 274), Big Billie and his wife fall on hard
times financially. In the climax of the action, Big
Billie's wife convinces her husband to murder a
stranger, a man who looks "like he owned the earth"
("Ballad" 278). The mysterious stranger is actually
Little Billie returned home. Little Billie's appearance

has changed to the extent that he fools a neighbor,
Joe Drew, and Little Billie tells him why he does not
want him to reveal his arrival to his parents:

"...Fer it's my aim
To git me some fun 'fore they know my
name,
And tease 'em and fun 'em, fer you never
guessed
I was Little Billie that went out West."
("Ballad" 278)

Warren uses Joe Drew's character to add
dramatic irony. Through his knowledge of Little
Billie's arrival, Joe Drew is similar to the Porter in
Macbeth, unaware of the importance of what little
knowledge he holds. Joe Drew's knowledge could be
the key to keep Big Billie and his wife out of Hell.
Both characters are connected to a "farmer that
hanged himself on th' expectation of plenty"
(Macbeth 2.3.4-5).

Warren uses the technique of mistaken
identity, perfected by Shakespeare, to add dramatic
irony. When Little Billie goes to the inn and sits at
his mother's table, he succeeds in fooling his parents:
"He joked them and teased them and he had his
fun/And they never guessed that he was the one/Had
been Mammy's darling and Pappy's joy" ("Ballad"
280).

Big Billie's feigned hospitality toward the dark
stranger is parallel to Macbeth's hospitality toward
Duncan. Macbeth conveys his relationship toward
Duncan, which is similar to the father/son and
host/guest relationship in "The Ballad of Billie Potts":

First, as I am his kinsman and his subject,
Strong both against the deed; then, as his host,
Who should against his murderer shut the
door,
Not bear the knife myself.
(Macbeth 1.7.13-16)

By asking for "fresh drincken water," Little
Billie provides an opening which his mother sees
through her cleverness. She conveys murderous
intentions to her husband shrewdly:

And the old woman said: "Pappy, take the
young gentleman
down to the spring so he kin git it good and
fresh?"
The old woman gave the old man a straight
look.

She gave him the bucket but it was not empty
but it was not water. ("Ballad" 280)

Big Billie lacks the intellect to think of this opportunity. His wife, much like Lady Macbeth with Macbeth, gives Big Billie the necessary drive to commit murder by manipulating his greed, both Macbeth's and Big Billie's tragic flaw. Strandberg calls Billie's wife the instigator for taking control of this situation (*Colder* 116). Little Billie's flaw, like Duncan's, is naivete in this situation, even though he should know what his father is capable of doing to strangers.

Big Billie continues to "mock the time with fairest show" (*Macbeth* 1.7.82) until the last moment, telling the dark stranger, "Just help yoreself" ("Ballad" 280), just before delivering the fatal blow of the hatchet. The origin of the hatchet is not disclosed, but Big Billie's wife probably provided it inside the water bucket, as Warren gives the reader the clue that the bucket "was not empty but it was not water" ("Ballad" 280). Big Billie's wife probably could have completed the murder herself because, like Lady Macbeth, she has more greed than maternal love. Otherwise, she probably would have recognized her son. In a sense, Big Billie's wife has psychologically done what Lady Macbeth only claimed she would be able to do:

I have given suck, and know
How tender 'tis to love the babe that milks
me;
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have plucked my nipple from his boneless
gums
And dashed the brains out.
(*Macbeth* 1.7.55-59)

If the Potts tradition had not dictated that Big Billie commit the murder, his wife probably could have been capable of the act, much like Lady Macbeth had to compensate for her husband's inaction. However, Big Billie lacks the foreknowledge Macbeth had shortly before his murder of Duncan. Unlike Macbeth, Big Billie stays in the physical realm and does not think before acting. Macbeth contemplates before his crime, making himself impotent with the plan: "If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well/It were done quickly" (*Macbeth* 1.7.1-2). Big Billie has numbed himself to the act of murder through repetition of the crime. In his attempt to murder Duncan, Macbeth

uses intuition, a typically feminine trait, but he becomes numb and unthinking later: "From this moment/The very firstlings of my heart shall be/The firstlings of my hand" (*Macbeth* 4.1.146-148). This heart-to-hand reaction is exactly the procedure Big Billie has perfected in his years of practicing his murderous craft.

Both Macbeth and Big Billie take advantage of their victims' vulnerability. Just as Macbeth attempts to kill Duncan as he sleeps and plots to kill Banquo in the dark, Big Billie kills Little Billie as makes himself prostrate: "Little Billie gets down on his knees/And props his hands in the same old place/To sup the water at his ease" ("Ballad" 280). Thus, Little Billie's high stature is reversed, and by overpowering this stranger, Big Billie's stature is ironically and temporarily restored. Big Billie and his wife perceive the murder as a mere part of a procedure completed by burying the stranger, their son, "in the dark of the trees" ("Ballad" 280) as well as in the dark of their memories.

Warren adds more dramatic irony with Joe Drew's character as the man arrives at the Potts' house shortly after their escapade, asking them "And whar's Little Billie?" ("Ballad" 281). Joe Drew describes him physically and tells them Little Billie's plans to bring back their luck. Big Billie replies in realization of the significance of the act he has just committed: "I shore-God could use some luck" ("Ballad" 281). He knows now that his luck has run out.

When Big Billie and his wife go to dig up the body of the stranger who may be their son, they once again trade typical gender traits as "she grabbed with her hands and he dug with the spade" ("Ballad" 282). Big Billie's wife's character has evolved into a more masculine character as the poem has progressed. In the beginning of the poem Warren describes her as being "like a cat," but near the river she digs "like a dog," stopping only when her hand is on the corpse's face ("Ballad" 282). By helping her husband dig up the body, Big Billie's wife connects herself physically with the murder, even though Little Billie's life ended because she instigated his murder. Thus, his blood is on her hands, a figurative version of Duncan's blood on Lady Macbeth's hands. Big Billie and his wife both deny the corpse's identity, the tangible evidence of their heinous crime, much like Macbeth tries to deny seeing the projection of his guilt through Banquo's ghost:

Avaunt, and quit my sight! Let the earth hide thee!

Thy bones are marrowless, thy blood is cold;
Thou hast no speculation in those eyes
Which thou dost glare with.

(*Macbeth* 3.4.94-97)

Big Billie keeps asking his wife, "Tell me his name," while Big Billie's wife says, "Ain't Billie, ain't Billie" ("Ballad" 282). She then slips into a stream-of-consciousness recollection of her maternity of Little Billie as a child, before she denounced her womanhood:

And offen his chin I would wipe the spittle
And wiped the drool and kissed him thar
And counted his toes and kissed him whar
The little black mark was under his tit,
Shaped lak a clover under his left tit,
With a shape fer luck and I'd kiss it[.]
("Ballad" 283)

She does not recall a typical mother's memory of a nursing child; instead, she recalls the times when she kissed her son's breast. Billie and his wife identify their son by this birthmark, ironically "shaped for luck," and realize the extent of their collaborative crime. Their regret of their actions is apparent, and they realize that "What's done cannot be undone" (*Macbeth* 5.1.67). At this point, they have ceased beguiling the time as the narrator tells the reader to "heave at the great fall of Time" ("Ballad" 283). Little Billie has become a martyr, pointing out to his parents their evil as well as absolving them of their sins (Strandberg, *Colder* 132-33). They will not be able to pass on their tradition of murder since they have killed their only son, which will probably prevent them from murdering again. Like *Macbeth* and Lady *Macbeth*, Billie and his mate have a "fruitless crown" (*Macbeth* 3.1.62); both couples have no heir to their material possessions or their wicked nature.

As order is eventually restored, the reality of the land between the rivers will eventually return to be more similar to its appearance (Clements 309), much like beauty and peace returns to Dunsinane after *Macbeth's* cycle of crime is finished. The time and the land are freed when the criminals' reigns are over (*Macbeth* 5.8.55).

Warren does not need to include Big Billie and his wife's mental decline as seen in *Macbeth* and Lady *Macbeth's* dealing with the aftermath of their

crime. Warren gives only a simple statement of the effect of Big Billie's reaction to his breach of his son's homecoming: "And the father waits for the son" ("Ballad" 284). *Macbeth's* realization speech is much like Warren's commentary at the end of "The Ballad of Billie Potts":

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day....
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more.

(*Macbeth* 5.5.19-28)

Warren hints to the reader that the couple's torture will continue until their lives end, which presumably won't be long: "The hour is late,/The scene familiar even in shadow,/The transaction brief" ("Ballad" 284). These lines in parallel to *Macbeth's* speech remind the reader that "The Ballad of Billie Potts" can be only a retold version of *Macbeth*.

Robert Penn Warren may or may not have consciously considered the similarities in characterization and plot between "The Ballad of Billie Potts" and *Macbeth*, but, as Winchell indicates, an understanding of Warren's use of Shakespeare can result in a greater understanding of Warren's writing (137). In his conversation with David Farrell, Warren confessed that his writing plans included "a very special kind of book" on Shakespeare (325). Since the Shakespeare criticism never appeared, perhaps he had already done this with "The Ballad of Billie Potts."

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A Brief History of the Abortion Controversy

Marye Stone

Although many Americans are ambivalent about politics and policy-making in this country, abortion is one issue that has gained and maintained national attention over the last twenty years. Most people believed the issue was settled in 1973, when the Roe v. Wade case legalized abortion in the United States. Nonetheless, the numerous Supreme Court decisions on abortion following the Roe v. Wade are proof that even legal abortion is a multi-faceted matter. The moral questions and the controversy surrounding women and their rights to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and now, the rights of an unborn fetus, have kept the abortion issue alive and recurrent in American politics. Analyzing the issue can be difficult because of its consistently turbulent nature. While politicians and even the Supreme Court seem to have shied away from the question lately, abortion will continue to plague the American political agenda until a definitive decision is reached.

To understand fully why the issue of abortion continues to resurface in American politics and policy-making, it is necessary first to examine its history and importance in societies throughout time. Anthropological studies show abortion to have been widespread in the ancient world and in preindustrial societies across the world and throughout history. In Western culture, Greeks and Romans considered abortion acceptable in the early stages of pregnancy.¹

In the United States, abortion was a very popular means of birth control in the nineteenth century. At the height of its popularity, 20 percent of pregnancies ended in abortion. This number is close to today's statistics on abortion in this country. Abortions were often performed by female "abortionists" who were not physicians. The process became very commercialized with abortionists advertising their services locally. This led to the first "right to life" movement by physicians who wanted to eliminate competition with their own medical practices. By 1900 all the states had laws outlawing abortion.²

Between 1870 and 1950 there were as many as thirty thousand legal abortions performed a year in hospitals by doctors, allowed if the pregnancy endangered the mother's life. At the same time there were many more illegal abortions being performed.³ In the 1950s a poll by Indiana University sexologist Alfred Kinsey revealed that nine out of ten pre-

marital pregnancies of the women he surveyed were ended by abortion.⁴

At the same time physicians began to feel uneasy with the responsibilities and consequences of their legal power to perform abortions. They were concerned with the legal ambiguities of their position as arbiters of the necessity of abortion. They were also troubled by the health risks taken by women who had received illegal abortions.⁵ Hundreds of thousands of American women affected by abortion policies were also concerned, but lacked a collective voice in the matter.⁶

This began to change in the 1960s when the abortion issue began to enter the public arena. There was a rise in the number of media "exposes" revealing the horrors of illegal abortion. The 1962 case of Sherry Finkbine (a white married woman, pregnant with her fifth child) brought the issue to the consciousness of middle-class America. Finkbine realized after she was pregnant that her sleeping pills contained Thalidomide, a drug that caused hideous birth defects, and her doctor arranged for a legal abortion. The story was leaked to the press before the procedure was carried out and the hospital where it was to take place was plagued by right-to-life supporters, causing the hospital to back out of the arrangement. Finkbine eventually went to Sweden to have the abortion performed. The attention given to Finkbine's story led to increased overall support for political change.⁷

By the late 1960s, estimates of illegal abortions ranged from two hundred thousand to 1.2 million a year. During this time two coalitions began to form. The pro-life movement strengthened its demand for the right of an unborn fetus to life. Simultaneously, with the growth of the Women's Movement, the pro-choice supporters rallied in support of the right of women to take greater responsibility over their own lives by terminating pregnancies if they so chose.⁸

By the early 1970s abortions had become fairly common in states with major urban centers. Elsewhere women needed money or connections to locate doctors to perform safe abortions, or they had to go obtain certification of danger to the mother's health if the pregnancy was carried to term.⁹

In 1972, the year before Roe v. Wade, almost six hundred thousand women received legal

abortions, mainly in the four states that had repealed their abortion laws: Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington.¹⁰

The political buildup that had been developing over several decades combined with the increased occurrence of abortions created the climate for the Supreme Court decision that changed the makeup of abortion policy in the United States. Jane Roe in the Roe v. Wade case of 1973, based her case on the argument that she could not afford to travel from her home state of Texas to a state where abortion was legal. The Supreme Court legalized abortion nationwide in the Roe v. Wade decision. This remains the basis of abortion policy today, though different aspects of the decision have been changed by subsequent Supreme Court rulings. While the Supreme Court in the Roe v. Wade decision sought to eliminate the patchwork nature that characterized abortion policy in the United States, there has been a recent return to increased power for the states in abortion policy-making.¹¹

In the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court interpreted the constitutional rights of a woman to have an abortion. The Court rejected the argument that fetuses were persons under the Constitution with all the rights of "life, liberty, and property" granted in the fourteenth amendment. It also stated that there is a Constitutional right to privacy, giving a woman the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion herself. The policy expressed the right of the state to protect maternal health, but also noted the right of the state to protect developing life.¹²

Therefore the Roe v. Wade decision set down the following legal guidelines for abortions:

During the first trimester (three months) of pregnancy, a woman's right to decide her future takes precedence over state interests and she may therefore have an abortion. Legal abortions had to take place in consultation with a physician, though.

In the second trimester, the Court said that the state had a compelling interest in the mother's health and that it could regulate the standards for the medical procedure of abortion, but not interfere with the right to an abortion.

During the third trimester, abortion could be prohibited by the states, "except when necessary to

preserve the life or health of the mother." This left the states the right to oversee the last three months of pregnancy and to test the limits of physician's consultation, fetal viability, and other issues.

The Supreme Court stated in the Roe v. Wade decision that abortion could only be prohibited by a state after the fetus was "viable" or able to survive outside the womb. This was estimated to be at about six months of development. The Court used the historic reasoning of English common law that abortion before "quickening" or first feeling of the fetus moving inside a woman was not illegal. The fact that the Court delved into the medical and philosophical issue of when life begins was to become a major force working against abortion policies based on the Roe v. Wade decision.¹³

While initial response to the issue was positive from many, the Roe v. Wade decision was also largely responsible for the growth of a new anti-abortion movement. (In 1973 the National Right to Life Committee was formed.) This represented a unification of most of the state anti-abortion organizations.¹⁴

Before the Roe v. Wade decision anti-abortionists had the benefit of legislative inertia on their side and did not see the need to coalesce nationally. But, once abortion was legal, they had to mobilize politically to fight for their interests. The legalization of abortion also gave a pet issue to the Republican party, as few established Republicans would be alienated by an anti-abortion stance and as the party could attract new members in the form of pro-life supporters.¹⁵

After the Roe v. Wade decision, abortion supporters tended to relax. When a political right has been recognized, political actors understandably expect that the right they have secured will continue without further effort from them. Such actors are in position to fall back on the Court's decision if there are problems in the political arena.¹⁶ The tendency to "rest on one's laurels" resulted in a sloughing off of concentrated effort to maintain legal abortion.

The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade did not remain the definitive policy on abortion, however. The controversy surrounding abortion and under what circumstances it should be allowed have been mainstays in the American political arena, as reflected in the many Supreme Court abortion decisions that have followed the Roe case. These decisions that have supplemented the policy set down

in Roe v. Wade all have contributed to the formation of an increasingly complex abortion policy in the United States today.

Therefore to understand the many facets of American abortion policy, it will be necessary to examine the major Supreme Court abortion rulings that have occurred since 1973. All influence legal abortion procedure in this country. They are:

The Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth decision of 1976 said that the states could not require a husband's consent as a condition for a first trimester abortion.

The Bellotti v. Baird decision in 1976 said that the states could not give parents a blanket veto over abortions by unmarried daughters under the age of eighteen.

Beal v. Doe and Maier v. Roe in 1977 upheld the right of the states to refuse to spend public money on abortions for low-income women when they are not necessary to save a woman's life.

Colautti v. Franklin in 1979 struck down a state requirement that a physician try to save the life of a fetus.

A further interpretation of Bellotti v. Baird in 1979 said that, as an alternative to parental permission for minors, if a minor could show a court that she was mature enough to make the decision herself or that the abortion was in her best interest, she could be granted a legal abortion.

Harris v. McRae in 1980 held that it is constitutional for the federal government to limit Medicaid funding to abortions which are necessary to save the mother's life. This limitation has been stipulated by Congress every year since 1977 under the Hyde amendment, which eliminated Medicaid funding for abortions, but not for childbirth.

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health in 1983 struck down an "informed consent" regulation, which requires that a physician tell his patients that a fetus is a human being from the moment of

conception, to describe the fetus' physical development and to list all the possible physical and emotional consequences of having an abortion.

In 1986 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists struck down a state requirement that the doctor use the same degree of care in aborting a fetus that he would use in delivering it and that he use the abortion method providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be born alive. This decision also struck down the state's informed consent regulation, saying it was an attempt to dissuade women from abortion, and struck down a reporting requirement on the grounds that it violated the confidentiality of medical records.¹⁷

These decisions helped define abortion policy more comprehensively in the United States, but national interest in the abortion issue was not heavily revived until the Webster v. Reproductive Health Services case in 1989. This decision, which was based on the argument that life begins at conception, ruled that the states—not the national government—should decide whether or when women should be allowed to abort their fetuses. It succeeded in bringing the abortion issue in the United States to a head nationally and brought on the remobilization of the pro-choice movement.¹⁸ The pro-abortion activists had relaxed their defenses while the pro-life movement gained strength and the Supreme Court became more conservative. Nationally determined abortion regulations became multiple state-legislated policies. With the poles reversed, political inertia was once again on the pro-life side.¹⁹

The Webster case was also different from other Supreme Court abortion cases in that it represented a removal of a right already granted to women. Only rarely has the Court done this. Yet by allowing the states to formulate their own abortion policy in 1989, the Supreme Court created a return to the pre-Roe world in which women would have to travel to states with favorable policies to receive an abortion. Such a policy had the most adverse effect on poor women who could not afford to travel to have abortions.²⁰

Another effect of the Webster case was on political leaders. After the Webster decision, a USA

Today poll found that 38 percent of the people surveyed would judge political candidates on their abortion views. This was twice as many as before the Webster case. State politicians have felt most of the burden of the issue because of their new responsibility in the matter. Many of them have modified their previous platforms to accommodate the growing importance of the abortion issue. There is an overall reluctance, however, on the part of politicians to take a stand on the abortion issue because of the strong reaction it evokes from both sides.²¹

Overall the Webster decision influenced public sentiment in favor of abortion. Psychology Today reported in October 1989 that public sentiment began to rise in approval of abortion and in disapproval of the decision. A Gallup Poll taken after the decision showed that 55 percent of those polled were in favor of abortion, with 37 percent opposed.²²

Abortion has been one of the key issues that has pulled people away from the Democratic party. Political analyst William Schneider states that the Republicans gained the right-to-life voters by endorsing an anti-abortion stance, but, "by failing to deliver on the abortion ban the GOP escapes the wrath of those, including many Republicans, who would deeply resent such a measure." This advantage is starting to slip as state politicians are forced to take a stand on abortion. At the same time, the Democrats have tried to lure Republican women who support Planned Parenthood and abortion and younger libertarians away from the GOP.²³

Despite indicated general approval of legal abortion in this country, the Supreme Court has continued to test the limits of national abortion regulation. In the 1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision, Court justices upheld a three-year-old regulation that bans discussion of abortion in federally funded clinics. This regulation does not forbid women to seek counseling on abortion in non-governmental facilities, but it does narrow the scope of information given to poor- and low-income women using Title X-funded clinic services. The Rust decision forces Title X clinics to decide whether to continue counseling women on abortion and thus to forfeit funding or to abide by the Rust regulation. The fact that four million women rely on this funding creates a serious question for the clinics.²⁴

Some clinics will choose to forfeit their funding so that they can discuss abortion, arguing that not telling a woman what her options are is unethical. Women still have a constitutional right to an abortion and the clinics opposed to the "gag rule" imposed by

the Rust decision believe that this rule violates that right. They also argue that the Rust rule breaches the doctor's First Amendment right to speak. The clinics fear that women will not understand their rights if abortion is not discussed. The Supreme Court was bitterly divided over this issue, but Chief Justice William Rehnquist spoke for the majority when he stated that, "The Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. It has merely chosen to fund one activity in exclusion of another."²⁵

Currently, the Supreme Court has the Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania case before it. At issue is a 1988 Pennsylvania law requiring minors to obtain parental consent and married women to notify their husbands before having abortions. The law also requires physicians to inform patients of potential medical complications from the procedure and it mandates a twenty-four-hour waiting period before an abortion is performed.²⁶ Some of these stipulations are identical to ones struck down by the Court over the nineteen years that have elapsed since Roe v. Wade.²⁷

Because a decision should be forthcoming by late June or early July of 1992, this case and the abortion issue may well play a key role in the 1992 presidential election. Pro-choice supporters are hopeful that a pre-election decision will become a political liability for President George Bush. An early ruling could be divisive for his party since Republicans that are pro-choice might vote against the G.O.P.²⁸

Even if the Court does not overturn Roe v. Wade directly, it may use the Pennsylvania case to chip away at the landmark decision. By upholding the Pennsylvania law, the Court would allow state legislatures to surround legal abortion with heavy restrictions. In that way, legal abortion could be effectively eliminated without being banned outright.²⁹

Legal abortion does have a direct correlation to reduced death and procedural complications by abortion, an important fact to consider when forming policy on the issue. Angela Bonavoglia stated in her book The Choices We Made that "of the 1.6 million legal abortions performed annually in the U.S. only 6 women die from the procedure. In contrast, approximately the same number of abortions are performed in Mexico, where abortion is illegal, but 140,000 women die annually from the procedure." Even though the number of abortion-related deaths has dropped since 1973, there is still disagreement on whether legalized abortion has improved women's

health overall. In his book Aborted Women: Silent No More David C. Reardon contends that the number of abortions performed since 1973 has risen dramatically, resulting in a higher number of complications. He claims, "Though the odds of any particular woman suffering ill effects from an abortion have dropped, the total number of women who suffer and die from abortion is far greater than ever before."³⁰

The American public is constantly bombarded with such conflicting statements as these that increase confusion and indecision about abortion. While the media most often highlights those people who have formed strong emotional opinions on the subject of abortion, many Americans do not seem to know what to think about the abortion issue. Polls both before and after the Webster decision found a clear majority of Americans willing to call the procedure "murder," yet that same majority still wants abortion to remain legal. In a 1989 Los Angeles Times poll, 74 percent of those polled agreed with the statement, "I personally feel that abortion is morally wrong, but I also feel that whether or not to have an abortion is a decision that has to be made by every woman for herself." The Times called this question "the key to understanding the overriding attitude of Americans toward abortion."³¹

Attitudes such as these, combined with the many Supreme Court abortion decisions, show that the issue has many complex layers that need to be addressed by American policy makers. While progress has been made in covering the different areas of the issue, the fact that the debate came to a head originally in Roe v. Wade, which combated state-legislated abortion policy, makes the Webster decision and the current state of policy seem like a return to ground zero. As Susan Kennedy of the National Abortion Rights Action League, known better as NARAL, pointed out in 1989, "Abortion wasn't invented in 1973 with Roe v. Wade, and it won't go away with an adverse decision in Webster."³²

Examination of the pre-Roe abortion situation proves that a national policy is needed that will firmly make an abortion decision once and for all. State ruled abortion decisions have proved discriminatory against young and poor women who are less able to travel to places where abortion is legal. Policies such as Webster that allow state-governed abortion legislation send a message to the American people that the nation as a whole does not know how to or does not want to deal with abortion. Ironically, while

the nations with which this country feels the most kinship, Canada and the European countries, have been on the forefront of abortion reform, the United States seems to be shying away from the issue. During the last two decades, at least sixty-five nations or sub-national jurisdictions have liberalized their abortion laws while only a few (including the United States) have restricted the grounds for abortion.³³

Medical advances assure the deepening of the complexity of the abortion issue in the future. Doctors are now able to save premature babies weighing as little as one pound, though there is no evidence to support the right-to-life claim that the date of viability could be earlier than twenty-three- to twenty-four weeks of development. The development of the "abortion pill" RU-486, which is available in France, may make it possible to terminate an early pregnancy at home. This and further progress will change the scope of the abortion issue even more, assuring continued debate and policy re-evaluation in this country.³⁴

An issue as complicated as abortion therefore calls for strong national leadership. While the subject will continue to elicit strong public sentiment, the Supreme Court could set aside some of the controversy by upholding a woman's right to privacy and to the control of her own body through a reaffirmation of the Roe v. Wade decision which legalized abortion nationwide. Such a ruling would demonstrate that policymakers in the United States are realistic enough to accept that, despite attitudes, policies, and laws both for and against it, abortion has always and will continue to exist.

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**Joyful Endurance: Medical Care in Kentucky
in the Early Nineteenth Century**
Paula B. Trafton

If a man (hunter) took a cold the remedy was to drink down a half pint or pint of bear's oil -- the quantity depended upon the capacity of a man's stomach, then lay down before a log fire in the woods, wrapped up in his blanket and if it snowed three or four inches deep on him in the night it was all the better, and when he awoke in the morning and shook the snow off of his blanket as the lion would the dew drops from his mane, the man was well of his cold, and fully prepared to take up his rifle and renew the hunt.¹

Such was the remedy that a frontiersman in Kentucky used to treat the common cold. Medicine in the late 1700s and early 1800s was frequently a home affair with domestic medicines applied without the guidance of a qualified physician. Remedies such as mustard plasters, sassafras, sulphur and molasses, rhubarb and the like were often used to cure the ill. Home treatment and self-medication were the rule in times of illness. Women typically played the role now filled by doctors--binding up wounds, treating fevers, and delivering babies.² In the early 1800s, however, a change occurred with regard to the quality of medical care in Kentucky. The influx of large numbers of settlers and the diseases they brought with them as well as those inherent to the area provided a greater need for physicians. This paper will look at the early physician -- his education, his remedies, and some of his achievements in meeting the medical needs of Kentuckians.

The earliest form of medical training was a two- to four-year apprenticeship with an established physician known as a "preceptor." Under this arrangement the student assisted his preceptor in his practice and performed various duties for a fee. In turn the preceptor provided his student with such theoretical knowledge as he possessed and with practical experience.³ The fee varied with the physician; Daniel Drake's father paid \$400 to Dr. William Goforth in 1800.⁴ This fee included room and board, with the preceptor furnishing all the books and equipment required. The student read basic texts and performed simple chores. Gradually, he assumed

more responsibilities, such as assisting in office calls, bloodletting, opening abscesses, and dressing wounds. In the second phase of the program the student accompanied the doctor on house calls, known as "riding with the doctor,"⁵ and sometimes assisted in surgeries. Upon the completion of the term of instruction the new physician received his certificate to practice medicine.⁶

By 1795 there were only three medical schools in the nation: the University of Pennsylvania (est. 1765), King's College in New York (est. 1768), and Harvard (est. 1783).⁷ A fourth, the Medical Department of Transylvania University, was instituted in 1799. A grant by the Virginia General Assembly in 1780 had resulted in the establishment of Transylvania Seminary (renamed Transylvania University) in Lexington. Thus, Transylvania University and the Medical Department had the dual distinction of being the first university and medical school west of the Alleghenies. Two professors, Drs. Samuel Brown and Frederick Ridgely, became the first professors of medicine in Kentucky. Dr. Brown received the sum of \$500 from the trustees of the University to procure a medical library. Accredited courses began in the fall of 1817 with twenty students in attendance. The department offered courses in Anatomy and Physiology, Theory and Practice of Medicine, Materia Medica and Botany, Obstetrics and Diseases of Women and Children, and Chemistry. Eighteen twenty-five saw the largest medical class in Transylvania's history -- 285 students. By the time of its dissolution in 1859, the Medical Department had enrolled a total of 6,456 students and awarded 1,881 M.D. degrees.

The entrance requirements for medical schools in the early nineteenth century were not stringent by today's standards. At Transylvania there were only three requirements: the student had to be twenty-one years of age, had to be of good moral character, and had to have been in an apprenticeship program for two years. If the student had not been in such a program at the time of his matriculation, he had to attend two annual sessions at the medical school. Otherwise, the requirement for a medical degree was one four-month session⁸ extending from November 1 to February 28. A student attended lectures six days a week. He paid \$15 for each professor's ticket, \$5

ticket, \$5 for a matriculation and library pass, a \$5 dissection fee and a \$20 graduation fee. After satisfactorily passing a comprehensive examination and completing a thesis bearing on some branch of medicine, the student began to practice medicine as an accredited physician.⁹

The Medical Department of Transylvania University was beset with internal factions and external opposition for much of its existence. Professors often argued over methods and therapies. Clinical experience was not available to students. There were no hospitals in Lexington, only the Kentucky Eastern Lunatic Asylum. Cadavers were difficult to obtain for dissection. Conflicts would arise with the town when students exhumed bodies from the local cemetery. Finally, the decline of Lexington's economy together with the growth of Louisville's economy led to the establishment of the Louisville Medical Institute in 1833, with the first session beginning in 1837. Clinical teaching took place at the Louisville Marine Hospital.¹⁰ Competition existed between the two schools, but in the 1840s both the Transylvania Medical School and the Louisville Medical Institute ranked just behind the University of Pennsylvania as the largest medical schools in the country.

Daily life in Kentucky in the 1800s was harsh. Infectious diseases such as mumps, measles, whooping cough, scarlet fever, smallpox, and diphtheria existed on the farms and in villages and towns. Endemic illnesses including tuberculosis, malaria, and dysentery plagued the state. Influenza and pneumonia claimed many victims during the fall and winter months. According to Dr. Benjamin Dudley, the "ten forms of autumnal fever arising from vegetable and animal putrefaction, the different states of pulmonary fever, from a catarrh [nose and throat disease] to a consumption, diabetes, hepatitis, enteritis, gastritis, dropsies, rheumatism, venereal, etc., are the diseases most common in Kentucky."¹¹ Epidemics such as typhoid in 1805, yellow fever in 1822, and Asiatic cholera in 1833-35 struck many areas in Kentucky. Another disease, "milk sickness," which was found in backwoods areas, was one of the most terrifying of all pioneer illnesses.¹² Rivers and highway systems carried diseases. River towns such as Louisville were built over ponds, and during the summer months these towns were favorite breeding places for mosquitoes.

It was to these health care issues that the new physician came. His short medical education no doubt left him ill-prepared to treat the pains and

illnesses and diseases of the townspeople. There was no laboratory analysis with which to diagnose diseases nor was there any knowledge of disinfection. According to William G. Rothstein, "nineteenth century physicians were ignorant of the causes and means of contagion of diseases, the relationship between their theories of medicine, their therapies, and the actual disease states had no scientific basis."¹³ His home served as his office, and he had little in the way of office medical equipment. His medical bag contained few instruments: simple syringes, a hot-water bottle, a lancet, a set of tooth forceps, and a few obstetrical instruments. By the 1830s he may have carried a stethoscope. He also carried both herbal and patent medicines with him. The physician prepared his own pills and tinctures. He often had to travel great distances to visit the sick, usually on horseback over mud and swamps and swollen streams. He traveled alone and at all hours, day or night. During epidemics, many people, including some doctors, fled the towns; yet many physicians stayed and were subjected to the same illness that was killing hundreds. Richard H. Shryock claims, "one of life's little ironies for the doctor, moreover, was the fact that it was often in his charitable work that he ran the greatest risk from contagion. This risk was very real, especially in times of epidemics, and the mortality among doctors was high."¹⁴

Physicians in the nineteenth century adopted several methods of treating diseases. One was the practice of bloodletting. This method stemmed from the theory that there are four body fluids -- blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm -- in a body's system. Man's normal constitution represents a balance of these body fluids, or "humors"; it is an imbalance of these humors that causes problems. In the event of illness blood depletions rid the body of these excess or impure fluids. The physician typically used a lancet on the vein of the patient's arm but in some cases took blood from the foot. The quantity of blood taken depended upon the physician. Some physicians advocated bleeding until unconscious, arguing that "the effect produced was more important than the quantity of blood extracted."¹⁵ Other physicians believed that extreme bleeding was not desirable. Bloodletting became a panacea for all inflammatory fevers, problems with the intestines, bladder, stomach, throat and eyes. It was also used for rheumatism, coughs, and headaches as well as wounds, burns, bruises, and fractures. Consequently, bloodletting was a popular

treatment for every conceivable illness.

Purging and the use of emetics were other methods for ridding the body of impurities. In many cases purging and emetics were used concurrently with bloodletting. John C. Gunn claims: "I bled him copiously, puked and purged him. . . ."¹⁶ Physicians administered medicines to cleanse the stomach and bowels by producing vomiting or acting as extremely powerful laxatives. A popular yet controversial medicine was calomel, a chloride of mercury. Once in the intestine, it broke down into highly poisonous components, which irritated and purged. It too, became a panacea for almost every illness. However, the side effects of calomel were, in some cases, disastrous. Even small doses could cause death. According to John M. Scudder, the most common cumulative side effect of calomel was that it affected the teeth and mouth: "the teeth would loosen and rot, causing them to fall out, the upper and lower jaw-bones would exfoliate (peel off in layers) and rot out sometimes, and parts of the tongue and palate would be frequently lost."¹⁷ The effect of purgatives on the patient's system was debilitating and dehydrating in the extreme. Many physicians, however, continued to administer them despite their side effects.

Medicinal drugs, both natural and chemical were an important part of a physician's remedies. Indians provided much of the information regarding native herbs and roots. A typical remedy for bleeding ulcers was as follows:

In the case of a bloody flux, take about two pounds of the inner bark of the white oak tree, taken off near the root on the north side, the bark there being the thickest and strongest; put the bark in an iron vessel with a gallon of water, boil it down to a quart, then take out the bark and add a quart of new milk and a lump of sugar about the size of a duck egg, boil that down to a quart; when cooled it is fit for use.¹⁸

According to Gunn, God had provided the frontier with mountains, fields, and meadows with "simples" for healing diseases without the use of foreign articles (chemicals).¹⁹ Herbs and plants that had medicinal virtues abounded in the region, and Gunn encouraged their use. Medical books with domestic remedies were available to both the physician and the common

man.²⁰ Patent medicines were available to the Kentucky physician, but many of the medicines would have to be ordered from the East, sometimes months in advance.

The primary forms of surgery performed in the early nineteenth century were amputations, treatment of superficial wounds, and removal of growths. Physicians could handle fractures and dislocations, but any complicated surgery risked infection. Surgery was often a last resort, since the risks following the operation were dreaded as much as the operation itself. However, as early as 1809 a physician in Danville, Kentucky, did what no other physician had done in the nation -- he performed the first ovariectomy.²¹ Dr. Ephraim McDowell had been practicing for fourteen years when he received a call to help a Mrs. Crawford who lived sixty miles away from Danville.²² Dr. McDowell rode on horseback to Mrs. Crawford's home, only to find that instead of being pregnant, she had a tumor in her ovary. Dr. McDowell informed Mrs. Crawford that excision of the diseased mass would be her only relief. Although he had never attempted the procedure before, he explained to her that he would be willing to undertake it with her consent. Without the operation her prognosis would be another two years of life filled with pain and misery. Mrs. Crawford agreed to the surgery, and they traveled by horseback to Dr. McDowell's home, where he preferred to do the surgery. Without using any anesthesia (ether and chloroform were not introduced until 1846 and 1872 respectively), Dr. McDowell made a nine inch incision in her abdomen. He described the procedure in the following manner:

The tumor then appeared full in view, but was so large that we could not take it away entire. . . . we then cut open the tumor, which was the ovarium. . . . We took out fifteen pounds of a dirty, gelatinous-looking substance; after which we cut through the Fallopian and extracted the sac, which weighed seven pounds and a half. As soon as the external opening was made, the intestines rushed out upon the table and so completely was the abdomen filled by tumor, that they could not be replaced during the operation, which was terminated in about twenty-five minutes. We then turned her upon her left side, so as to

permit the blood to escape . . . we closed the external opening with the interrupted suture.²³

Mrs. Crawford was up and around after five days and returned home after twenty-five days. Indeed, Mrs. Crawford lived another thirty-two years after her surgery. It took a tremendous amount of courage on both their parts,²⁴ and Dr. McDowell has been credited with being the "father of ovariectomy." Thus, Kentucky has the honor of being the first state in which surgery of that magnitude was performed.

According to Shryock, "the medical care of Negro slaves was perhaps the most distinctive phase of Southern practice."²⁵ Since slave owners had an economic interest in their slaves, they felt a personal responsibility in maintaining their health. Shryock goes on to say that perhaps the slaves received more care than did the southern "poor whites" or the northern laborers.²⁶ Slave owners called upon physicians to treat the illnesses of the slaves, sometimes performing surgeries. Indeed, Dr. McDowell reports in his "Three Cases of Extirpation of Diseased Ovaries" that two of his early ovarian operations were performed on Negro women.²⁷ In addition, Dr. Walter Brashear of Bardstown, who performed the first successful hip-joint operation in America,²⁸ operated on a seventeen-year old mulatto boy. However, some physicians, such as Dr. Benjamin Dudley, noted that blacks appeared to be susceptible to a different type of consumption than the whites. He attributed the black consumption to the conditions under which they were forced to live -- "improper ailment, scanty clothing, exposures at night to cold in rambling about from place to place, filthiness, and etc." -- and argued that attention should be directed to the removal of these conditions.²⁹ Thus, Kentucky physicians demonstrated concern for the medical needs of all whom they encountered, regardless of color.

With all the modern medical technology that abounds in the world today, it is difficult to imagine how a physician functioned in the early 1800s. With no X-ray or proper surgical equipment, no laboratory analysis, and no sterilization techniques, the early nineteenth century physician was at a distinct disadvantage. Countless doctors stood by and watched as members of their communities died needlessly due to the lack of adequate knowledge and effective remedies. The fact that many physicians were able to overcome these obstacles makes their

accomplishments even more remarkable. They exhibited courage, endurance, dedication, and even an innovative spirit, when needed, in meeting the health care needs of their fellow men and women, both white and black. Dr. J. J. Polk, who served in Perryville in the dual role of physician and minister, perhaps sums it up best:

Day and night brought calls from the sick and dying. . . . I rode all day, and frequently returned home weary, but to start out again through darkness and rain or cold to spend a sleepless night. Such are the toils and hardships of the faithful physician. Yet I loved them -- I endured them joyfully; for certainly there can be no greater earthly bliss than to administer to the comfort of our fellow-beings -- to restore, under God, health to the sick, or, when human skill is exhausted, to point the dying individual to the great Physician of Souls.³⁰

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Notes

¹Samuel Haycraft, A History of Elizabethtown, Kentucky, and Its Surroundings (Elizabethtown, KY, 1921), 151.

²Ibid. See also John H.I. Ellis, Medicine in Kentucky (Lexington, KY, 1977), 2.

³Ellis, Medicine, 3, comments, "Whether the student was well or ill trained depended on the ability and conscientiousness of his preceptor."

⁴See Charles D. Drake, ed., Pioneer Life in Kentucky: A Series of Reminiscent Letters from Daniel Drake, M.D., of Cincinnati, to His Children (Cincinnati, 1870), 232, in his letter December 20, 1845: "I was to live in the doctor's family, and he was to pay four hundred dollars, provided I remained, as it was expected I would, four years: . . ."

⁵So William G. Rothstein, American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science (Baltimore, 1972), 86.

⁶For example, Daniel Drake's diploma reads as follows: "I do hereby certify that Mr. Daniel Drake has pursued, under my direction, for four years, the study of Physic, Surgery, Midwifery. From his good abilities and marked attention to the prosecution of his studies, I am fully convinced that he is well qualified to practice in those Branches. Signed, Wm. Goforth, Surgeon General, 1st Division, Ohio Militia, Cincinnati, State of Ohio, August 1st, 1805." See The Work Projects Administration, Medicine and Its Development in Kentucky (Louisville, 1940), p.118.

⁷Some aspiring physicians also attended the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, which was recognized as one of the top medical schools in the world. One such individual was Ephraim McDowell, whose pioneering surgery on a Kentucky woman will be discussed below.

⁸In 1820 Daniel Drake called for the extension of the course of medical study to five months. See Henry D. Shapiro and Zane L. Miller, eds., Physician to the West: Selected Writings of Daniel Drake on Science and Society (Lexington, 1970), 161. Drake, Pioneer Life in Kentucky, 232, notes that prior to entering medical school, "I had looked into the medical books of my cousin and found them so learned, technical and obscure, that I was convinced my education was too limited."

⁹Becoming an "accredited" physician did not, of course, guarantee that the individual had met high academic standards. Joseph F. Kett in The Formation of the American Medical Profession (New Haven, 1968), vii, comments that "Historians have found little to say in defense of medical standards in the 1820 to 1860 period. Medical schools were bad, sometimes incredibly bad." Indeed, some self-professed doctors, skilled in Indian practices, would claim college-bred doctors were "regular man killers," see Haycraft, A History of Elizabethtown, 153.

¹⁰The hospital was established in 1817 "to take care of those engaged in navigating the Ohio and Mississippi rivers (who) owing to the fatigue and exposure incident to long voyages become sick and languish at the town of Louisville. . . ." See The Work Projects Administration, Medicine and Its Development, 152.

¹¹ Benjamin W. Dudley, "A Sketch of the Medical Topography of Lexington and Its Vicinity" (doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1806), 16. Dudley was one of the earliest professors of Anatomy and Physiology in the Medical Department at Transylvania University. He distinguished himself by performing 225 lithotomies with only three fatalities.

¹²Dudley, "A Sketch of the Medical Topography," 24, states that cows often fed on poisonous herbage, such as the white snakeroot. Nursing calves, as well as persons who consumed the milk, butter or flesh of the stricken animals, would become comatose and die. Those who were lucky enough to recover never regained normal health.

¹³Rothstein, American Physicians, 41-42.

¹⁴Richard Harrison Shryock, Medicine in America: Historical Essays (Baltimore, 1966), 69.

¹⁵Rothstein, American Physicians, 46.

¹⁶John C. Gunn, Gunn's Domestic Medicine, or Poor Man's Friend 9th ed., Xenia, Ohio, 1837), 181.

¹⁷John M. Scudder, The Eclectic Practice of Medicine (revised ed., Cincinnati, 1870), p. 388, quoted in Rothstein, American Physicians, 51.

¹⁸Haycraft, A History of Elizabethtown, 151-2.

¹⁹Gunn, Gunn's Domestic Medicine, 13.

²⁰For example, Gunn, Gunn's Domestic Medicine; James Ewell, The Medical Companion (Philadelphia, 1816); John W. Bright, The Mother's Medical Guide; A Plain, Practical Treatise on Midwifery and the Diseases of Women and Children (Louisville, 1844); Henry Wilkins,

The Family Advisor: or, A Plain and Modern Practice of Physic; Calculated for the Use of Families Who Have Not the Advantages of a Physician, and Accommodated to the Diseases of America (New York, 1814); and John Wesley, Primitive Physic: or, An Easy and Natural Method of Curing Most Diseases (New York, 1814).

²¹According to Dudley, "A Sketch of the Medical Topography," 20, "the diseases of females constitute a very great part of the maladies with which physicians have to contend in Kentucky."

²²It was not unusual for women to be reluctant to call in a physician. For example, Dudley, *ibid.*, comments: "The many ignorant old women of the country, who pretend to a knowledge of a particular department in surgery, and who are called on more from a delicacy of the patient's feelings, than from a conviction of their qualifications to perform the duties of a surgeon, leave but too many proofs of the impropriety of their whiskey stews, their other nostrums, and their precipitate conduct in relieving the sick; and so long as the female class of the citizens refuse to adopt the customs of populous countries and large cities, so long must they be the prey of many distressing complaints, which by proper attention might have been avoided."

²³Ephraim McDowell, "Three Cases of Extirpation of Diseased Ovaries," Electric Repertory and Analytical Review (Oct., 1816), reprinted in J. N. McCormack, ed., Some of the Medical Pioneers of Kentucky (Bowling Green, KY, 1917), 18-19.

²⁴See Mrs. Arthur Thomas McCormack, "Our pioneer Heroine of Surgery -- Mrs. Jane Todd Crawford," The Filson Club Quarterly, 6 (April, 1932), 109-123. Mrs. McCormack argues that Mrs. Crawford deserves equal fame as the heroine in the monumental surgery. Mrs. McCormack worked diligently for a memorial for Mrs. Crawford -- in 1932 the road on which she and Dr. McDowell rode for sixty miles was named "The Jane Todd Crawford Trail" in her memory.

²⁵Shryock, Medicine in America, 63.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷McDowell, "Three Cases of Extirpation," 19; see also David W. Yandell, "Pioneer Surgery in Kentucky," The American Practitioner and News, X (July 5, 1890), 3-5.

²⁸Yandell, "Pioneer Surgery", 1-3.

²⁹Dudley, "A Sketch of the Medical Topography," 20.

³⁰J. J. Polk, Autobiography of Dr. J. J. Polk (Louisville, 1867), 39. Dr. Polk was a practicing physician before he attended medical school at Transylvania. He realized after attending several important cases that "the application of remedies -- there was the rub!" (36). He attended the medical school,¹ and within four months "the long cherished desire of my heart was realized -- I was a physician" (36). Polk kept a record of his cases; he attended 14,000 cases of sickness and 825 births.